A Blog by Jonathan Low

 

Jan 2, 2020

Boeing's Response To Automation Failure: More Automation

Boeing claims pilots are not as well trained as they should be so the company's response is to automate even further, which presumes those doing the automating are better at what they do than those doing the flying. And if you believe that...JL


Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel report in the Wall Street Journal :

Boeing is increasingly committed to transferring more control of aircraft from pilots to computers after two crashes exposed flaws in an automated system on its 737 MAX that overpowered aviators in the disasters. Boeing and other makers of planes believe more-sophisticated systems are necessary to serve as backstops for pilots, help them assimilate information and  provide immediate responses to imminent hazards. Such changes seek to address that average pilots may not react to problems—including those tied to automation—as proficiently as designers assumed
Boeing is increasingly committed to transferring more control of aircraft from pilots to computers after two crashes exposed flaws in an automated system on its 737 MAX that overpowered aviators in the disasters.
Executives at Boeing and other makers of planes and cockpit-automation systems for some time have believed more-sophisticated systems are necessary to serve as backstops for pilots, help them assimilate information and, in some cases, provide immediate responses to imminent hazards.
Now, such changes also seek to address the fact that average pilots may not react to problems—including those tied to automation—as quickly or proficiently as designers traditionally assumed, according to former and current Boeing officials and industry executives. The view took hold after a flight-control system known as MCAS put two MAX jets into fatal nosedives within the past 14 months that together killed 346 people.
We are going to have to ultimately almost—almost—make these planes fly on their own,” then Boeing Chairman Dave Calhoun said in a CNBC interview in November. Mr. Calhoun will become the plane maker’s chief executive Jan. 13.
While the MAX’s problems stemmed from a misguided design of automation, many engineers and airline executives remain confident that properly devised computerized features have proven extremely reliable and will prevent accidents. They cite the safety benefits of everything from automated engine adjustments to computer-controlled landing maneuvers that are more precise and predictable than any pilot commands.Over the years, Boeing rival Airbus EADSY 1.43% SE has tended to devise systems where pilots are trained to let automated systems handle emergencies, and company executives say that approach will continue.
Executives at Boeing and Airbus have said they are also designing flight-control systems tailored for younger pilots, who generally have less flying time in their logbooks—and a more innate familiarity with technology—than aviators of years past.Airbus recently unveiled touchscreens designed by France’s Thales SA for its A350 wide-body aircraft that permit pilots to operate them using finger swipes. Airbus is pursuing additional automation for single-pilot aircraft and enhanced computer-controlled responses to midair collision warnings, according to officials at the company and in the industry.
Boeing also plans to tailor its design and training to better serve the more globally diverse group of pilots now flying its planes, said former and current company officials familiar with the plans.
Engineers predict an expansion of automated safeguards including, possibly, artificial intelligence to assist pilots. “Such features are certainly going to have a greater role in air carrier cockpits,” said Alan Diehl, a former military and civilian accident investigator who was one of the first automation specialists for the Federal Aviation Administration.
Some of the new systems Boeing and other companies are working on are designed to maintain stable flight while pilots troubleshoot in moments—like those during both MAX crashes—when crews face cascades of emergency alerts and warnings that can be confusing or contradictory.
“Automation can help by verifying that pilots are doing the right things, and then helping them all the way through” an incident, said Kevin Hiatt, a former airline captain and industry safety executive.
Boeing and Airbus have been automating some aspects of flight for decades, innovations that have helped make aviation the safest mode of transportation. From early versions of autopilots to the introduction of automated landing systems and cockpit layouts dominated by video screens, computers have steadily gained control of commercial flight.
Boeing test pilots have boasted at air shows about the ability of some company jets to automatically compensate if an engine stops working at takeoff.
Beginning in the 1980s, Airbus devised what is called fly-by-wire automation to prevent accidents. No matter what commands pilots give, under normal circumstances, computers on board won’t let them turn a plane too sharply or raise the nose to too steep an angle. Boeing, by contrast, traditionally designed automated systems that could be overruled by crew commands.
That distinction started blurring long before automation-gone-haywire overpowered two MAX crews. Boeing has crafted extensive fly-by-wire applications, some beyond the control of pilots.
Now Boeing is rethinking how to tailor more-sophisticated automation without forsaking its pilot-centric design approach, said the current and former company officials with knowledge of the company’s plans.
“We’re also going to take a look at the pilot-machine interface on our airplanes in designing that for the next generation, as technology is rapidly evolving,” then-CEO Dennis Muilenburg said at a congressional hearing on Boeing’s role in the MAX crashes in October. “We are investing heavily in that area, future flight deck design.”
While manufacturers say automation fosters safety, some aviation experts harbor concerns. Studies have shown that undue reliance on automation can degrade manual flying skills, or make pilots less decisive in emergencies. The MAX tragedies also show how automated features can backfire if they malfunction, said Mica Endsley, an industry consultant and former chief scientist for the Air Force.
“Engineers get very enamored with their automation,” Ms. Endsley said. “When we assume it’s perfect, then we don’t design” necessary defenses for pilots, she said.
Boeing’s automation projects include an electrically powered cargo plane that would fly without any aviators on board. Before the second MAX crashed in March, the company said it had completed the initial test flight of a totally autonomous prototype vehicle that can take off and land vertically.
Some of the most potent automation is first surfacing in private or recreational aircraft. A number of models allow pilots at the push of a button to have computers maintain speed and altitude while they pore over emergency checklists. Other models automatically head for a designated airport in case of pilot incapacitation.

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