Ground Drones Have Rapidly Assumed A Leading Role In Ukraine's Offensives

Ground drones or robots or UGVs (uncrewed ground vehicles) have, in a matter of months, gone from an interesting technological experiment to become a leading element in Ukrainian operations, particularly on the offensive.

Initially identified as a supremely useful tool for logistics along the drone dominated front, they were quickly employed effectively for reconnaissance and then, not just in leading prior to infantry in attacks but being transported behind Russian lines to assault strong points. The Ukrainians are now talking openly about deploying as many as 50,000 of them by early next year. And just as Russia's casualty and recruitment problems worsen. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

In Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi, the widescale employment of Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs) is transforming land combat. The emergence of a broad range of functions for UGVs, and their employment at scale, (signals) the rise of Robotic Ground Combat. UGVs are breaching Russian obstacles as part of the doctrinal approach of SOSRA – suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, assault – in combined arms offensives. A range of other functions conducted by UGVs during Operation Vivaldi include reconnaissance for humans and other UGVs; electronic warfare; deception operations and sowing confusion in close and deep fights; kinetic strike through exploding UGVs and using UGV-mounted grenade launchers and other weapons; mine laying and minefield clearance; logistic support; attacking Russian logistic resupply routes to fix or isolate enemy positions; flank security; and, casualty evacuation.

Eight years ago, I published this report about human-machine teaming with the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. My report explored UGVs and proposed a strategy for their development within Western military forces. The main reason I wrote this was that I was concerned we were not leaning into the learning and development of autonomous systems in the ground environment. As I wrote back then:

By the middle of the 21st century, ground forces will employ tens of thousands of robots, and the decisions of human commanders will be shaped by artificial intelligence. Although the future is impossible to predict, trends in technology and warfare make this a near certainty. Military organisations must plan now for this new era of warfare. Governments must be prepared for the political, strategic, and ethical dimensions of this shift in the character of war.

Recent developments in Ukraine, such as Operation Vivaldi, has seen the widescale development and employment of Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and is transforming the character of land combat. Indeed, we might now describe the emergence of a broad range of functions for UGVs, and their employment at scale, as the rise of Robotic Ground Combat. This is land combat that features the massed integration of UGVs into combined arms manoeuvre, and their teaming with humans and traditional military hardware to undertake missions across the spectrum of land operations from reconnaissance to close combat to security to logistics.

What is occurring now in Ukraine represents the first Generation of Robotic Ground Combat. This article provides a short history into how this situation came about, the current state of the art in Robotic Ground Combat, the potential trajectory for subsequent generations of Robotic Ground Combat, and how Western military institutions might learn and adapt.

The Robotic Ground Combatant Cometh

A lot has changed since I wrote these words in 2018. And things have changed even faster than I anticipated.

The most profound shift since 2018 has been the wide-scale application of autonomous, semi-autonomous and remotely controlled systems in the war in Ukraine since February 2022. Although new UGVs emerged in the first two decades of the 21^st century, the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has accelerated things. We are witnessing a Cambrian explosion in uncrewed systems in the air, on land and at sea.

In the past two years, developments in land uncrewed systems have expanded in scope and developments of new UGVs has increased in speed. There has been an expanded use of them as remote-controlled bombs by both sides (the Russians have used old tanks in this role), as well as in surveillance, mine laying, resupply and casualty evacuation.

Ukraine’s initial forays into battlefield land systems add up to a battle lab effect. It is another aspect of the larger adaptation battle which is taking place across multiple domains in and around Ukraine. Battlefield experimentation, some formal and much of it informal, over the past couple of years has provided insights into the applications of uncrewed ground combat systems, the variety of capabilities needed to make them feasible in the land environment such as power, sensors, propulsion, running gear and weapons, as well as how they might force changes to land tactics.

One prominent early experiment was the Battle of Lyptsi in December 2024. The Ukrainians attacked Russian positions near the village of Lyptsi, which is in Kharkiv oblast. The assault employed dozens of UGVs and FPV drones. The ground vehicles were tasked with several different missions, including surveillance, mine clearing and direct fire using machine guns. The UGVs were apparently supported throughout the activity by FPV drones. While this doesn’t make the attack fully autonomous – the vehicles need human operators – it is one of the more significant examples of drone combat in this war.

This combination of ground and aerial recon-attack capabilities means that the operation was in effect an air-land operation. But it was probably one that was very different to that envisioned by the architects of the Cold War era Air-Land Battle doctrine.

Small battles like those in Lyptsi, as well as logistics and casualty evacuation missions along the frontline in the past two years, has informed the deployment of successive models of UGVs for the Ukrainians (and Russians). But recently, another event has highlighted the role of UGVs in modern land combat and provided insights into how they are becoming an essential component of combined arms teams – and successful offensive ground operations.

Vivaldi: Four Seasons of Robotic Ground Combat

Image: Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps

In September 2026, the Ukrainian armed forces officially revealed the ongoing campaign to push back Russian gains on the eastern front around Lyman, which it called Operation Vivaldi. In his updates about the operation, the commander of the 3^rd Corps described Russian units that “lost control and surrendered in groups, along with their officers, drone pilots, and artillerymen.”

The Russian units involved came from the 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies, including the 3rd, 144th and 67th Motor Rifle Divisions and the 11th Tank Brigade. Operation Vivaldi disrupted and probably stopped the Russian plans to conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from the Lyman and Dobropillya directions. You can read a good brief from the Institute for the Study of War on the importance of this Fortress Belt at this link.

Vivaldi also liberated Ukrainian areas from Russian occupation, provided a morale boost for Ukrainians, and demonstrated that offensive manoeuvre is possible in eastern Ukraine. This dimension of the Ukrainian counteroffensive – the return of offensive manoeuvre – matters just as much as the Ukrainian territory liberated over the last couple of months. The 3rd Corps reorganised its command and control before the offensive began, and it used drones to execute deep operations by striking Russian fuel pipelines and supply depots in depth, while also employing uncrewed ground vehicles extensively to support the infantry, and deployed ground-based radio beacons to keep its drones flying through heavy GPS jamming.

President Zelenskyy has highlighted the role of UGVs being employed by Ukraine. “Replacing our soldiers with ground robotic systems whenever possible is a highly promising area at present,” he said, adding that this element made it possible to accomplish a great deal. Back in April, he ordered the supply of 50,000 UGVs to Ukraine’s military.

The 3rd Corps has released information on several important aspects of UGV integration into ground operations during Operation Vivaldi:

First, they described how 3rd Corps re-roled heavy bomber drones as motherships to carry UGVs to the flanks and into the rear of Russian positions to suppress enemy drones and drone operations centres as part of shaping for subsequent phases of battle.

Second, 3rd Corps released a synopsis of how it employed UGVs to support infantry operations as well as provide logistic support. This is an important video because it shows the integration of UGVs into modern combined arms operations – not totally replacing combined arms.

Third, a video about the employment of breaching UGVs and their integration into offensive operations was released by the 3rd Corps. Once again, UGVs are spreading their wings into additional missions but breaching Russian obstacles as part of the doctrinal approach of SOSRA – suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, assault – in combined arms offensive operations.

A range of other functions conducted by UGVs during Operation Vivaldi have filtered out through different sources. These missions include reconnaissance for humans and other UGVs; electronic warfare; deception operations and sowing confusion in the close and deep fights; kinetic strike through exploding UGVs and using UGV-mounted grenade launchers and other weapons; mine laying and minefield clearance; logistic support; attacking Russian logistic resupply routes to fix or isolate enemy positions; flank security; and, casualty evacuation.

Operation Vivaldi is a large, real-time experiment and proving ground for integration of UGVs into traditional land formations. New doctrines for the employment of UGVs, and the sharing of these new tactical and operational methods, are crucial to Ukraine liberating its territory. Every Western military should be watching these developments. Offensive operations are a central capability for military forces. The ability to conduct offensive operations is also a crucial element of any nation’s strategic deterrent.