The Backstairs Kremlin Maneuvering To Succeed Putin Has Already Begun

Putin is 74 years old. He shows no signs of fading or of giving up power. But like most dictators, he is surrounded by a cadre of largely faceless men - and they are all men. This is intentional both on his part and theirs. 

He will brook no rivals or pretenders to the throne. And his courtiers are well aware that promoting themselves through public recognition will quickly lead to an 'accidental' fall from a high window. But behind the scenes they are maneuvering so as to be in the best position when he either dies, falters due to age or his misadventures in Ukraine and elsewhere finally catch up with him. All, though, are acutely aware of Kremlin history, particularly after Stalin's death, when the subordinate considered least capable and least likely to succeed Stalin actually won. His name was Nikita Kruschchev. JL

Raj K reports in Medium:

In dictatorial systems, the dictator behaves as if he is immortal, while the courtiers around him constantly look to fill the power vacuum. Putin' inner courtiers are already preparing for the world after him and the battle of succession. Stalin sowed distrust among his companions, leveled accusations of conspiracies against them, and tested their loyalty so no one could build power around himself. Putin is on the same path today. As he turns 74, his body weakens and his contact with the real world fades, he will resort even more to fear, cruelty, and war to maintain his power. The model for the system after Putin is drawn from the power struggle that took place after Stalin’s death in March 1953 when a fierce battle took place among Lavrentiy Beria, Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Nikita Khrushchev, in which Khrushchev, regarded as ordinary, surprised Russians by having Beria killed, and then pushed the remaining rivals to the margins and seized supreme power.

The biggest contradiction of dictatorial systems is that the dictator behaves as if he is immortal, while the courtiers around him constantly look to fill the possible power vacuum.

Putin is approaching 74. As this dictator's time at the top grows, the number of people in the corridors of the Kremlin who believe in the claims of any magical “elixir” or eternal youth keeps shrinking.

On the surface, it may look like complete peace and unbroken loyalty, but Putin’s inner courtier system is already preparing for the world after him, that is, for the battle of succession.

But Putin is neither preparing a successor nor does he currently intend to. He runs a system in which the moment a successor's name is mentioned, the ruler loses relevance.

Many people ask: in which direction will power turn after Putin, and which players are currently at the forefront of this hidden race?

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To understand Putin’s current political behavior, it becomes essential to look at Soviet history, especially the final phase of Joseph Stalin’s rule.

Putin sees himself as a great historical hero who, like Stalin, wants to show that he is the only alternative.

In his final years, Stalin did not declare anyone his successor. Stalin deliberately diminished the stature of his colleagues, such as Vyacheslav Molotov.

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stalin-molotov-kremlin-meeting Credit: AI-generated image

Molotov was considered the natural successor, but Stalin first arrested his wife, then publicly humiliated him and pushed him out of the Politburo.

Stalin often sowed distrust among his companions, leveled accusations of secret conspiracies against them, and tested their loyalty so no one in the corridors of power could build a center of power around himself.

There is no doubt that Putin is on the same path today. In 2008, Putin experimented with a power swap with Dmitry Medvedev, which, in his experience, was enough once.

Dmitry Medvedev, Putin Photograph: Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP

He does not want to weaken his position again by formally making anyone his “number 2”.

Putin does distribute administrative and financial resources to those close to him, but he keeps the most important tool of power — the siloviki (security agencies) and the legitimate monopoly on violence — completely concentrated in his own hands.

He is building a system that can run by itself, but with the steering wheel remaining only in his hands. In Putin’s Russia, there is an unwritten but strict rule: no official will promote his own “politics”.

In Russian bureaucratic terms, “politics” means personal PR or the display of future ambitions.

Whether it is a powerful federal minister or the governor of a vast region, if the media even starts discussing anyone’s personal political rise or his possible succession to Putin, the official’s PR team immediately gets busy suppressing it.

Officials have to repeat on every public platform that they are only the President’s soldiers, that their work is only to fulfill assigned responsibilities, and that they have no independent ambition.

The main reason is the FSB's (Federal Security Service) extensive surveillance.

Every high official of the Kremlin knows very well that his phone is being tapped and that every meeting of his is being monitored.

Detailed “dossiers” or files on the financial scandals, benami (proxy-held) properties, and secret transactions of every top official are already prepared.

The system tolerates an official having a file of black money. Still, if even the slightest clue of mobilization or political coordination as “an alternative to Putin” is found in any file, then his political and personal downfall is certain.

The blow that fell on military commanders after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion has multiplied this fear many times over.

According to the Russian Constitution, if the presidency becomes vacant for any reason, the Prime Minister assumes the role of acting President.

This is why, in this future race, the Prime Minister by default has the strongest starting position. At present, Mikhail Mishustin holds this post.

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Acting Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin Image by Kremlin ru

However, for Putin, Mishustin is not part of his inner circle; he is a temporary manager.

Putin can replace the Prime Minister with a single signature, without dissolving the entire government.

The 2020 constitutional amendments have given the President the freedom to remove the Prime Minister whenever he wants.

We should also note that when Mishustin turned 60 in March, Putin did not give him any state medal, whereas industrialist Suleiman Kerimov was immediately awarded a medal on his 60th birthday.

Putin did not even publicly congratulate Mishustin. Despite this, Mishustin continues to show complete discipline and repeatedly affirms unwavering loyalty to the President.

But as far as I believe, Mishustin can never take Putin’s post. If there are any other contenders, they could be Sergei Sobyanin and Sergei Kiriyenko.

Sobyanin is the powerful mayor of Moscow and has been associated with Putin since the 2000s. If something happens to Putin in the near future, a coalition of large financial and administrative stakeholders can form around Sobyanin. But his age, 68, goes against him.

On the other hand, Kiriyenko has built an administrative machinery for Putin’s authoritarian structure that is almost impossible to change.

He has created a system that trains hundreds of thousands of civil servants and controls ideology, media, and culture.

But in the traditional tug-of-war going on between the Kremlin administration and the security agencies (FSB), Kiriyenko often finds himself in the crosshairs.

Security officials believe that Kiriyenko’s people make paper plans, while the real work of control is possible only through fear and repression.

The children and supporters of Putin’s old companions—known as the “Cooperative Ozero” group—have now taken top positions in the government and state companies.

Dmitry Patrushev: the son of Putin’s most hardline and powerful companion, Nikolai Patrushev (age 75).

He rose to Deputy Prime Minister after stints at the FSB Academy, VTB Bank, Gazprom, and the Ministry of Agriculture.

Boris Kovalchuk: the son of Putin’s closest friend Yuri Kovalchuk, and now the head of the Accounts Chamber.

Denis Manturov: close to Rostec chief Sergei Chemezov (who had worked with Putin in Dresden) and controls the country’s entire industry.

As a dictator grows old, the influence of those who control “access to the body” increases disproportionately compared to the major ministers of the state.

Those who decide when he sleeps, wakes, travels, and meets become the real centers of power.

In this category, the most powerful person is 54-year-old Alexei Dyumin. Dyumin was once Putin’s personal bodyguard and chief adjutant.

He led the special military operation to extract Viktor Yanukovych from Ukraine in 2014 and played an active role in the annexation of Crimea.

Putin can remain in power for another 10 years as well, but the biological reality of aging cannot be avoided.

In Leonid Brezhnev's final years, the Soviet people had grown accustomed to his faltering steps, unclear speeches, and fascination with medals.

The people had become emotionally cut off from power, and the entire society had begun living in an era of political jokes (anekdoty). Putin does not want to look ridiculous like Brezhnev; he wants people to fear him.

Therefore, as his body weakens and his contact with the real world fades, he will resort even more aggressively to fear, cruelty, and a frenzy of war to maintain his power.

The model for the system after Putin is often drawn from the power struggle that took place after Stalin’s death in March 1953.

After Stalin’s death, a fierce struggle took place among Lavrentiy Beria, Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Nikita Khrushchev, in which Khrushchev, who was regarded as ordinary, first brought everyone together, had Beria killed, and then, in the next 2 years, pushed the remaining rivals to the margins and seized supreme power.

But among Putin’s courtiers, there is no Khrushchev-like aggression or Beria-like cruel courage; therefore, it is unlikely that, as soon as Putin goes, someone like Khrushchev will have his rivals shot and seize power.