Mezha Media reports:
The Russian army’s summer offensive campaign in 2026 failed to deliver the strategic breakthrough the Kremlin expected. After a sharp increase in the intensity of fighting at the beginning of summer, the pace of advance began to slow, while the area of captured territory has barely grown for the second consecutive month. Heavy losses did not provide the Russian army with proportional progress deeper into Ukraine’s defenses. This may indicate the gradual depletion of its offensive potential. "The summer offensive did not gain operational momentum, and there was no breakthrough of Ukraine’s defenses."The battlefield has entered a dangerous pause: Russia is paying heavily for limited gains, while the next season could reshape pressure on Ukraine’s fortified Donbas belt.
The Russian army’s summer offensive campaign in 2026 failed to deliver the strategic breakthrough the Kremlin had expected. After a sharp increase in the intensity of fighting at the beginning of summer, the pace of advance began to slow, while the area of captured territory has barely grown for the second consecutive month.
According to BBC.
Ukraine’s General Staff recorded the highest number of combat engagements in early July – up to 270–290 per day. By early September, that figure had fallen to approximately 220 battles a day. The hottest areas remained around Kostiantynivka and Dobropillia in Donetsk region.
Russia’s Offensive Is Losing Momentum
According to open-source analysts from the DeepState project and the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces captured between 235 and 270 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory over the summer. That is nearly four times less than during the same period in 2025.
Other indicators of the summer campaign point to the high cost of Russia’s offensive:
- according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russia has captured nearly 990 square kilometers since the beginning of 2026;
- Ukraine has liberated approximately 820 square kilometers;
- irrecoverable Russian army losses in July and August amounted to approximately 40,000–43,000 troops per month.
Heavy losses did not provide the Russian army with proportional progress deeper into Ukraine’s defenses. This may indicate the gradual depletion of its offensive potential. At the same time, Russia continues to hold the initiative in most areas of the front, primarily in Donetsk region.
The aggressor’s summer offensive did not gain operational momentum, and there was no breakthrough of Ukraine’s defenses.
– Viktor Kevlyuk
Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, called the current situation the most favorable for Ukraine since 2023. At the same time, he warned that Russia had not abandoned its offensive plans and that months of heavy fighting could still lie ahead.
Dobropillia and the Defense of Donbas’s Fortified Belt
After the loss of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian units concentrated significant forces on defending Dobropillia – the last major city in the western part of Donbas. Russian troops approached its outskirts from the south and east.
Ukrainian soldiers confirm that several Russian assault groups infiltrated the area around Hannivka. At the same time, reports that they have established positions there remain unconfirmed.
Another objective of the Russian command is to cut the Dobropillia–Kramatorsk highway. If successful, this could complicate the supply of Ukrainian forces defending the line of fortified cities consisting of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka.
Ukraine denies the Kremlin’s claims that it has fully captured Kostiantynivka, as well as claims that Russian troops are approaching Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. According to a source in the military command, dozens of Ukrainian positions still remain in Kostiantynivka. Fighting continues in the central and northern parts of the city.
At the same time, Russia is attempting to stretch Ukraine’s defenses by creating what is known as a buffer zone in the border areas of Sumy and Kharkiv regions. Russian units have failed to advance deep into Ukraine, but Ukrainian forces have also been unable to drive them out of some of the positions they have occupied.
Infiltration by Russian Groups and Strikes on the Rear
One of the defining features of the summer was the attempt by small Russian groups to infiltrate villages near the front line. According to open-source analysts, such operations do not always enable Russia to hold the territory it captures, but they force Ukraine to deploy assault units to clear settlements.
Russian claims that individual cities, including Sviatohirsk, had been captured did not correspond to the situation on the battlefield. Thus, the infiltrations were often aimed not so much at immediately expanding the zone of control as at placing additional pressure on Ukrainian reserves.
Over the summer, Ukraine intensified strikes against Russian logistics in the south, in occupied Crimea, and in the Black and Azov seas. Ukrainian drones attacked transport facilities, ships, energy infrastructure, logistics hubs, and oil refineries deep in Russia’s rear.
In response, Russia focused on attacking Ukrainian infrastructure. Throughout the summer, it actively used ballistic missiles to strike Kyiv and Odesa. In late August, Russian forces began launching jet-powered drones at the capital and its suburbs almost daily. Targets included logistics hubs, postal terminals, and warehouses.
What Autumn Could Bring to the Front
Statements by the leadership of Ukraine and Russia indicate that in autumn 2026, the sides are preparing not for a reduction in the intensity of hostilities but for further escalation. Volodymyr Zelenskyy declared his intention to “close the skies over Russia.” This likely refers to the expanded use of long-range attack drones.
For its part, the Russian leadership announced preparations for new attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Amid a shortage of air-defense missiles, the main weapons used in the strikes may remain Iskander-M ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones.
Worsening weather in autumn may reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian reconnaissance and attack drones. This will create additional opportunities for Russian forces to conduct offensive operations, particularly in the areas of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Dobropillia.
At the same time, the Russian army’s record losses over the summer may limit its ability to maintain the current pace of its offensive. To quickly replenish its ranks, the Kremlin might need a new mobilization, but Vladimir Putin continues to call it a measure of last resort.
Autumn will therefore be a test for both sides: the decisive factor will be who can maintain the intensity of hostilities longer without allowing people, equipment, and ammunition to become critically depleted.
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