3rd Ukraine Corps Flexibility, Reshaping Battlefield Led To Lyman Success

Months before Ukraine's 3rd Corps' Operation Vivaldi decimated the Russian armies holding the Lyman sector, it had to completely reorganize; identifying strengths and weaknesses, replacing subordinate commanders, improving the NCOs, vetting and then adapting to the new technologies that would become part of its legend. 

And that ability to think strategically, redefine the components of leadership needed for the 2026 battlefield and the hard work of then implementing that new vision is what led to its current success .JL

Howard Altman reports in The War Zone:

The success of Vivaldi began long before any troop movements, changing the culture from a rigid Soviet-era model, with a cumbersome chain of command, to a modern, flexible one better suited for the current conflict. (We) must be responsible for the cycle, from training a soldier to the result on the battlefield. "In some cases that meant replacing a commander. In others it meant restructuring staff or strengthening the NCO chain. We had to build processes. When the corps took over its sector, our first task was not an offensive, we had to stabilize. We had to stockpile ammunition, drones and other resources, understand the enemy, and plan the next step. Only after that could we move forward.” By June, the corps was able to secure the front “in the sector from Borova to Lyman. You cannot plan a complex operation if you don’t know where your forward edge will be tomorrow. So the first phase of ‘Vivaldi’ was creating conditions that made an advance possible.” 

Ukraine recently regained about 125 sq. km. of territory near the town of Lyman in the eastern Donetsk region during what has been dubbed Operation Vivaldi. Rodion Kudryashov, a Ukrainian colonel and deputy commander of the Third Army Corps, offered some insights into this offensive and what made it different.

The success of Vivaldi began long before any troop movements, Kudryashov explained in an editorial he published in Ukrainian Pravda. 

Ukraine is making advances near the town of Lyman, located in the Donetsk region. (Google Earth)

“After the Third Army Corps was formed, we changed the command system of its subordinate units,” he noted. “Some brigades came to the corps after very heavy fighting, with losses, manning problems and, most importantly, eroded trust in their leadership.”

Third Army Corps Commander Brig. Gen. Andriy Biletsky “then set out one of our key principles: a commander must be responsible for the entire cycle, from training a soldier to the result on the battlefield,” Kudryashov pointed out. “In some places that meant replacing a commander. In others it meant restructuring a staff or strengthening the NCO chain. In some cases we had to build, almost from scratch, processes that on paper should have been working long ago.”

At issue was changing the culture from a more rigid Soviet-era model, with a cumbersome chain of command, to a modern, more flexible one better suited for the current conflict.

“A modern commander has to handle an enormous flow of information and make decisions quickly,” the deputy commander proffered. “He has to understand what unmanned systems, logistics, reconnaissance and adjacent units can do, while not smothering initiative at lower levels with endless approvals. An army where every decision takes hours to travel up and down the chain loses to an army that makes the same trip in minutes.”

Once those changes were put in place, the Third Army Corps had to first stop Russian advances in the sector before it could move forward. 

“When the corps took over its area of responsibility, our first task was not an offensive,” the officer said. “We had to stop the situation from deteriorating and stabilize the forward edge.”

“The enemy was pressing. In some sectors our combat formations were losing cohesion,” he underscored. “The Russians were actively using infiltration tactics: small groups seeped between positions, massed in our rear, threatened logistics and gradually eroded the defensive line.”

“We had to stabilize the forward edge and stop the infiltration,” Kudryashov said. “We had to rebuild command, put in commanders capable of making decisions, form new teams and reconstitute units. We had to set up the surveillance-and-strike system and sustain the front line. We had to stockpile ammunition, drones and other resources, understand the enemy, and plan the next step before the previous one was finished. Only after that could we move forward.”

By June, the corps was able to secure the front “in the sector from Borova to Lyman and eliminate the enemy’s infiltration zones,” Kudryashov continued. “That sounds less impressive than the word ‘offensive,’ but no offensive ever happens without it.”

“You cannot plan a complex operation if you don’t know where your forward edge will be tomorrow,” the deputy commander extrapolated. “You cannot build up forces if your logistics are constantly under threat. And you cannot form a strike group if your units are always forced to patch new breaches. So the first phase of ‘Vivaldi’ was not an advance at all. It was creating the conditions that made an advance possible in the first place.” 

Once the front was stabilized, the next step was shaping the battlefield for the offensive. The corps’ unmanned systems units went to work against Russian logistics, striking a pipeline and depots. That forced the enemy to change its fuel and lubricant supply routes. 

“The operation also involved the corps’ brigades, its reconnaissance and unmanned units, and attached forces from the SSO (Special Operations Forces), GUR (Defense Intelligence) and DPSU (State Border Guard Service),” the deputy commander said. “To counter infiltration, a joint headquarters was set up to coordinate special and reconnaissance units at the tactical level under a single concept.”

“In my view, this is one of the main characteristics of modern war,” he further stated. “It is not 10 strong units that each fight well on their own. It is 10 different elements that start working as one system at the right moment.” 

The influential, Kremlin-connected Rybar Telegram channel has acknowledged Ukrainian gains in this sector. 

“In the first half of summer, Russian units gradually advanced in Lyman,” Rybar wrote this morning. “However, in August, the enemy launched counterattacks and, by the first week of September, regained some positions, and also began attempts to recapture Shandryholovo and Zarechnoye.”

“The enemy did not inflict significant losses on Russian troops, as the concentration of units of the West group of forces in the salient remained relatively low,” Rybar added. “However, later, the UAF deployed reserves to launch an offensive towards Zherebets in order to align the front along the water barrier and return it to the configuration of the end of 2025.” 

Though the battle is still in flux, Kudryashov said there are lessons the rest of the Ukrainian military should heed.

“Winning one battle is not yet winning the war,” he said. “The enemy is learning too. He changes tactics, looks for weak spots and tries to scale what works for him.”

“So our task is to be faster, not only in physically moving forward but also in our ability to see, think, decide and put into practice what delivers results,” the deputy commander avowed. “And to do everything possible so that our soldiers pay the lowest possible price for every next kilometer of Ukrainian land.”