Working With the New Middle East: Will Nationalism Be More Of An Issue Than Islamism?

The specter of Islamic radicals taking over countries across the Maghreb (North Africa) to the Persian Gulf is keeping western diplomats and militaries awake at night. However, they may be fighting the last war and ignoring a the latest version of an old force; Arab nationalism:

Former French Foriegn Minister Hubert Vedrine offers his insights in the Financial Times:

How events in the Arab world will evolve is of course uncertain. What is certain, however, is that we in the west have to adjust to a new reality: an Arab world that will be more nationalistic.

For now, the west is frightening itself with the spectre of political Islam. It is premature to say a solution has been found to avoid moving from the overthrow of authoritarian regimes to sinking into Islamism, but no expert on the Arab world foresees a scenario à la Iran which took everyone by surprise, including Iranians. Islamic parties will emerge stronger from free elections, but the chances that they will seek to hijack the democratic process are slim. And there is a counter-example to Iran – Turkey.

Rather what we are most likely to witness now is the revival of Arab nationalism, coming particularly from the new Egypt and extending around it. This will be a non-chauvinistic, legitimate nationalism, based on a new-found pride.

Egypt is historically the heart of the Arab world but it was de facto neutralised for more than 30 years and left the Arab world paralysed. Now a democratic Egypt will inevitably seek to reassert its influence. It will not question its peace treaty with Israel nor will it take an aggressive posture. But it will cease to give credibility to a pseudo peace process and stop obliging others by hosting summits of convenience in Sharm el-Sheikh. This should neither surprise nor alarm the west which will need to avoid the temptation of inventing a new enemy for itself – Arab nationalism – and should stand ready instead to deal with this new Arab world as a real partner.

The long and comfortable era for the west and Israel has ended. We will have to forgo the cosy relations we had and adapt intelligently. This is also true of other Arab countries, especially those in the Gulf that benefited from Egypt’s absence and will now have to adjust to its return. Eventually, a more democratic Egypt, as it is emerging, will be a more solid partner for peace. That is if Israel agrees to make the compromises the whole world agrees are necessary and which a majority of its own public opinion accepts as long as its security is guaranteed.

While it is true that the west leant on the Arab governments and sought their support for its own initiatives, the west did not bring those regimes to power and had no role in their demise. They were overthrown by the revolts of young Arab men and women from Tunisia and Egypt. Others will follow.

American neoconservatives and their followers in Europe have no reason to take credit for any of these revolts. They did not predict them – otherwise why did they develop those theories under President George W Bush about the need for military interventions to achieve change? In fact, they only brought disrepute to the notion of democratisation by using it as a pretext to justify the war on Iraq a posteriori. It is fair to ask whether the neoconservatives did not delay democratisation of the Arab world. That an international coalition intervened in Libya does not change this equation; no one outside Libya predicted, let alone fomented, the uprising of Benghazi. Libya is an extreme case where the responsibility to protect the insurgents overrode all other considerations. But this international engagement under the UN and Mr Bush set a precedent that will need to be treated carefully.

No doubt the Tunisians, Egyptians and others will face daunting problems. Libya’s future is fraught with uncertainty. Building a cohesive democratic society after Muammer Gaddafi might take longer, and neoconservatives and Syria each present unique challenges. There will be moments of regression, but there are also hopeful prospects. Morocco is one of them.

How these Arab processes will evolve will not be our decision, which does not exempt us from seeking to help them succeed. As they move to build democratic institutions, Arab states will be more assertive and pursue their interests with stronger self-confidence. Egypt is already setting the tone by signalling to the three major powers of the region (Turkey, Iran and Israel) and also Sudan that it seeks a new page in its relationship with them. Other countries will do the same. This new nationalism has little to do with the pan-Arabism of the 1950s. It reflects a yearning for increased sovereignty in managing foreign policy interests. Objectively, we have no reason to fear it