Why Russia Has Lost the Ability To Alter the Dynamics of the Ukraine War
Since its inability to capture Kyiv at the start of the war almost six months ago, Russia has repeatedly failed to make significant gains in Ukraine.
The causes are many, but the new reality is, that having squandered its best troops and weapons on an inept strategy, Russia now finds itself with inadequate resources including logistics, equipment, troops, leaders, economic support - and time. JL
Bryan Frydenborg reports in Real Context News:
Russia has lost the ability to alter the
dynamics of the war. After Russia was routed in March and from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy fronts, the
Russian Army has for months been able to do little
morethan inch forward in the east, attack defenseless civilians (or even wheat fields) andlob missilesfromextreme distances. Mostof Russia’sbest combattroopsaredead,wounded, or inunitsthatare non-“combat effective”. Russia’sconscript-contracthybrid systemiscontributingto asevere lack of cohesion. Massive casualties,equipment losses(and sanctions) mean that Russia’s ambitionsfar exceed its current and foreseeablecapabilities.
I can respect the fact that many journalists are not terribly steeped in military history, strategy, or tactics, but the writing really is on the wall for Russia in its miserable failure of a war. And while projecting too much optimism may run the risk losing a needed sense of urgency in some quarters,support for Ukrainehas not onlybeen statedasa clearandlong-termcommitmentthroughouttheWestbut acted uponwith vigoroverthe morethanfive monthsof this war, with supportonly increasingandmoreandmore supportsurelyon the way. Thus, analysis that misses Ukraine’s success—not just past or tactically, but in forging, driving, and dominating dynamics that have put Ukraine on the path to surprising victory and Russia on the path to ignominious defeat—is not presenting an accurate picture.
As I noted elsewhere, a simple look at a few maps produced by the Institute for the Study of War in conjunction with Critical Threats reveals that, since late March, Ukraine has been more on the offensive than Russia and is taking far more of its occupied territory from Russia since then than territory Russia has taken since then from Ukraine, never a good sign for any invader.
Thus, there simply are currently no good, fast options to replace Russia’smounting casualtiesand Russia is basicallyrunning outof not just quality troops, but troops in general. There are not 50,000—let alone 20,000—fresh Russian elite combat forces arriving well-equipped and well-supplied with high-morale and quality leadership at Russia’s fronts anytime soon, and Russia’scurrent leadership cultureis incapable of patiently and methodically training any large numbers of high-quality troops, especially in its current flailing mode. Even if Russia’s leaders were focusing on producing well-trained troops, it would be a long time before they could be deployable, maybe even too late to prevent a full loss of all Russian gains in Ukrainesince 2014, let alone 2022. It is also crucial to note that Russia’s military machinerycannot be properlymaintained orproduced anymorewithoutkey componentsmanufacturedoutside of Russiaandblocked by Western sanctions. Even if Russian President Vladimir Putin hits the panic button and beginsa general draft mobilization(politicallyrisky for him), that cannot yield serious results anytime soon, either.
As a Partner and Co-Founder of Predictiv and PredictivAsia, Jon specializes in management performance and organizational effectiveness for both domestic and international clients. He is an editor and author whose works include Invisible Advantage: How Intangilbles are Driving Business Performance. Learn more...
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