A Blog by Jonathan Low


Nov 14, 2022

The Siege of Kherson Is Over. The Siege of Crimea Is Beginning

Crimea is only one of the Ukrainian military's attack options and may be postponed for a later day given their strategy of strangling Russian bases and units through further damaged logistics leading to the the inevitability of encirclement or retreat. 

But whenever it happens, the recapture of Crimea now appears to have been set, with only the timing and tactics of the Ukrainian effort to be determined. JL

Trent Telenko reports in Twitter:

The Siege of Crimea began before the Siege of Kherson ended, (specifically) on October 8th 2022 when the Kerch Straits bridge was bombed. This cut Crimea off from its fuel supply for Crimean based aviation and for the Black Sea Fleet operations. The Russian Army's "Dnipro line" screening Crimea has an open western flank, with its sea and ground lines interdicted, and its source of fuel to support combat operations cut. The reality of interdicted routes, short fuel and the threat of the open flank represent the Russian Army's new logistical (reality) for the Siege of Crimea.The Siege of Kherson is over. The Siege of Crimea has begun. I've laid out the logistics of the Kherson siege previously, plus the water implications for Crimea if Kherson's right bank fell. The Siege of Crimea began before the Siege of Kherson ended, on October 8th 2022. When the Kerch Straits road and rail bridge was bombed. This attack cut Crimea off from its primary fuel supply, This loss of fuel for Russia's Crimean based aviation accelerated the Siege of Kherson's right bank by denying the VKS the closely based fuel it needed to contest Ukrainian air superiority. This loss means a great deal for the Ukrainian Navy's Neptune ASCM launchers.ppling VKS aviation based there. Stanislav, Kherson Oblast represents a key piece of strategic Ukrainian terrain for the siege of Crimea for basing the Ukrainian Navy mobile Neptune anti-ship cruise missile launchers. Their reach from there covers well south of the port of Sevastopol. The Russian Black Sea Fleet operational patterns in screening Sevastopol have changed. Whether from the drone boat bomb attack or the fall of the Dnipro's right bank increasing the Neptune's engagements range isn't clear. Given the changed operational pattern spotted, the ability of Russian Black Sea Fleet to move fuel by coastal tanker or fuel filled cistern rail cars by ferry to Sevastopol port has been fatally compromised. The most extreme western tip of occupied southern Ukraine is the Kinburn peninsula at the right bank of the Dnipro's mouth. It is the most fuel starved territory in Russia's grasp & it has no air cover from AFU drones. Worse, with the fall of Stanislav, the Kinburn peninsula is under the footprint of Ukrainian Army, drone directed, 155mm guns firing basic shells, AKA "Fire Control." A Ukrainian helicopter and/or boat lifted light infantry force with Stugna-P ATGM, ..Switchblade drones, mortars and long range artillery radios that reach Stanislav would be able to take & potentially hold the Kinburn peninsula inside that artillery footprint. Whether AFU actually does this is a different matter. The problem is the Russians have to honor this threat to the Western flank the Dnipro line. Forcing the Russians to occupy Kinburn peninsula, which hIf the Russians leave the Kinburn peninsula an unoccupied "Grey Zone." It becomes a sanctuary for Ukrainian Partisans, Special Forces and especially AFU drones. And the threat to their Western flank remains as Russian aircover recedes asn't been fortified yet due to a lack of roads, gives the Ukrainians lots of Russian soft artillery targets out in the open.
It is consistent with both. And by that I mean the presence of AFU HIMARS on the Dnipro's right bank puts the Russian VKS helicopter base in Chaplynka in GMLRS range with all the explosive implications that fact represents. Nor is that the only GMLMS problem the Russian face in S. Ukraine. The following are within the GMLRS footprint: o The E97 route from Western Crimea o All the P57 route to the Black Sea o The supply hub at Myrne o The P47 route to Malachka o The M14 route to Druzhbivka


The Russian Army's "Dnipro line" screening Crimea has an open western flank at the Kinburn peninsula, with its sea and ground lines of communications interdicted, and its Crimea supply source being short of fuel to support combat operations because of the bombed Kerch Bridge. The reality of interdicted routes, short fuel and the threat of the open flank at the Kinburn peninsula represent the Russian Army's new logistical tar baby for the Siege of Crimea. Just as the Kyiv 40 km parking lot, Snake Island, Chornobaevka & Kherson all were before it. We are seeing yet again Ukraine's "Death of a Thousand Cuts" operational strategy at work against Russians. Russia's trucks supporting the Dnipro line screening Crimea are in a kill jar of Ukraine's making. Defeat & retreat, to & thru Crimea, are the only Russian outcomes


Post a Comment