A Blog by Jonathan Low

 

Dec 30, 2022

Why Re-Taking Crimea May Be A Realistic Goal For Ukraine In 2023

Recent Russian failures in the Donbas - at Bakhmut, Svatove and Kreminna - suggest that the Russian army is no closer to solving its strategic problems than it was before the 'partial mobilization.' 

Missile and drone attacks on Ukraine's cities are more a reflection of desperation than a war changing outcome. If Ukraine can continue to husband its resources, use them effectively and continue to wear down Russian forces - and demonstrate that no rear-echelon Russian forces or bases are safe - retaking Crimea becomes a realistic objective. JL

Mick Ryan reports in War In the Future:

The complete liberation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces will be essential precursors to any Ukrainian campaign for Crimea. If Ukraine has received significant injections of western weapons, has the full support of America and Europe to take back Crimea and has demonstrated the battlefield aptitude and will to do so, Russia could well then be on the precipice of a stunning national humiliation. "It's important to focus on the accumulation of resources right now for the more protracted and heavier battles that may begin next year."

The Crimean War in the early 1850s is known for events such battles at Balaclava, the siege of Sevastopol and the Charge of the Light Brigade.

These all had an impact on the war, and public opinion in European capitals.

What is less remembered is that it was the first truly modern war, employing the technological developments of the first industrial revolution.

Mass-produced weapons, the use of trains for logistics and troop movements, advanced firearms, the application of the telegram for military communication and news correspondents all featured in the Crimean War.

Now, Crimea is again the focus of war.

Recently, a small cottage industry has arisen for commentary about whether Ukraine can or should seek to take back its Crimean territory through the force of arms.

Whether this talk is diplomatic timidity, a desire to return to some historic relic like the concept of Europe, or just a response to the normal uncertainty of war, it helps Russia far more than it does Ukraine.

There is almost no prospect of Russia negotiating over the future of Crimea unless they are forced to through continuing battlefield defeats.

Putin has shown zero inclination to give up annexed territory he doesn't control, let alone Ukrainian territory he illegally seized in 2014.

Supporters of Ukraine sending mixed messages

How might Ukraine, and its supporters in the international community, move towards an outcome where Ukraine regains control of this part of its territory?

First, Ukraine's supporters need to stop sending mixed signals on the status of Crimea.

Comments from politicians and senior military leaders about the "difficulty'"of Ukraine retaking Crimea need to be moderated with "but, we support Ukraine taking back all their territory".

Discussing Crimea as territory that "only" went to Ukraine in 1954 is a spurious and illogical argument. By this logic, many of the territorial transfers that occurred in Europe in the wake of the 20th century world wars could also be re-litigated.

Second, western industry needs to step up its production of munitions and transfer of armoured vehicles and other offensive capabilities to Ukraine.

The Ukranian army requires a large numbers of armoured vehicles (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured obstacle breaching vehicles), replacement artillery systems, helicopters and fighter aircraft.

As Ukrainian command in chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has noted in a recent interview with The Economist, "we have made all the calculations — how many tanks, artillery we need and so on.

"This is what everyone needs to concentrate on right now … it's more important to focus on the accumulation of resources right now for the more protracted and heavier battles that may begin next year."

Kherson and Zaporizhzhia the first priority

Third, Ukraine needs to complete offensives to recapture all of its southern territory as enabling activities.

The liberation of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces will be essential precursors to any Ukrainian campaign for Crimea.

Not only do these provide the only two ground axes that might be used to advance into Crimea, but they will also be critical for logistics, fire support from artillery and basing of aircraft.

Politically and militarily, seeking to liberate Crimea without first doing so in these other two southern provinces would be an impossibility.

Fourth, strategic patience is vital.

It is possible that it might take Ukraine all of 2023 to secure its southern territory before a Crimea operation is possible.

Patience is something that European and American publics and governments have demonstrated so far in this war, much to the shock of Putin.

Part of his logic for engaging in this devastating invasion was that the West was unlikely to intervene, and even if it wanted to, Kyiv would be taken too quickly for NATO to react.

Putin's decision-making since shows that he is still hoping to run out the clock on this conflict by demonstrating greater strategic perseverance than Ukraine's supporters.

As he reputedly told the Israeli Prime Minister earlier this year, "we are a big country and we have patience."

We must not allow this Russian theory of victory to succeed.

Campaign to seize Crimea still in play

All of these are necessary precursors to Ukraine considering a large military campaign to seize Crimea.

Indeed, if all four of these criteria are met then perhaps there may be an opportunity for negotiations about the future of Crimea.

If this particular future comes to pass, Russia will be in a difficult position if it holds out on negotiations.

If Ukraine has received significant injections of western weapons, has the full support of America and Europe to take back Crimea and has demonstrated the battlefield aptitude and will to do so, Russia could well then be on the precipice of a stunning national humiliation.

Of course, Russia may then decide that its only option to defend Crimea is nuclear weapons.

While there are numerous speculations about such a scenario, Putin by this point might appreciate that a negotiated settlement for a Crimean "special zone" would be better than Russia being an international pariah for a generation or more.

Perhaps.

We are a long way from such a scenario playing out, however.

The coming winter will see Ukraine and Russia reinforcing weary and battered units, protecting (or attacking) strategic infrastructure, sourcing munitions and supplies for 2023, and exploiting short-term battlefield opportunities.

But at some point, in the coming year, the different scenarios for how Ukraine might recover its Crimea territory — diplomatic and military — are going to be planned and discussed in Kyiv, Moscow, Washington DC and European capitals.

In 2023, all roads may lead to Crimea in the Russo-Ukraine War.

 

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