Russian Forces Are Starting To Repeat Mistakes From the Start of the Invasion

Russian forces attacking in Ukraine are making many of the same mistakes their predecessors did at the start of the invasion two years, at Vuhledar a year later and, more recently, at Avdiivka.

The reasons appear to be that most trained Russian soldiers and officers are now dead or hospitalized so not available to advise newer recruits. But the other reason is hubris borne of overconfidence. The Russians know they currently enjoy some material advantages over the Ukrainians and so are being reckless in how they use both troops and equipment. JL 

Ellie Cook reports in Newsweek:

Ukraine's recent success in taking out Russian tanks and armored vehicles, illustrate Russian strategy continuing mistakes that cost Moscow dearly in the early weeks of the war. At Tonenke,  the loss of so many vehicles in one swoop (recalls) the early errors and sky-high armored losses that Moscow suffered in the first phase of its invasion. "The column in Tonenke used a single road and didn't use the open ground." Organizational and planning failures plagued Russia's first armored assaults during its invasion in 2022. Ruptures in the chain of command, poor training and heavy initial casualties (have) left few Russian soldiers to train the next generation. (But) "they know that they have materiel superiority and can afford to be reckless."

Ukraine has lauded its recent success in taking out a slew of Russian tanks and armored vehicles near the embattled former Ukrainian stronghold of Avdiivka, illustrating a Russian strategy that continues to echo mistakes that cost Moscow dearly in the early weeks of the war, despite recent territorial gains.

Kyiv on Monday said paratroopers from the country's 25th Airborne Brigade had stopped a "massive" Russian attack close to the village of Tonenke, destroying four tanks and two infantry fighting vehicles directly west of Avdiivka. The brigade, in a separate statement, said simply that it had "destroyed a column of enemy equipment."

 

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a U.S. think tank that closely follows the conflict in Ukraine, described the Russian attack around Tonenke as Moscow's "first battalion-sized mechanized assault" since the Kremlin kicked off its offensive on Avdiivka last October. A Russian tank battalion typically contains upwards of 30 vehicles.

Fresh off claiming Avdiivka in mid-February—Russia's first major victory since the fall of Bakhmut in May 2023—the loss of so many vehicles in one fell swoop is a callback to the early errors, and sky-high armored losses, that Moscow suffered in the first phase of its full-scale invasion

 

"There are some similarities between this Russian attack near Tonenke and those Russian assaults early in the war," said Bryden Spurling, senior research leader for defense and security with the European branch of the RAND think tank.

 

"It's surprising that the column in Tonenke mostly used a single road and didn't appear to use the open ground [on] either side and spread its forces out, though it looks like some vehicles did try to disperse," he told Newsweek.

The Russian crews may have been worried about muddy terrain or mines, he added, saying: "Either way, these were significant losses of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles."

 

"Near Tonenke, we saw almost the same mistakes from their side as near Vuhledar in the previous year," Major Victor Tregubov, a Ukrainian journalist and editor who now serves in the Ukrainian military, told Newsweek.

Vuhledar, a small village in southern Ukraine, was the scene of intense clashes for several weeks in the early part of 2023. Ukrainian officials told The New York Times at the time that it was the "biggest tank battle of the war so far."

Analysts previously told Newsweek that organizational and planning failures plagued Russia's first armored assaults during its initial invasion in 2022. Ruptures in the chain of command, poor training and heavy initial casualties left few Russian soldiers to train the next generation

 

Russia has since burned through its tank arsenal. In February, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a U.K.-based think tank, estimated that Moscow had lost more than 3,000 tanks in two years of war — more than its entire pre-war active fleet. Russia's tank losses are estimated at even higher by Ukraine, at more than 7,000.

Yet Moscow has put its massive defense industry on a war footing, helping to replenish its fleet while still taking constant hits from Ukrainian forces. Domestic Russian tank production has increased fivefold since February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin said earlier this year. The Kremlin has also pulled old tanks from storage, and repurposes antiquated vehicles to ferry and detonate  explosives. "They know that they have materiel superiority and can afford to be reckless," said Tregubov, the Ukrainian journalist-turned-soldier.

 

"They seem to have little regard for personnel losses and throw units at the Ukrainian lines in an attempt to exhaust the defenders and find weak spots," added Spurling, the RAND analyst.

Military analysts broadly agree that Russia has, for the most part, re-evaluated some of its early tactics. The Kremlin launched its invasion "underprepared and over-confident," Spurling said, as its armored vehicles got caught in Ukrainian ambushes without enough infantry support to shield them.

"Russia now has lots of personnel and has switched to preserving its equipment and using very infantry-heavy tactics," Spurling said. "They have adapted and are now playing to some of their strengths."