Reports Reveal Russia Rushed Kharkiv Attack, Which Contributed To Its Failure

Russia's original plan for a spring offensive against Kharkiv was intended to begin with a much larger force a week later than it actually began. The goals for this planned assault were far also more aggressive and would have threatened Kharkiv city. 

It now appears that the Kremlin moved up the date of the attack and initiated it with a force it knew to be inadequate because they hoped to take advantage of Ukrainian manpower and ammunition shortages before renewed western aid arrived. Those plans were thwarted by NATO's logistical prowess in moving pre-positioned stores to Ukraine more quickly than anticipated and by Ukraine's ability to respond more rapidly and with greater firepower than the Russians expected. The Russians viewed the revised plan as an opportunistic initiative which they could afford to attempt, though its results have since been characterized as disappointing. JL

The Institute For the Study of War reports:

The Russian military command initially planned that Russian forces would quickly make significant advances in Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian plans called for Russian forces to advance to Borshchova (20 kilometers northeast of Kharkiv City and 16 kilometers from the border) within 72 hours to place Russian forces within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City. The Russian plans also called for Russian forces to advance 50 kilometers from the border in an unspecified time frame. The offensive was initially planned to begin May 16. The Russians may have decided to start the offensive with an understrength group to take advantage of Ukrainian manpower and materiel shortages before the arrival of Western aid.

The Russian military command reportedly initially planned that Russian forces would quickly make significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast, but the limited force grouping deployed to the area suggests that the Russian military command likely changed these plans in the lead up to offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast. The Economist reported on May 20 that it viewed Russian military plans from an unspecified date about a planned Russian offensive in the Kharkiv City and Vovchansk directions.[12] The Russian plans reportedly called for Russian forces to advance to Borshchova (about 20 kilometers northeast of Kharkiv City and about 16 kilometers from the international border) within 72 hours in order to place Russian forces within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City. The Russian plans also reportedly called for Russian forces to advance to Pechenihy (south of Vovchansk and about 50 kilometers from the international border) in an unspecified time frame. The Russian offensive was reportedly initially planned to begin May 15 to 16, and the Economist stated that it is unknown why Russian forces pushed forward their offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast to May 10 instead. ISW assesses that Russian forces have advanced a maximum of about 10 kilometers deep in the Kharkiv City direction and a maximum of about seven kilometers deep in the Vovchansk direction since May 10. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on May 2 that Russian forces had concentrated about 35,000 personnel in the international border area and planned to concentrate a total of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel.[13] Russian forces reportedly launched offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast when the Northern Grouping of Forces was understrength and have only committed a limited amount of combat power to the area thus far.[14]

The Russian military command very likely did not expect these limited and understrength forces to be able to reach these objectives, and a Ukrainian reserve officer observed that Russian forces have focused on ”creeping advances” rather than swift drives to an operational depth since their military failures in 2022.[15] The Economist did not specify when the Russian military command created these reported plans, and it is possible that the Russian military command created the plans before it became clear that the Northern Grouping of Forces would not be staffed at its desired end strength or that an earlier or more limited attack was desired. The Russian military command may have also decided to start offensive operations with an understrength grouping to take advantage of Ukrainian manpower and materiel shortages before the arrival of Western aid at scale to the frontline.