Russia is still a long-ways from taking Pokrovsk, which the press was saying might fall in August 2024. There have been some advances to the South of the city, but these are extremely costly micro-advances. The situation in Kursk is likewise static. The Ukrainians launched a spoiling attack, and the Russians are desperately trying to retake the area. Its clear that Ukraine holding a chunk of Russia has screwed up Russian strategic calculations (and possibly Trump’s). Ukrainians will have to continue to grow their own long-range strike capacity if they want to change the status quo in the war. They have put together some very successful long-range strikes using their own systemsIf Trump’s thinking is reflected in US policy—and we should assume it will soon be—there is a very high percentage chance that even the very limited permission that the Biden Administration has given Ukraine to strike targets in Russia with US systems, will be revoked. And if Trump revokes this right, I think we can count on Europeans going along as they will not wanting to anger him in the coming weeks (even as he emasculates them with invasion threats).
What this means is that Ukrainians will have to continue to grow their own long-range strike capacity materially and intellectually if they want to have any hope of changing the status quo in the war.
The issues that the Ukrainians have faced in this regard are ones of accuracy, mass and penetrating power. They have put together some very successful long-range strikes using their own systems, but they have still not shown the ability to wage a long-term ranged campaign—or to break through the hardest targets on their own (they often use US ATACMS or UK/FR Storm Shadows to attack Russian headquarters for instance.
This week there were examples that they were trying. There was a very long-range attack on the Russian Taneko oil refinery in Tartarstan. The Taneko refinery is located in the city of Nizhnekamsk, around 1,300 kilometers from inside Russia from Ukraine.
This is the second time this refinery—which is one of the newest and most important in Russia has been attacked. And what was interesting was that even with its importance and previous history of being attacked—the Ukrainians were able to get some systems in to hit it successfully.
Maybe the even more important attacks were not so-long range as this but did seem to show Ukrainian improvement in home-made systems and in complex operations. The first was an attack on a Russian UAV storage depot in Rostov. I don’t need to tell you how important Russian UAVs have been to their war effort—so needless to say it was a high value target.
What this attack seemed to involve was a combination operation. First simpler Ukrainian UAVs were sent in to divert Russian anti-air defenses, the phrase the Ukrainians used was “overloaded”, and then some modified Ukrainian Neptune missiles (originally land-sea anti ship system) followed up to penetrate the defenses and explode the depot.
If the Ukrainians cant get their hands on ATACMS or European-made systems for ranged attacks, they will really need to step up production of these Neptunes. It is at least a hoepful sign that they seem to be using them on defended targets in Russia.
Finally, there was another UAV strike on the Russian port of Novorossiysk, which is where most of the remaining Black Sea Fleet is based. A few things stand out. Even though this is a very high-value target and has been attacked before, local reports were that Russian air defense was not operating until the strikes hit.
So either Russian air defenses are really stretched or the Ukrainians found a way to deceive them.
Overall it was the kind of week that shows what Ukraine would like to do, and how they are going about it. These attacks show preparation, high-value targeting, the ability to surmount Russian air defense, etc. The fact that they could do three in a week is great. However, questions remains about whether they can actually carry out a true ranged campaign on their own. If Trump truly is operating under Russian reflexive control—that will be very difficult.
The Donbas and Kursk Battlefields—Little Substantive Change
Haven’t dwelled on the Donbas much lately as the changes there are pretty small. Russia is still a long-ways from taking Pokrovsk, which as you might recall the press was saying might fall in August 2024. There have been some advances to the South of the city, but these are extremely costly micro-advances writ large. Here is the situation right now according to Deep State.
And here is the situation on January 1, 2025.
All the talk about greatly accelerated Russian advances seem to have been toned down.
The situation in Kursk is likewise pretty static. The Ukrainians launched a brief spoiling attack a few days ago, and the Russians are desperately trying to retake the area. Its clear that Ukraine holding a chunk of Russia has screwed up Russian strategic calculations (and possibly Trump’s). As of now, however, Kursk remains pretty stable.
Of course what this ground war continues to show is that Ukraine needs to wage a ranged campaign to change the general dynamic of the war. The land-war is what it is—it wont change unless one side or the other really runs out of forces (which could happen eventually). If the war is going to see a major change—it will come from a successful Ukrainian ranged war. Which, of course, the Ukrainians understand—even if most people in the west dont.
Jan 13, 2025
Pokrovsk Remains Distant For Russia As Front Line Barely Moves In A Month
A look at the maps reveals that despite the heavy breathing from the usual suspect western media (we're looking at you, New York Times), Russia remains far from taking Pokrovsk - just as it has for the past 6 months - while Kursk remains largely in Ukrainian hands and Russian gains anywhere along the front are most accurately described as micro-mini. JL
Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:
0 comments:
Post a Comment