Why In the Ukraine War's Third Year, Russia Is On Its Third Army

Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine with what was presumed to be the world's second most powerful army. The Ukrainians were considered plucky but far overmatched. Well, that was then.

Three years on, most of that first, professional Russian army is dead or incapacitated. Most of its equipment has likewise been destroyed. The second, substitute Russian army of 2023-2024 is also now largely decimated. It was made up of a mix of convicts, hapless conscripts and recruits fighting for money, using equipment pulled from Soviet storage depots. They did not fare much better in terms of objectives achieved. So Russia is now on its third army in three years, a combination of highly compensated contractors, surviving convicts and North Koreans, a force almost entirely bereft of recognizable armor due to previous losses. The thirds appear to be hanging on but not accomplishing much. Ukraine is arguably on its second army (some say third) focused primarily on drone operators and those defending them, with some special forces and mechanized/artillery units. They are holding their own. But the larger lesson is that force generation during conflict may be more important in high tech war than who is available at the start. JL 

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

Wars are hardly ever won by the forces on hand when they started. A few years after the war starts, there is hardly anything left of the original. Russia is now on its third army. The original Russian force in February 2022 - the supposedly second greatest army in the world - was mostly destroyed by 2023. The mixed old-new army that fought much of late 2023-through the end of 2024 with new soldiers and old equipment has been deconstructed. What we see now is the third Russian army, a mostly new force in equipment and capabilities. The Ukrainians are on their second army, more UAV reliant, with an understanding of which western weapons are effective and trying to generate the right number of soldiers.

If there one great trap that military analysts fell into when thinking about the Russian full-scale invasion, it was what might best be called the “short-war delusion”. This is the idea that any war will be determined in a relatively short period of time (say less than a year) through the interactions of the forces that are on hand when the war starts. This is often seen by the idea that any war “will be over by Christmas”. In War and Power, I talk about how this short war idea has popped up regularly from World War I (Schlieffen Plan anyone?) to the present.

However, even a cursory study of military history over the last few centuries (and arguably throughout history) shows that this is a deeply flawed way to approach strategic analysis. Wars are hardly ever won by the forces on hand when they start. They are almost always won by the forces that are generated during the fighting—so much so that it is often the case that a few years after the war started, there is hardly anything left of the original armies, and what is facing each other in the field are completely new beasts in terms of personnel and even equipment and doctrine.

Therefore to try and understand how a war will develop its far more useful to study how the different sides can generate new force—rather than obsessing with the armies that they have at the start. Unfortunately, militaries obsess about the forces that they have on hand-and war games, for instance, usually involve the interaction of such. It points out the problem we have with our war-game focussed analyses.

This analytical trap was one of the reasons I was frustrated with all the ahistorical and extraordinarily pro-Russian “shock and awe” analysis of what would happen when the Russians launched their original invasion. This was short-war thinking brought to a level never before seen—which had people widely claiming that Russia would win the war in days or weeks (and in one case, hours). It was based on a dreadfully limited understanding of what matters in war and a tremendous over-estimation of the strengths of Russian armies at the start of fighting.

It would be far better to analyze a war by trying to estimate how each side will generate new force over a three year period. This 3-year test is one that held very well for many of the late modern wars, from World Wars One and Two, to the Iran-Iraq War. In all these cases the armies that were in existence when the fighting commenced were almost completely wasted in the opening year or so, and what happened is that new equipment needed to be built, new technological lessons incorporated, new soldiers raised and trained—entirely new militaries needed to be constructed. For example, the British Army by 1917 was an entirely different beast from the same force in 1914, and the US Army by 1944 bore almost no resemblance to the force on hand in 1941.

In 1914 the British Army was a small, professional force with few vehicles and even only a tiny stock of modern artillery.

British soldiers marching to war in 1914

By 1917 the British Army was integrating entirely new tank and aircraft technologies into its operations—such as at the Battle of Cambrai.

Likewise the US Army in 1941 was a small force, much of whose equipment was World War I based.

US Troops training in 1941

By 1944 this force was now being supported by masses of aircraft, almost all of which had been built since 1942. These included thousands of newly-built P-47s, which patrolled the skies over US forces in France in after D-Day,

And this is the case now between Russia and Ukraine. It could be said that both sides are now on their third armies—particularly the Russians. There was the original Russian force that was used in the February 2022 (the supposedly second greatest army in the world—I still shake my head when I read such nonsense). That was mostly destroyed by late 2022 or 2023.

The Russian Army of 2021, which was supposedly so awesome it would win a short war. It was almost all worn down by 2023,

There was then a massive infusion of new soldiers and the activation of masses amounts of old equipment (tanks, artillery, etc) out of storage added to the technologies that were newly built or acquired. This is where UAVs (Unpiloted Aerial Vehicles—or drones) started playing their great role. This mixed old-new army that fought much of late 2023-through the end of 2024.

Now that army has been deconstructed. Many of the vehicles on which it was reliant have been destroyed or can not reach the front, and many of the soldiers raised in that mobilization process have been killed and wounded. So what we are seeing now is arguably the third Russian army—almost all light vehicle, UAV and infantry based—a mostly new force in equipment and capabilities. In this war, fast light golf carts are arguably more effective than large, expensive tanks.

A Chinese built “Desertcross” cart, which the Russians are now using to attack.

The Ukrainians are likewise at least on their second army, and arguably their third. There was the Soviet-era equipped force (with some light western weapons) with which the Russian invasion was mostly fought off. Then there was the hybrid armed forces, with soldiers raised in 2022-2023, that took this foundation and added the new western weapons its allies provided. Much of that force has been worn down. Now the Ukrainian military is very different, more and more UAV reliant, with an understanding of which western weapons are effective (which less so) and now trying to politically generate the right number of soldiers.

In many ways the one weapons system that shows how force generation matters far more than force on hand when a war starts, is the UAV. When the Russian launched their full-scale invasion—the discussion of the importance of UAVs was minimal. The Russians were seen as an awesome combined arms military, with tanks, mobile artillery, fixed wing aircraft and long-range missiles. The Ukrainians were seen as either corrupt and doomed, or plucky but about to be overwhelmed. In neither case was the UAV judged to be a weapons systems of great importance in determining the outcome of the war.

What very few people understood was that the early stages of combat would start showing how technologies were different than expected and how those technologies could be adapted going forward. What this war showed was that, the cheap UAV and sea drones, called into question the value of larger, far more expensive, legacy systems. And both the Ukrainians and Russians came to that conclusion sooner than the analytical community (many of whom were still extolling the great value of tank for far too long).

And what we have seen since then is in many ways a completely new force generation competition between the Russians and Ukrainians when it comes to UAVs. They went, particularly for the Ukrainians, from an almost non-existent part of their war production, to arguably the largest part. In 2022 the Ukrainians made an estimated 5000 UAVs. In 2023 this number increased to what at the time seemed an amazing 300,000. However it was only a precursor to the extraordinary story of Ukrainian UAV production in 2024, which was estimated at close to 4 million.

In late 2024 the Ukrainian UAV production situation was described as follows.

Ukraine now boasts over 200 drone manufacturers, with about a hundred capable of producing large quantities of various drone types, not just FPV (first-person view) drones. The industry has developed the following:

• Long-range drones capable of flying over 1,000 km.

• Strike drones.

• Reconnaissance UAVs.

• UAVs with payload drop capabilities.

• The FPVs.

The Russians have done something similar. While new tank production seems to have risen hardly at all (what the Russians have done is taken and refurbished old armor), UAV production has skyrocketed. One telling example would be the well-known Iranian-designed Shaheds, which Russia first purchased from Iran but is now mass producing (under license) on their own. Here is a chart on that—which is very sobering. 

In just over two years Shahed Production has grown by many multiples. Russian small FPV UAV production has also skyrocketed and there have been adaptations (on both sides) with the introduction of fibre-optic controlled UAVs, which cannot be stopped by Electronic Warfare.

And this means that three years after the full-scale invasion the third Russian and second/third Ukrainian armies are meeting in a war that bears little resemblance to that of early 2022. Their equipment mixes are vastly different, and their ability to maneuver has been transformed (in a severely limited fashion). Their training and doctrines are also very different. One example—the increasing effort put into training (and protecting) FPV UAV pilots. There are so many UAVs being built that one of the greatest limiting factors on using them is having enough trained and competent pilots to fly them. Moreover, more and more efforts are being put into place to protect the pilots that are there—who often have to be relatively close to the battle line.

As more and more UAVs fill the skies over the battlefield, all of these new factors will matter more and arguably advances will become increasingly more difficult—unless and until one side can gain a material advantage through either technological developments, mass production, or the support of allies.

So—never think about what force you have on hand, if you want to understand the course of a war—think of the force that will be built going forward.