Drone saturation near the front line often forces soldiers to walk up to 20 km to reach positions undetected. But 20 km is not the upper limit. Since early 2024, quadcopter-style FPV drones have operated 25–30 km behind enemy lines. The development of fibre-optic drones, immune to electronic warfare, has further changed the game, with an operational range of 20 km. (But), there are no significant technical barriers to extending this range — Ukrainian systems with 30- and 40-km cables already exist. A 50–60 km kill zone may soon be the norm. “Warfare has shifted towards remote, long-range engagements rather than infantry or armor-based operations. Distances have grown, and so have the kill zones,”In recent months, there has been growing discussion of the so-called “kill zone” — a drone-enabled space designed to halt Russian advances. We sought to understand what this concept entails, how it operates, and its limitations.
The Kill Zone Theory
According to Field Manual (FM) 3-90: Tactics, a kill zone is a space where concentrated fire from an ambush is directed at the enemy. Typically, this involves short bursts of intense direct fire. In a broader combat context, direct and indirect fire may be sustained over a broader area and for a longer period.
“A year ago, the grey zone stretched roughly 500 metres to 2 kilometres. Now it has expanded to 5–6 kilometres, and in some directions, up to 7 kilometres,” says Yuriy “Lys”, a senior sergeant in the unmanned systems battalion of the 24th Mechanised Brigade.
This expansion, he explains, is the result of a dramatic rise in unmanned aerial vehicles constantly monitoring and attacking in the area.
“At any given moment, there are around 50 drones in the air — both reconnaissance and strike, ours and theirs,” he notes.
Russia, he adds, is also scaling up its drone capabilities, often mimicking Ukrainian tactics in drone warfare and mine-laying.
“Warfare has shifted towards remote, long-range engagements rather than infantry or armor-based operations. Distances have grown, and so have the kill zones,” he concludes.
Yet the figure of 7 km may already be outdated. Drone saturation near the front line often forces Ukrainian soldiers to walk up to 20 km to reach positions undetected. Russian logistics are reportedly worse, so they are now using pack animals for resupply.
But 20 km is not the upper limit. Since early 2024, quadcopter-style FPV drones have operated 25–30 km behind enemy lines. The development of fibre-optic drones, which are immune to electronic warfare, has further changed the game. Russia has already deployed such drones at scale, with an operational range of around 20 km, while Ukraine is progressing more slowly. However, there are no significant technical barriers to extending this range — Ukrainian systems with 30- and even 40-km cables already exist.
As FPV drones, repeater balloons, aircraft-type drones, and optical navigation systems become more affordable, strike range will only increase. A 50–60 km kill zone may soon be the norm.
This is the logic behind the emerging doctrine of the drone kill zone: an area in which drones strike any target that enters.
One expression of this doctrine is the “Drone Line” project. Its goal is to develop elite unmanned units and spread their tactics across the broader military. Ukrayinska Pravda reported that the immediate objective is to stop Russian advances — what comes next will follow.
Senior army sources shared with the Ukrayinska Pravda that Russian breakthroughs only happen where they manage to overwhelm weaker Ukrainian units. For example, where elite brigades like the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade are deployed, there is confidence that the unit will hold even if electronic warfare fails or drones are grounded.
“But elite units are often flanked by weaker ones whose commanders are still adjusting to modern warfare. That’s where Russian forces break through. And when the flank collapses, the stronger unit must also fall back to avoid encirclement.”
One of the developers explains that the Drone Line is intended as a buffer behind these vulnerable units, helping them hold their ground. Over time, the idea is for these UAV-heavy formations to stabilize specific sectors and eventually train and strengthen the line units ahead of them.
According to Yuriy Fedorenko, commander of the Achilles regiment, this approach lets units fight from fortified positions and conduct systematic reconnaissance and fire missions against the enemy.
These UAV regiments are unlikely to be stretched across the entire 1,200-km front. Instead, they will concentrate on the most difficult sectors.
The broader goal is to put initiative in the hands of experienced UAV units that understand the evolving dynamics of drone warfare. This strategy favours horizontal coordination at the tactical level over centralised command doctrine updates.
A Shifting Concept
In reality, what Ukraine now calls a “kill zone” is far from the original military definition. It is not a space of guaranteed destruction, but rather one of elevated risk. Both Russian (the Russians quickly imitate all, with a few exceptions, successful Ukrainian practices, adapting them to their needs) and Ukrainian forces operate within these zones, often remaining in position for extended periods, exposed to but not always hit by drone strikes. Therefore, the infantry “shines” at a minimum and can stay in positions for months.
The true foundation of the kill zone is not firepower, but reconnaissance and coordination. In fact, the term “kill zone” is a popular shorthand for what is essentially a reconnaissance-strike complex. Given sufficient munitions and quality intelligence, artillery could theoretically replace drones as the strike component. In some scenarios, artillery is still more effective. But given the widespread deindustrialization, drones are easier to mass-produce in today’s post-industrial context. Our earlier article, “The Place of Artillery on the Ukrainian Battlefield” (in Ukrainian) explores this in detail.
This is also where problems would begin.
While cheap commercial drones suffice for short-range strikes, deep strikes require aircraft-type reconnaissance drones that can identify, track, and relay targets. Russia has also begun using FPV interceptors — albeit in select elite units like the notorious Rubicon.
These tactics are spreading. Russia’s Airborne Forces have formed dedicated counter-drone units and recently released footage claiming 67 drone kills in three weeks using FPV interceptors. Though this figure pales compared to Ukrainian totals, it points to an emerging trend.
Like Ukraine, Russia increasingly relies on a network of anti-drone radars — a sign of institutional effort, not just isolated unit-level innovation. And electronic warfare remains a persistent threat to drone operations on both sides.
Countermeasure tactics and problems on the ground
Russia has responded to drone saturation with new assault tactics: fast advances on motorcycles and civilian vehicles, infantry infiltration, and combined-arms assaults. They are now less reliant on heavy armour, the Soviet reserves of which are also gradually being depleted, making them both vulnerable and in dwindling supply.
“The Russians are trying to disperse their forces — using infantry, motorcycles, ATVs, and light vehicles. The terrain of the Chasiv Yar area itself is not very favorable for using heavy equipment,” Yuriy “Lys” notes.
According to him, this is challenging for Ukraine’s drone units.
“This is a big problem for us, since these are mobile groups that we must constantly track and deploy a large number of strike drones. But our tactics of reconnaissance, fire damage, and mining the roads are yielding results,” he adds.
The strain on drone operators is significant. During the Kursk campaign, following the arrival of North Korean units, North Korean infantry used mass attacks to overwhelm UAV operators and break through Ukrainian infantry’s positions.
At the same time, the Ukrainian military noted that with a sufficient supply of cluster munitions, 60–70% of such mass assaults could be repelled.
Strike drone units face a low rate of fire, since the drone operator can use only one drone at a time: each operator can launch one drone every 10–15 minutes, with hit rates varying between 20–40%.
And small FPV drones, due to the limited weight of the warhead, often struggle against dispersed infantry or fortified targets, sometimes requiring dozens of hits to destroy a single vehicle.
Most FPV drones still rely on analog communication, limiting the number that can be deployed simultaneously due to frequency congestion. Units must coordinate drone use, effectively “waiting in line.”
Despite the losses, Russia continues to deploy large numbers of motorcycles (reports show Ukrainian units destroyed about a hundred (!) motorcycles along with dozens of armored vehicles) in suicidal but sometimes effective assaults, taking advantage of Ukraine’s infantry shortages.
Another Russian tactic is a throwback to the Wagner strategy in Bakhmut: repeated infantry attacks aimed at infiltrating and surrounding Ukrainian positions. Most attackers are killed, but some survive and regroup in abandoned shelters before launching another assault.
Ukrainian intelligence and coordination — especially among weaker units — remains uneven. Occasionally, Russian forces advance in broad daylight with little resistance. These cases are rare, but the need for reinforcement via the Drone Line is rooted in such vulnerabilities.
Conclusion
The idea of a drone-based kill zone emerged as a workaround to several deep-rooted problems that Ukraine cannot solve directly, so it was decided to look for a creative solution.
The first is a severe shortage of infantry. With mobilization lagging, drones have become a stopgap measure. The idea is that “machines should fight, not people.” But drone-centric defence is fragile: once the enemy breaches the zone or suppresses drone operators, resistance crumbles. In such cases, attackers either take empty fortifications or force UAV teams into direct firefights — something that, unfortunately, has already happened.
The second is a lack of conventional firepower and limited capacity to ramp up production, due to industrial decline in both Ukraine and allied countries (Russia faces similar constraints). Drones, by contrast, are easier to scale, relying on global supply chains and commercial components, many from China. This is unsustainable in the long term, but workable for now.
The third is a drastic shortage of officers, competent or otherwise. This leaves gaps in command and slows reform. Ukraine’s military bureaucracy, while organically developed, is not easily replaced.
Therefore, instead of centrally raising the overall average level, it was decided to develop “success stories” that, through natural cooperation with adjacent units, should also raise their level. Instead of raising standards from the top down, the system is betting on horizontal innovation at the front line.
However impressive drone warfare may be, one must not forget that everything ultimately rests on the infantry. No matter how many drones circle overhead, a position without a soldier in the trench will eventually fall. And if the enemy takes it, one can only hope they stop there.
1 comments:
These Christmas sale coupons are a total game-changer! 🎁 I’ve already saved big on gifts for friends and family — and even treated myself to a little something.
Post a Comment