Ukraine Has Halved Russia's Bomber Launched Cruise Missile Capability

Ukraine's long range attacks on Russia's strategic bomber fleet and related strikes against Russian missile and aircraft manufacturing capabilities have done their job.

Russian attacks on Ukraine using cruise missiles fired by strategic bombers have dropped in half, largely because of the destruction of Russian bombers and the factories making the missiles. This demonstrates the effectiveness of Ukraine's targeting and execution of such attacks. JL

Stefan Korshak reports in the Kyiv Post:

A critical piece of Russia’s long-range force military projection capability – cruise missiles dropped by a strategic bomber in the air thousands of kilometers away from the target – is half of what it was a year ago. Russia’s bomber fleet has fewer flyable airplanes, and Russian missile manufacturers are delivering fewer missiles to military airfields. (The reasons are) losses to Russia’s bomber fleet inflicted by Operation Spiderweb, largely responsible for a 42% drop in air-launched cruise missile counts fired , long-range Ukrainian drone strikes targeting Russian missile plants.

A critical piece of Russia’s long-range force military projection capability – cruise missiles dropped by a big strategic bomber in the air thousands of kilometers away from the target – is around half of what it was a year ago.

A Kyiv Post review of Ukrainian Air Force data and information platforms assesses that Russia’s bomber fleet has fewer flyable airplanes, and Russian missile manufacturers seem to be delivering fewer missiles to military airfields. In addition, long-range Ukrainian drone strikes have been targeting Russian missile plants.

Quoting sources in Ukraine’s SBU, the national spy agency, the Ukrainian security research group on Tuesday reported Russia’s heavy bomber fleet during April and May was able to launch an average of 33 cruise missiles in a nighttime massed strike, and that in June and July the figure had fallen to an average of 19 cruise missiles.

 

The report linked the weakening strength of the Russian missile attacks against Ukrainian homes and businesses with the SBU’s daring June 1 Operation Spiderweb, which attacked Russia’s heavy bomber fleet.

SBU operators flying FPV drones concealed in civilian cargo trucks and launched in proximity of four major Russian air bases, destroyed or damaged 41 Russian Air Force aircraft on the ground, video from the strikes showed. Ukraine’s military claimed about one out of three heavy bombers in the entire Russian Air Force had been put out of action.

 

Bomber types hit in the surprise drone attacks deep inside Russia included Tu-95MS turboprops (NATO reporting name: “Bear”), Tu-160 supersonic naval strike jets (NATO reporting name: “Blackjack”) and Tu-22M jets (NATO reporting name “Backfire”).

Losses to Russia’s bomber fleet inflicted by Operation Spiderweb, according to that report, are largely responsible for a 42 percent drop in air-launched cruise missile counts fired by the Kremlin at Ukraine, the article said.

 

Missile counts in Russia’s nighttime strikes against Ukrainian homes and businesses are in fact falling, but the causes are probably more than just a bomber deficit, other sources said.

Notwithstanding Operation Spiderweb’s success, some of Russia’s biggest strikes against Ukraine actually took place in the weeks immediately afterward: 479 drones and 20 missiles on June 8-9; 200-plus drones and 41 air-launched cruise missiles (along with 20 missiles of other types) on June 29; and 539 drones and 11 air-launched cruise missiles on July 3-4.

But Russian firepower deployed against Ukraine in 2024 was worse. The most punishing single attack of the entire war, probably, took place on August 26–27 2024, involved 127 missiles, some 70 percent of which were cruise missiles and 30 percent of which were ballistic missiles.

Over the course of August 2024 Russian bombers, based on open-source counts, probably launched 80-90 cruise missiles at targets Ukraine. In November 2024, during Russian strikes probably intended to destroy Ukraine’s power grid (they failed), again between 80-90 cruise missiles were fired.

In July 2025, the last full month of attacks, the figure was around 30 air-launched cruise missiles, Kyiv Post researchers found. Even three months previously, on March 6-7, the heaviest Russian missile attack on Ukraine of the month, Russian bombers dropped a reported 35 cruise missiles.

 

The downward trend has held in August 2025. In the most recent substantial massed air weapons attack by Russia against Ukraine, overnight Aug. 18-19, Russian bombers launched only five Kh-101 cruise missiles, but Kremlin strike planners beefed up the attack with five ballistic missiles carrying warheads up to 800 kilograms and launched from the ground, and 230 drones, some carrying warheads in the 50–90-kilogram range, and others deployed as decoys.

Ukrainian air defense units later claimed shootdowns of two ballistic missiles and four cruise missiles, and more than 80 percent of the drones. The weapons that reached their targets badly damaged energy infrastructure in the cities Kremenchuk and Poltava. The cities of Sumy, Dnipro, Odesa and Kyiv also were hit. A reported 8 civilians died and 21 were injured.

The most recent Russian strike, overnight August 19-20, was less ambitious and less deadly: 2 surface-to-surface ballistic missiles (1 shot down), 91 drones (61 shot down) and no bomber-launched cruise missiles at all, a Wednesday Ukrainian Air Force statement said.

 

Published Ukrainian military intelligence reports have suggested Russia’s armaments industry probably assembles 30 to 50 air-launched cruise missiles for the Russian Air Force monthly. Access to critical high-grade military electronics manufactured outside Russia is a confirmed bottleneck.

According to Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, HUR, the most common cruise missile manufactured by Russia in quantity, the Kh-59, contains dozens of advanced components sold by US firms (Cypress Semiconductor, Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, Marvell Technology, Intel, Spansion, Linear Technology, Skyworks Solutions, Maxim Integrated Products, Integrated Silicon Solutions), as well as a few from Europe (MTechnology – Switzerland, NXP Semiconductors – the Netherlands). Sanctions in effect have reduced but not eliminated Russian access to these critical parts.

Russia’s most advanced air-launched cruise missile, the Kh-101, as currently produced contains at least 138 specific military-grade electronic components produced largely in the US and so subject to sanction, but with a few components produced in Taiwan, China, the Netherlands and Japan. Taiwan has placed limited export bans on potential dual-use components to Russia, China has not. 

According to open sources, Ukraine has attacked Russian cruise missile plants at least twice: on May 28-29, 2025, and Aug. 11, 2025.

The first strike hitting the Raduga Design Bureau in Moscow region was Ukraine’s biggest massed drone attack of the war, according to some reports, with close to 300 drones launched at the factory itself or into airspace elsewhere in Russia as decoys.

 

Russian official statements said all the drones were shot down and no damage caused. However, independent news reports and local social media showed most likely there were hits and fires ignited in workshops and assembly line buildings. Hit count estimates varied from 10 to 20 aircraft.

A reported 10 to 15 long-range drones hit the Arzamas Instrument-Building Plant in Nizhny Novgorod region on Aug. 11. The factory produces components for Kh-101, Kh-32, and Kh-59 cruise missiles along with military electronics for aircraft. At least three drones hit the plant. A fire and structural damage were reported. The plant officials said all the drones were shot down and that the attack did not affect production.