Ukraine's Growing Ground, Deep Strike Ability Reinforces That Russia Cannot Win

Not only has Ukraine repeatedly stopped Russia on the ground in the place - Pokrovsk - where it has invested the most resources, but it is unveiling a growing capability to launch deep strikes against Russia's most important oil, air and missile assets which the Russians are clearly incapable powerless to stop. And in addition, Europe stands even more united in its support of Ukraine.

The conclusion is that Russia simply cannot win this war, even with China and the US doing all they can to support it. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

Even with limitations on weapons and intelligence, the Ukrainians have severely hurt the Russians on the ground and air. Increasingly effective Ukrainian long-range strikes reinforces that Russia cannot win this war. And Russia’s ability to convince certain foreign politicians that it is winning the war greatly exceeds its ability to do so. Russia now is making only minor gains on the ground for massive human and material losses. Ukraine has unveiled multiple new long-range strike weapons which will add to Ukraine’s already-impressive ability to penetrate Russian air defences and hit targets deep inside Russia; demonstrating a particular skill for hitting Russian oil and missile capabilities, which is having an impact on Russia’s war making capacity.  Russia faces expanding Ukrainian strikes against economic and military targets in Russia it is powerless to stop.

Even with one hand tied behind their back by limitations on foreign weapons and intelligence use, the Ukrainians have severely hurt the Russians with their offensive capacity on the ground and the air.

This increasingly capable and effective Ukrainian long-range strike capability reinforces that Russia cannot win this war. And this has made one thing particularly clear in the past year. Russia’s ability to convince certain foreign politicians that it is winning the war greatly exceeds its ability to actually do so.

There is an often-used metaphor that is employed to challenge Russian narratives about success in this war. It goes like this:

Imagine it is 2006. It is three years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. After three years, America has only succeeded in taking 20% of the country, has not yet toppled Saddam Hussein, and has suffered over one million casualties. Would we view this as ‘winning’?

I think it is a useful framework for examining military and strategic success and failure in this war. But I would add another layer to this metaphor which, I believe, really brings home the precarious position that Russia is in. The additional layer is this:

Imagine again that it is 2006, and in addition to the ongoing operations in Iraq with the conditions described previously, that Iraq is undertaking a widespread serious of strikes against oil and gas production, refining and storage facilities across America.

Do we seriously think that this would not have a massive impact on American politics, war policy and the economy? It would certainly have an influence on domestic views of winning and losing and would objectively indicate that America was not winning.

This is the situation that Russia now faces. It is making only minor gains on the ground for massive human and material losses. It is facing an expanding series of Ukrainian strikes against economic and military targets in Russia that it appears powerless to stop.

Let me restate my hypothesis: Ukraine’s long-range strike operations reinforce that Russia cannot win this war.

Russia can only be handed a victory through a political process, which is why Putin is so desperate to convince the Trump administration about land transfers, to deny the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine and to influence Ukrainian foreign policy.

Nothing demonstrates this more than the increasingly dangerous (for Russia) long-range strike campaign being executed with precision, focus and discipline by Ukraine.

It is precise because the Ukrainian long-range attack systems employ a mix of indigenous and foreign intelligence and targeting assistance that ensures drones and missiles have the best chance of reaching and hitting their targets. It is focused because the Ukrainians are keeping a tight focus on just a few strategic classes of targets. And it is disciplined because despite the Russian focus on hitting civilian targets, Ukraine continues to avoid this practice as it has done throughout the war.

Throughout the war, one of the topics to which I have regularly returned has been the development of Ukraine’s strategic strike complex. Now, after three and a half years, Ukraine possesses has a very mature and highly lethal strike system which incorporates Western, former Soviet, indigenous and commercial elements.

This long-range strike capability has been a vital development for the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022. They have developed an increasingly capable range of weapons to hit further into Russia and hold a wider range of strategic targets at risk. Ukraine has done this to degrade Russian military capability, executing active measures to reduce Russian missile strikes on its citizens and infrastructure. But these long-range strikes are not just military affairs; they are also a political necessity.

The timing of this assessment is based on the convergence of three factors. First, Ukraine has recently unveiled multiple new long-range strike weapons, including the new Flamingo missile, which will add to Ukraine’s already-impressive ability to penetrate Russian air defences and hit targets deep inside Russia. Second, Ukraine is demonstrating a particular skill for hitting Russian oil and missile development and launch capabilities, which is having an impact on Russia’s war making capacity. And finally, the ability of Ukraine to hurt Russia strategically is a significant aspect of their leverage in the ongoing, though stilted, peace process.