Russia's Pokrovsk Debacle Emblematic of Decreasing Ability To Change the War

The latest figures for the war in Ukraine and if you are a Kremlin official, they make grim reading. Russian advances have halved despite the same number of attacks. Casualties are consistent. The Ukrainians are advancing opportunistically and, as at Dobropillia, trapping Russian units in kill zones. 

The larger analysis reveals that despite its constant, grinding assaults, Russia's ability to impose battlefield changes is decreasing. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

The Russia infiltration north of Pokrovsk has been a Russian debacle. In September 2025, according to the analysts at Deep State, Russian advances halved from August—even though the number of attacks remained similar. The changes in the battle line are so relatively small that seeing them on a map is not easy. We have now had two years of almost constant Russian offensives, of the Russians raising mass formations (say 30,000 new soldiers a month) and expending them on the battlefield, and their ability to change the dynamic there seems if anything to be decreasing.

In September 2025, according to the analysts at Deep State, Russian advances halved from August—even though attacks remained pretty similar.

Moreover, Russian advances slowed markedly in the second half of the month, with them taking only 30 sq km in the last ten days of September according to the Institute for the Study of War.

The changes in the battle line are so relatively small that seeing them on a map is not easy. Here is the most up to date Deep State map (from October 4—which shows almost no change from September 30 it needs to be stressed).

And here is the same exact map on 1 September 2025.

We have now had two years of almost constant Russian offensives, of the Russians raising mass formations (say 30,000 new soldiers a month) and expending them on the battlefield, and their ability to change the dynamic there seems if anything to be decreasing. Its a sign that the land war is getting, if anything, more horrific and transparent. Spotting soldiers and equipment is becoming easier as more and more drones survey the field and the range of fibre-optic, FPV drones lengthens. As Andriy Zagorodnyuk wrote in an article I have referred to a few times, the “kill-zone” of the land war is, if anything growing. Unless one side or the other gains a technical or mass adaptation advantage, its hard to see this changing.

This reality is one of the reasons I have tried to caution people against listening too much to the voices that are clamoring for Ukraine to draft all its young men and send them to the front. The land war is a charnel house, and having more and more forces there will lead to more slaughter more than anything else. If the Ukrainians can stop the Russians with machines, that is what they should prioritize.

It even makes me a little queasy to hear Ukrainian talk about a counter offensive. Zelensky has said this a number of time over the last few weeks. It could be that the counter offensive is a series of small, focussed counterattacks to provide Ukraine a better defensive line to inflict losses on Russia—or indeed that he is referring to the operation to cut off the Russia infiltration north of Pokrovsk (which has been a Russian debacle).