Russian Casualties Rise Suggests Limited Pokrovsk Impact On War

Russia's casualties are rising again, as they have at the end of every other year since the invasion. The reason is that Putin is always desperate to be able to claim some momentum or other success. 

But most experts now concur that there is little likelihood of changes in the trajectory of the war and that the Kremlin does not seem able to achieve an outcome that could be described as a win given the losses, the failure to advance beyond initial gains from four years ago and the slow motion collapse of the Russian economy. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina :

It is unlikely that Pokrovsk’s loss to Russia will have a major impact on the war. Russian casualties have shown an increase as the calendar year draws to a close. This increase has been observed in all four autumn-winter periods of this war. The only assessment that can be made is that Ukraine is killing enough Russians to ensure that Russia cannot win this war, but not killing enough to change Putin’s calculus. In four years, Russia has lost over one million troops, taken less than 20% of Ukraine and is suffering massive damage to its economy. But that won’t stop Putin from seeking to influence Trump. Unless there is a drastic increase in the number of Russians killed and the kill ratio between Ukraine and Russia improves, it is hard to see any drastic changes in the trajectory of this war.

As expected, and forecast in previous weekly updates, Russian average weekly casualties have shown an increase as the calendar year draws to a close. This increase has been observed now in all four autumn-winter periods of this war. The increase coincides with the desire of the Russian government to achieve significant Russian strategic objectives.

In 2022, it was the escalation in Russian operations around Bakhmut. Last year, it was Putin’s desire to capture as much territory as possible to shape the views of Presidential contender Trump. This nnyear, Putin seeks the capture of Pokrovsk to again shape the narrative it rolls out to the Trump administration and it to put itself in a favourable position for subsequent operations in Donetsk.

We should expect the average casualties to rise over the next two months at least. Despite this, the only assessment that can be made with these figures is that Ukraine is killing enough Russians to ensure that Russia cannot win this war, but is not killing enough to change Putin’s calculus. Unless there is a drastic increase in the overall number of Russians killed (which the Commander of the USF has discussed) and the kill ratio between Ukraine and Russia improves, it is hard to see any drastic changes in the trajectory of this war.

 

The Battle for Pokrvosk began in earnest in July 2024, and since then, the Russians have maintained the Pokrovsk axis of advance as their ground operations main effort. Even when Ukraine executed its incursion into Kursk in 2024, Russia sustained its efforts on the Pokrovsk axis of advance. As I wrote at the time:

For the foreseeable future therefore, both Ukraine and Russia must commit to conducting two major ground campaigns concurrently. While Russia is probably better placed to resource two such campaigns, neither Ukraine nor Russia is likely to be able to do so into 2025…Unfortunately, as stunning and clever as the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk has been, it may not change Putin’s overall war goals. Previous setbacks, including the Russian Army’s defeat in its 2022 Kyiv offensive, its defeats in Kharkiv and Kherson as well as the international sanctions regime, have not modified Putin’s overall goal of subjugating Ukraine and destroying its capacity to exist as a sovereign, prosperous democracy.

And so this campaign has played out. The Ukrainian Kursk campaign is largely over. Russia, freed from its need to clear the Ukrainians from Russia soil, has continued to throw troops at the Battle for Pokrovsk and to prepare for subsequent advances.

Progression of Russia's double envelopment of Pokrovsk since May 2025. Images: ISW

What will be the political and military impacts of a possible fall of Pokrovsk?

Political Impacts. The biggest impact of a fall of Pokrovsk will be to reinforce Russian strategic messaging about inevitable victory in this war. Of course, this proposition has no evidence given that in four years, Russia has lost over one million troops, taken less than 20% of Ukraine and is suffering massive damage to its economy from Ukrainian aerial assaults. But that won’t stop Putin, Lavrov and others from seeking to influence the Trump administration to pressure Ukraine to ‘stop the killing.’

The fall of Pokrovsk probably won’t do wonders for Zelenskyy’s popularity but he retains broad popularity and support of two thirds of the population. It is unlikely that Pokrovsk’s loss to Russia will have a major impact on Zelenskyy’s government given that he can demonstrate that the military has done everything possible to defend it. And, given the need to preserve the army is more important that retaining what is essentially now a dead city with no value as a logistics hub, the smart political move soon will be to withdraw Ukrainian troops while they can do so in good order.

Military Impacts. In many respects, the fall of Pokrovsk will simplify things for senior Ukrainian commanders in Eastern Ukraine. They will have straightened the defensive line, potentially allowing them to form some operational reserves to deny the Russians further advances if they take Pokrovsk.