Kremlin "False Narrative" Belies Failure To Take Pokrovsk Despite 120 Day Presence

Objective observers are calling out the Kremlin's 'false narrative' of victory, intended to convince western - and particularly, White House - audiences that the Russians gains are significant. 

In reality, Russian troops have been present within Pokrovsk for over three months but have failed to secure neighborhoods, let alone take the city. These assessments point out that the slow Russian advance has been so costly that Kremlin has been forces to redeploy more elite units in order not to further lose ground to the Ukrainians. JL

The Institute for the Study of War reports:

The Kremlin continues to advance a false narrative that Ukraine’s front line and political stability are on the verge of collapse in an effort to convince the West to capitulate to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure militarily. The Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk remains prolonged and costly as Russian forces can only achieve a slow rate of advance and have failed to seize Pokrovsk entirely despite occupying positions within the town for over 120 days. Costly urban warfare within Pokrovsk has weakened the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army forcing the Russian command to commit the relatively elite 336th Naval Infantry Brigade and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. ISW continues to assess that a Russian battlefield victory is not imminent.

The Kremlin continues to advance a false narrative that Ukraine’s front line and political stability are on the verge of collapse in an effort to convince the West to capitulate to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure militarily. ISW continues to assess that a Russian battlefield victory is neither imminent nor inevitable and that the Russian war effort has vulnerabilities the West has not exploited. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on a Russian state television program aired on November 30 that Ukraine’s battlefield and internal problems worsen every day.[19] Peskov also accused the Ukrainian government of stalling the peace negotiations process, despite the fact that Ukrainian delegations were actively negotiating the terms of the US-proposed peace deal with US counterparts since reports of the proposal emerged in mid-November 2025, including on November 30, and agreed to terms that Russia has not.[20] Peskov’s latest statements are likely part of the Kremlin’s consolidated cognitive effort to create a false sense of urgency over Russia’s claimed inevitable victory — and that Ukraine and the West should therefore immediately concede to Russia’s demands before the situation worsens for Ukraine.[21]

Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to contradict the Kremlin’s efforts to portray Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent or inevitable, however. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged that the tactical battlefield situation favors Russia, particularly near Hulyaipole, but stated that Russian state media coverage of Russian progress on the battlefield once again resembles “joyfully idiotic, rosy, self-indulgent nonsense” that does not support the war effort.[22] The milblogger stated that such narratives of an imminent Russian victory create the false perception domestically that the Russian society no longer needs to urgently support the war effort against Ukraine, a competent adversary that uses NATO equipment and intelligence. The milblogger also noted that continuing the war effort in Ukraine will cost Russia further state resources amid growing societal dissatisfaction with the introduction of new fees and rising taxes in 2026.[23] The milblogger added that Russia continues to face manpower shortages and that the ongoing volunteer recruitment campaign is not generating a sufficient number of forces to demobilize Russian personnel that the Kremlin involuntarily called up in September 2022. Girkin similarly assessed in a letter published on November 26 that Russia could develop its possible future seizures of Hulyaipole and Orikhiv into operational successes only if Russia has enough reserves to exploit these tactical advances.[24] Girkin observed that the most recent six-month Russian offensive on Kupyansk did not result in a “big victory” and assessed that Russian efforts to seize the “secondary” objectives of Pokrovsk, Vovchansk, Siversk, and Lyman are only tactical and will not be quick, will not degrade the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian military writ large, and will not collapse the front lines. Girkin implied that Russia has enough troops to support tactical advances but lacks the necessary reserves and resources to achieve its strategic goals, such as seizing Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv cities. ISW continues to assess that while the situation in some specific sectors of the front line is serious, particularly in Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, the Kremlin’s efforts to present Russia’s victory in Ukraine as inevitable do not correspond to the battlefield reality.[25] It is notable that the Kremlin’s misrepresentation of the situation on the ground was so far from reality that prominent pro-war milbloggers and ultranationalist figures continue to feel compelled to issue their own corrective statements.[26]

The Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk remains prolonged and costly as Russian forces are optimized for positional warfare and can only achieve a slow rate of advance. Russian forces continue to make slow advances and have failed to seize Pokrovsk entirely despite occupying positions within the town for over 120 days.[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 30 that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces to the southern outskirts of Rodynske during counterattacks.[28] Mashovets added that)

 costly urban warfare within Pokrovsk has weakened elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), forcing the Russian military command to commit elements of the relatively elite 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet

 in the neighboring Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area to the 51st CAA’s efforts west of the Kazennyi Torets River (northeast of Pokrovsk and southeast of Dobropillya) and in the Novoekonomichne-Myrnohrad direction (east and north of Pokrovsk).[29] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are unable to transport armored vehicles across the Kazennyi Torets River to their foothold west of the river, forcing Russian infantry to operate unsupported in the foothold — further constraining the rate of Russian advance on the northeastern shoulder of the Pokrovsk encirclement. Geolocated footage published on November 29 and 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian bridge-laying vehicles and armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) east of Boikivka, south of Pankivka, and west of Novotoretske (all southeast of Dobropillya) as the vehicles attempted to cross the Kazennyi Torets River.[30] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on November 28 that Russian forces are not fully leveraging their numerical superiority in drones and manpower and that the presence of Russian forces in Pokrovsk is not a reason for Ukrainian forces to retreat from the town.[31] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 30 that Russian forces sent poorly trained, recently recruited personnel into the first wave of assaults, followed by relatively better-trained personnel.