Why Putin Should Declare Victory Now...Before It's Too Late

A growing chorus of experts are asking the same daunting question of the Kremlin: what if this - the Russian position in midsummer 2025 is as good as it is going to get?

The summer offensive has been largely disappointing. The Russian military is basically out of armor. It has become totally reliant on North Korea and, to a lesser extent, China, for weapons and ammunition. It is importing wage slaves from even more impoverished countries to try to fill its workforce needs depleted by constant rounds of conscription and casualties. It's economy is widely reported to be cratering. In the 1960s and 70s, after losing embarrassing wars to the much smaller Israelis, the so-called "Egyptian Army strategy" was to declare victory, have a parade - and go home. While this could be humiliating for Putin, it might save him from a worse fate if the war of attrition causes Russia to fall further behind other powers on which it has become even more dependent. The smart move might be to quit while not behind. JL

Thomas Graham reports in The National Interest:

Russia is unlikely to improve current conditions by prolonging the war without severely depleting resources it will need to compete against other great powers in the future. The longer the attrition continues, the weaker Russia will become relative to (competing) powers in a multipolar world. Technologically, Russia is falling behind as it allocates resources to current military requirements. Its room for maneuver on the global stage will narrow as a consequence of the war.  From the US standpoint, it degrades Russia’s military capabilities at little expense to the US, while, from the Chinese perspective, it deepens Russia’s dependence on China. Prosecuting the war further saps the strength Russia will need in the intensifying great-power competition shaping world events. An astute strategist would recognize that it’s time to declare victory. 

Though Russia holds most of its desired territory in Ukraine, prolonging the war weakens its global position. Strategically, declaring victory now could preserve Russian power in an emerging multipolar world.

The grisly Russia-Ukraine war is well into its fourth year with no end in sight. Russia has the advantage on the battlefield, pounding Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, defense industries, and major cities from the air and slowly but steadily pushing the front lines deeper into Ukraine. The cost in Russian lives lost and materiel destroyed is staggering. The dead and wounded now number north of one million; the materiel losses are incalculable, but Russia’s stocks of weapons have been depleted to the extent that it relies on extra supplies from North Korea and Iran.  

Yet Putin vows that Russia will continue this war of attrition until he has achieved all the goals he set out when he launched the invasion. At the same time, his lead negotiator with the Ukrainians boasts that Russia will fight for decades, as it did in the Great Northern War of the early eighteenth century, if that is what it takes to gain victory. The Kremlin shrugged off President Donald Trump’s recent decision to step up arms deliveries to Ukraine and levy harsh sanctions should Russia not agree to a ceasefire. 

Why Should Russia Declare Victory Over Ukraine?

The great irony is that for all practical purposes, Russia has already largely achieved its goals, while prosecuting the war further saps the strength Russia will need to hold its own in the intensifying great-power competition that will shape world events in the years ahead. An astute strategist would recognize that it’s time to declare victory, 

A year ago, Putin laid out his goals: No NATO membership for Ukraine, Ukraine’s recognition of Russia’s annexation of five of its provinces, its demilitarization, its denazification (code for regime change), and the lifting of Western sanctions. Where do things stand at the moment? 

Now, Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO anytime soon. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the United States and its European allies have emphatically demonstrated that they are not going to risk war with Russia to defend Ukraine. They are not now about to commit to doing just that by admitting Ukraine into the alliance. 

Further, Russia now occupies roughly 85 percent of the Ukrainian territory it has formally annexed. Its land bridge along the Sea of Azov to Crimea is next to impregnable. While Kyiv refuses to recognize de jure Russia’s control of this territory, it has conceded that it cannot regain it by force. Meanwhile, the West will learn to live with these “territorial realities,” as Putin puts it, as they did with the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states during the Cold War. 

America’s Efforts to Stop the Ukraine War Have Been Futile

Negotiations over the character of Ukraine’s neutrality could lead to limits on the size of its armed forces and its security ties with Europe and the United States, which would be seen as demilitarization from the Russian standpoint. 

Moreover, presidential and parliamentary elections are likely to take place soon after the declaration of a ceasefire, resulting in the formation of a new government in Ukraine. The rights of Russians would be guaranteed because, one, Russia already controls the major Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine, and, two, as part of the EU accession process, Ukraine would have to commit to non-discrimination against ethnic Russians and other ethnic minorities. These steps would go a long way toward the regime change that Russia demands. 

With a ceasefire, the United States and Europe would begin the process of incrementally lifting sanctions.  

Russia is unlikely to significantly improve these current conditions by prolonging the war without severely depleting the resources it will need to compete against other great powers in the future. In other words, the longer the war of attrition continues, the weaker Russia will become relative to the different centers of power in the multipolar world that Putin insists is emerging. 

Indeed, this is true about the United States and China. Indeed, as some US and Chinese officials have suggested, both countries have a vested interest in the continuation of the conflict. From the US standpoint, it degrades Russia’s military capabilities at little expense to the United States, while, from the Chinese perspective, it deepens Russia’s dependence on China. 

Russia will also confront a more unified Europe, which, in reaction to Russia’s aggression and out of fear of US abandonment, is finally beginning to develop its hard-power capabilities. Further, it is doing that based on an economy that dwarfs Russia’s. Meanwhile, India’s economy is expected to outpace Russia’s by a wide margin in the years ahead.  

Moreover, technologically, Russia is falling behind the other major powers, as it allocates resources to immediate, non-productive military requirements. In short, Russia’s room for maneuver on the global stage will narrow in the coming years as a consequence of the war. By the middle of the next decade, it could easily prove to be the weakest of the great powers, even if it retains a massive nuclear arsenal. 

A quarter century ago, Putin rose to power determined to reassert Russia’s prerogatives as a great power. Through cautious policies and patience, he did just that. Now, obsessed with Ukraine and intent on achieving total victory, he is slowly eroding the foundations of Russian power and mortgaging his country’s future for short-term gains of dubious value. A clear-eyed strategist would rather take the, granted, not total victory at hand and turn his sights to rebuilding his country for the acute great-power competition that most assuredly lies ahead.