Ukrainian Forces Holding Kharkiv, Kupiansk Have Blocked Russian Offensive Attempts

Russian forces have tried repeatedly to break through Ukrainian defenses around Kupiansk but have been thwarted by Ukrainian infantry and drone units. 

The Russians keep trying, despite their failures, because of the potential reputational and logistics benefits, but their attacks are frequently disorganized and undermanned: they've even tried sending troops across the Oskil River on tire tubes because they dont have assault craft and cannot build pontoon bridges. This sector appears to be another of those in the summer of 2025 where the Russian offensive has ultimately broken down. JL

Vasyl Pekhno reports in New Voice of Ukraine:

In November 2024, the order came - reportedly from Putin - to capture Kupiansk and the Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi rail junction. Today, both remain under Ukrainian control. We’ve had no losses of ground in that area, despite ongoing pressure. In July, this was the only sector where the Russians twice tried to use armor - tanks and APCs - to break our lines. Both times they were destroyed before reaching the front. They couldn’t build pontoon bridges. They crossed in inflatable boats, or even truck tire tubes. Some made it across; others were hit mid-river. Re-taking Kupiansk is a priority because they could restore rail connections and would be a symbolic victory. But they have been stopped and blocked. 

Commander of the 429th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment Achilles, Yuriy Fedorenko, in an interview with Radio NV, on the Kupiansk sector as one of Russia’s key priorities, and the broader threat from Moscow that spans more than eight Ukrainian oblasts and Crimea.

 

— The enemy is doing what it can.

When it comes to the state border — the long stretch between Russia and Ukraine — the Russians have been actively scouting our defensive positions since 2024. Their sabotage and reconnaissance groups have operated along the entire border.

They’ve repeatedly tried to cross into Ukraine with small teams, often resorting to deception — dressing in Ukrainian military “pixel” camouflage or civilian clothing to pass as locals.

So, one way or another, Kharkiv Oblast is crucial for the enemy. The border is long, and the distance from the current front line to Kharkiv’s administrative limits is short. This forces us to keep a certain number of forces and assets here that we can’t send elsewhere — to Sumy, for example, or to reinforce Donetsk.

In the spring of 2025, Russia launched an active offensive in Kharkiv Oblast. Let’s break down the key directions briefly but clearly.

The shortest distance from Russian forward positions to Kharkiv city limits is in the Lypetska community. In 2024, the enemy broke through there but was stopped in open fields by the legendary 92nd Assault Brigade — then still known as the Khartia Brigade — along with the 58th Brigade and other units.

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Then came the Kursk operation. While it was underway, and our forces tied down Russian reserves there, our defenders in Kharkiv Oblast used the time to strengthen their positions — forward lines, landing zones, movement routes. Perfect fortifications don’t exist, but compared to 2024, the difference is like night and day.

After being blocked there, the Russians tried to push forward in two areas of the Kupiansk sector.

Where exactly? Near the village of Kruhlia­kivka, intense assaults took place. In just three days of fighting in September 2024, the Achilles unit — then still a battalion — destroyed 50 pieces of Russian armored equipment. Imagine the intensity. The treelines there were literally piled with enemy dead.

The Russians managed to take the village, on the left bank of the Oskil River, and began preparing a bridgehead for a crossing. But constant fire and blocking maneuvers by our forces stopped them.

By November 2024, their focus shifted. The order came from the very top — reportedly from [Russian dictator Vladimir] Putin himself — to capture Left-Bank Kupiansk and the Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi rail junction. Today, both remain under full Ukrainian control. Since then, we’ve had virtually no losses of ground in that area, despite ongoing pressure. In July, this was the only sector where the Russians twice tried to use armor — tanks and APCs — to break our lines. Both times they were detected and destroyed before reaching the front.

Unable to advance toward Zahryzove or Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, and failing on the left bank, the enemy began probing elsewhere.

— I’ll explain for those who don’t have the map in their heads: Kupiansk, then south along the Oskil is Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi with its rail station. Further south are the Russian salients toward the river from last year’s offensive — but they never managed to expand them.

 

— Right. At the end of 2024 and start of 2025, they began probing upstream, near the village of Dvorichna. At that time, the units there were less capable than those fighting in the hottest zones — Donetsk, and the main Kupiansk sectors.

The Russians massed significant assault forces and crossed the Oskil. But they couldn’t build proper pontoon bridges to secure logistics and hold a strong right-bank bridgehead. Instead, they crossed in inflatable boats, or even truck tire tubes — two soldiers at a time, rushing into the water. Some made it across; others were hit mid-river.

They did manage to seize Novomlynets. We redeployed forces, blocked them, and with help from the Edelweiss unit arriving from another sector, pushed them back into the river within three days.

They later crossed again near Dvorichna and dug in. That’s what you now see on the right bank of the Oskil — Dvorichna and nearby settlements downstream to the northern outskirts. It took them eight months of heavy fighting, with massive losses, to hold and try to expand that bridgehead.

Why is this important to them? Since they can’t take Left-Bank Kupiansk or cross near Kruhlia­kivka, they’re trying to bypass Kupiansk from the northwest — not entering the city but putting our supply routes, including those to the crossings, under fire. This could force us to withdraw without a direct assault.

I can speak openly about this because it’s no secret — either to us, to them, or to the Ukrainian public.

We’ve blocked these attempts. In the past 14 days, they haven’t advanced a single meter. In fact, we’ve been taking steps to improve our positions, retake ground where possible, and tighten the front line to deny them any advantage from the terrain.

Kharkiv Oblast, as anyone who’s been here knows, is wooded. Some treelines are so thick you can’t see what’s beyond them. The Russians try to infiltrate between our positions without direct contact, using the cover. But by tightening our lines in the most active areas and using drones — including Maviks, the so-called “wedding drones” — we can monitor waterways, movement routes, and deliver fire strikes.

They would very much like to raise their rag — the Russian flag — somewhere near Kupiansk by Aug. 24, Ukraine’s Independence Day. We’re making sure that doesn’t happen.

— Why is Kupiansk such a priority? I have a theory, one I’ve discussed with officers of various ranks: Kupiansk and Kharkiv Oblast are Russia’s second priority after Donbas in terms of territory they want to seize. The logic? Secure a line along the Oskil, gain additional logistics capacity — Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, for example, is a massive, strategically important railway hub. Why do they want it so badly?

— First and foremost, it’s logistics. If our forces were pushed back 30 kilometers from Kupiansk, Russia could restore rail connections with its territory once it secured that bridgehead.

We’ve seen this before. In 2022, the enemy actively used every available network route when the front line in Kharkiv Oblast was beyond Chuhuiv. At that time, they fully exploited those logistical links.

So that’s the first reason. The second is symbolism — retaking Kupiansk would be a political win. For Putin, any visible result matters. If it were otherwise, they wouldn’t send in small groups just to plant a flag — three soldiers running in, getting killed, then three more, just to get a drone photo proving they were in a certain settlement.

Yesterday’s incidents were exactly that — provocation. We drove them back, yet they still claimed to have captured something. Politically and strategically, Kupiansk matters to them — especially for logistics.

Why Milove? Because they’re blocked — not only on the right bank of Kupiansk, but also in Vovchansk. Despite intense assaults, they’ve only managed to take a small patch of forest, which we later recaptured. Yes, they have a presence in part of that forest, but to say they control it fully would be wrong. They’ve also tried to activate in the city itself, without success.

What do they need to do? Stretch our defenses — force units like the 429th Achilles Regiment and others with strong drone capabilities and ground components to hold yet another area.

After lengthy reconnaissance, they chose Milove. Strategically, there are routes there they could try to control, but it’s an ambitious goal they haven’t met. They launched assaults, but we anticipated them. The enemy was stopped and blocked. If you look at the public maps over time, you’ll see they’ve made no progress. In fact, our forces have retaken several treelines in joint operations.

So, in line with their means and capabilities, they’ll keep fighting in Kharkiv Oblast. After their experience in Kursk, they also understand something else — our partners could still give us what we need, driven by public sentiment. The reality on the ground doesn’t match the narrative you sometimes see online — that “there’s no one left to fight” or “no one to defend independence.” Ukraine still has plenty of people willing to fight.

The Russians are also worried about threats to their own territory, so they try to act preemptively. But above all, it’s political. They want to increase their presence so they can go to the international stage and say: “It’s not just Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya, Kherson, and Crimea — maybe Kharkiv too.”

Remember Putin’s statement two or three weeks ago — that it’s not just about the oblasts, but also “buffer zones.” That means Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and others between Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kherson are now openly in their sights. He’s already committed to continuing assaults here.

And if they seize even 20% of an oblast, can they claim they “need” it? Of course they can — and they will.

Everyone must understand: the enemy’s goal is not just four oblasts and Crimea. Their real aim is to destroy Ukrainian statehood — to overthrow our government. Full occupation of Ukraine is what they want. That’s why they’ve turned to air terror — because they’re failing at the front.

 

Yes, we’ve lost some ground in the past six months. Yes, every meter matters — each one is soaked in the sweat and blood of Ukrainian soldiers. But if you compare it to the enemy’s losses, they’re fighting in frustration, unable to achieve the results they need to end this war on their terms.

What does Putin remember? The Chechen wars of the 2000s. Chechnya was small — Grozny could be driven around in minutes. Russia’s approach there? In the information space, they labeled the Chechens “militants” and won that propaganda battle, shaping global perception. The second step was mass terror — not just in Grozny, but in villages, using not only air strikes but also rocket artillery and other weapons, to force civilians to capitulate.

Ukraine is vast, and our air defenses keep them from dominating the skies. They can only operate missile carriers near the front. So they’ve shifted to a strategy of terror — trying to drive civilians out, depopulate our cities, and weaken our economy.

What does that achieve? Workforce losses, lower tax revenues, and less capacity for defense. They know the military is part of society — the army wins battles, but the people win wars.

Through terror, they hope to break Ukrainians’ will, force us to capitulate, and pressure our government.

But our nature is different. We’re a freedom-loving people. No “tsar” can order us around. Every major event in our independent history proves this — we don’t take orders, we make agreements. Each strike only fuels our hatred and steels our resolve.

Since the start of mass strikes, one unit in the 429th Achilles Regiment — focused on downing enemy aerial targets and intercepting Shaheds — has seen a recruitment spike of 80%.

— That’s interesting. How close are we to what Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi (known as “Madyar”) described — building a wall higher than the Great Wall of China that would keep Shaheds from penetrating deep into Ukraine?

— Work is underway. Some sectors of the front are already fully covered. But along the entire line of contact, especially in priority areas, the key factor remains the most important capital in war — people.

We can have the best electronic reconnaissance to detect enemy drones, the best electronic warfare to jam them, and interceptors to destroy them. But those systems still need human operators. The more civilians we recruit into specialized units — both those with and without prior military obligations, including women — the more effectively we can use the equipment already in the field. That’s how we can seal the front line and strengthen our national air defense network.