Ukraine "Possesses Initiative" At Pokrovsk, As They Funnel Russians Into Kill Zones

Ukrainian forces are now widely credited with 'possessing the initiative' at Pokrovsk, as Ukraine has adapted more quickly and effectively to both threats and opportunities especially as drones have expanded the 'gray zone' where no one is in complete control and the battle lines are less clear. 

The Ukrainians, having studied the latest Russian military manuals, are now using that information to funnel ever more Russian units into disguised kill zones where they are destroyed by pre-sighted drone and artillery. The Russian inability to adapt - evident since the first days of the invasion - remains a lethal advantage for Ukrainian forces at this latest charnel house battlefield. JL

David Axe reports in Trench Art:

The Ukrainians have mostly destroyed the 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade and carved up the Russian salient. Ukrainian forces “possess the initiative here.” According to the definitive The Russian Way of War, Russian regiments construct fortifications to “protect the forward edge of the defense and canalize the enemy into fire sacs within the defense.” It is especially formidable given Russian commanders’ inability to adapt quickly—and find a safer route for their beleaguered troops. The Russian aren’t deterred by the nearby hulks of numerous destroyed armored vehicles. This strategy, repeatedly used by Ukraine, funnels enemies into kill zones where they are destroyed with concentrated firepower.

In late July or early August, the Russian 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade slipped past Ukrainian trenches east of Rodynske and marched on Dobropillia, which sits astride one of the two main supply lines into Pokrovsk.

The Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps raced toward the breach. In the weeks that followed, the corps may have mostly destroyed the 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade and carved up the Russian salient. Ukrainian forces “possess the initiative here,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies reported.

But how many Russians remain in the salient, and where, is unclear.

 

According to the definitive The Russian Way of War, Russian regiments construct fortifications to “protect the forward edge of the defense and canalize the enemy into fire sacs within the defense.” It is especially formidable given Russian commanders’ inability to adapt quickly—and find a safer route for their beleaguered troops. It was, in fact, a trap. And not the first one Ukrainian troops have sprung along the Russians’ preferred routes as Russia’s wider war on Ukraine grinds into its 43rd month.

Incredibly, the Russian wasn’t deterred by the nearby hulks of numerous destroyed armored vehicles. It’s possible one alternative—trying to jump the trench—scared him more than the prospect of motoring across a possible kill zone.

That stubbornness is still evident a year and a half later as Russians continue riding to their injury or death on that one deadly trench crossing.

Ukrainians outsmart Russians

This strategy, repeatedly used by Ukraine, funnels enemies into kill zones where they are destroyed with concentrated firepower.

 

Uncertainty is becoming the new normal in Ukraine as both sides struggle to recruit enough good infantry and tiny explosive drones increasingly dominate the landscape. The fighting around the fortress city of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast is so fluid and chaotic that the best outside observers—independent analysts and mappers—struggle to make sense of it.

Two leading mappers—Deep State and Unit Observer—have tried to pinpoint the locations of the main Russian and Ukrainian units, as well as the geographic zones of control across a 12-km front stretching from Rodynske to Dobropillia just northeast of Pokrovsk.

Armored vehicles are too easy to spot from the air, so infantry from both sides tend to attack on foot, hoping to sneak unnoticed across a largely empty no-man’s-land that grows wider by the month as more and better drones range farther and farther.

“With manpower shortages and infiltration tactics, the front line in some areas has become far less defined and certain,” explained Tatarigami, the founder of the Ukrainian Frontelligence Insight analysis group.

“It has reached the point where even soldiers on both sides are uncertain about the front line—at least beyond their own unit’s tactical area,” Tatarigami added. “As a result, sources once considered reliable for mappers are no longer as dependable.”