One of Putin’s objectives in 2022 was to ‘demilitarise’ Ukraine. He has achieved the opposite. Ukraine has built its industrial capacity to a remarkable extent. It now provides 60% of its own kit and ammunition. It has become a major innovator in drone warfare. 4.5 million drones will be produced this year. It has unmatched operational experience which it now shares with Europe. Despite its extraordinary battlefield losses Russia continues to fail to make serious gains. Its energy infrastructure is attacked on a daily basis. The West is not doing Ukraine a favor by helping it resist; it is Ukraine doing the West a favor. Russia is clearly the aggressor and Ukraine the aggrieved. Russia is an autocracy, Ukraine a democracy. Because of this Ukraine is being integrated into European security structures, (and) becoming a de facto member of NATO.
Any long war leads to innovations in military technology and tactics and shakes up the established political order. The war in Ukraine is no exception. There has been much commentary on what it means for the character of modern war, especially because of the saturation of the front-lines with cheap and expendable drones. But there has been less on its impact on the conceptual framework with which we think about questions of alliance and security guarantees.
In 2008 the door was opened to eventual NATO membership for Ukraine though without any mechanism to allow it to walk through the door. Yet the possibility that one day Ukraine might join the alliance was used by Moscow to justify the invasion and occupation of its neighbour, and some in the West believe it had a point. Because Moscow has put so much stress on this issue it is now taken for granted, including by Ukraine, that when and if a peace deal is agreed to end this war, NATO membership will be precluded.
This has left Kyiv and its supporters scrambling around to find an acceptable alternative that will guarantee Ukraine’s security should there be a deal. One problem is that the old model of NATO, the model Ukraine wanted to join, has been subverted if not quite done away with by Donald Trump. In this post I will assess the impact on both our thinking and practice of this combination of the US administration’s expectation that European countries will do more to look after not only their own security but also Ukraine’s, and the persistent challenge posed by Russian aggression.
Backing Ukraine
When Russia annexed Crimea and carved out enclaves in eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO countries backed Ukraine, with sanctions against Russia and some arms supplies, though these were limited in both numbers and type. Western countries sought to show their displeasure with Rusia while limiting their own liabilities. That remained the case even after the full-scale invasion of February 2022. The sanctions became more severe and more weapons were delivered, but liabilities were kept limited. The weapons supplied were notionally defensive. Putin made sure, when he announced the ‘special military operation’ that any direct engagement by NATO troops would involve the highest risks:
‘No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.’
The influence of his warning was felt early in the war. Ukraine asked for a No-Fly Zone to protect civilians as Russia began to strike its cities. The proposal was dismissed quickly. The prospect of dogfights between NATO and Russia aircraft led to a collective shudder in NATO capitals.
The message was clear and well understood. Defeating Russian aggression might be a vital interest of NATO countries, but they would not be backing Ukraine with their own armed forces. It took a long time before they were prepared to transfer systems suitable for land offensives, then more time for rockets and missiles able to reach behind the enemy’s front lines, and even longer to add the permissions that allowed them actually to be used against Russian territory.
With every incremental step the Russians repeated their warnings about dire consequences but as each threshold was passed they discovered short of going to war against NATO there was little they could do. Yet while NATO imposed sanctions, provided money and advice, and gradually upped the quality and quantity of the weapons and munitions delivered, there was one threshold that was not to be crossed. Only Ukrainians would do the fighting. For only Ukrainian territory had been invaded and occupied; only Ukrainian cities battered and infrastructure targeted; only Ukrainian men, women, and children killed and injured.
Western states have big stakes in how the war is being fought and its eventual outcome - in energy markets, the risks of a wider war, refugee flows. Most importantly they depend on Russia being held in Ukraine and ideally being pushed back. If instead it pushes forward then the crisis will come with it, and bordering NATO countries will feel vulnerable and anxious. The West is not doing Ukraine a favour by helping it resist aggression; it is Ukraine doing the West a favour. Then there is a moral dimension. Russia is clearly the aggressor and Ukraine the aggrieved. Russia is an autocracy, Ukraine a democracy.
NATO’s semi-detached approach had the advantage of avoiding the risks and rows that would have accompanied a more direct engagement in the war. It made Western support most sustainable. The quality of Ukrainian resistance shown during the first months of the war also suggested that this might be sufficient on its own to help Ukraine win the war. But this always meant asking a lot of Ukraine against a much larger and more powerful neighbour.
As long as it takes
There has, therefore, been a disconnect between Ukraine’s survival as an independent, sovereign country being a vital Western interest, and what is being done to help Ukraine survive. We might even come to do less, if the desire for a quieter life and some semblance of normal relations with Russia leads to reduced support and at worse Ukraine being effectively abandoned. This has clearly been the Russian hope. Starting with the energy crunch in 2022 and continuing with all the current provocations and efforts at sabotage and manipulation, it has tried to show Europeans that they would be well advised to give up on Ukraine. This effort has failed. Despite all the early talk of ‘Ukraine fatigue’ levels of support have been maintained.
From the start, when were asked if they were ready to back Ukraine through the hardships and vicissitudes of war, the allies have insisted that they were. And for how long? Well, they answered, ‘for as long as it takes.’
In May 2022 when European Council President Charles Michel visited Odesa he spoke of how Ukraine was ‘not alone,’ adding: ‘We stand with you. We will not let you down. We will be with you for as long as it takes.’ The same phrase was used regularly by Joe Biden: ‘The American people are with you every step of the way,’ he told Volodymyr Zelenskyy at a press conference in the White House in December 2022, ‘And we will stay as long as it takes.’ Th2 term is still in use, for example in a recent article in the Financial Times by Chancellor Merz of Germany.
This is the reassuring formula used to show readiness to commit for the long haul, to reflect understanding that this is a war with perhaps years to run and that Russia must be given no hope that weariness with the struggle will result in vital assistance falling away.
As a statement of policy it has nonetheless been criticised from two different directions, both for offering too much and for offering too little.
Those who believe it offers too much may take this position because they are sympathetic to Russia and want it to win, or because they consider Ukraine to be undeserving because of its corruption, or because they think - ‘realistically’ - that Russia is bound to win in the end and so Ukraine is just a poor investment. Others who do not want to abandon Ukraine still worry about giving Kyiv a blank cheque and warn about excessive Ukrainian ambitions. Western support, they insist, cannot come with unlimited risks and unlimited resources. Ukraine must adjust its expectations and its methods to fit in with what its allies are prepared to do.
In practice, though never stated quite so starkly, this was the position of the Biden administration. In the most definitive statement on US policy in May 2022, Biden explained why ‘a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine’ was a vital interest and promised that the US will ‘will stay the course.’ But he also explained that he did not seek a war with Russia, nor Putin’s ouster:
‘So long as the United States or our allies are not attacked, we will not be directly engaged in this conflict, either by sending American troops to fight in Ukraine or by attacking Russian forces. We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia.’
Hence the restraints put on Ukraine in its targeting of Russia. This fretting about whether the US would suffer the costs for Ukrainian audacity could be seen in the early stages of the current campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, although this is now one of the most effective elements in Ukrainian strategy.
This leads on to the criticism of the ‘as long as it takes’ formula from the other direction. It lacks ambition. We should not be satisfied just with keeping Ukraine in the fight or preparing for a long haul. The aim must be the defeat of Russia. The stakes are too high to settle for a second-best outcome. For as long as ‘it’ takes. Fine. But what is ‘it?’
That question became more difficult to answer once doubts developed about the ability of Ukraine to defeat Russia. For the ‘limited support’ crowd that showed the dangers of backing objectives beyond Ukraine’s reach. For the ‘unlimited support’ crowd, this was the inevitable result of the West being so shamefully hesitant and reticent. Ukraine would be a lot closer to victory now if only the allies had got their act together earlier and had boosted production of essential equipment and munitions when the need first arose. From this perspective, Ukraine should have been allowed the weapons and permissions needed to take the war to Russia. This critique has force although we also should recognise that it took time for the Ukrainians to adapt to the demands of an intensive war, and that they were hampered by their own capacity constraints, especially with manpower and training.
As a formula ‘as long as it takes’ lacks urgency. It is an option for the allies precisely because they are not doing the fighting. It is also what makes this situation different from the other long wars which the US and its allies struggled to justify as their populations wearied - notably Vietnam and Afghanistan. These were their fights because their people were dying - but without evident purpose. This helps explain the lack of urgency in this case. The commitment to Ukraine is significant but also quite manageable when spread across so many countries.
The question I now want to turn to is whether that commitment can last after the fighting has stopped. There will be support until a ceasefire, but then what? What is to be done to prevent another round of war? How best can Moscow be deterred for coming back for more, to finish the job it started but failed to complete? With security guarantees if there is a next time Ukraine should not be fighting alone. Other countries will be fighting side by side with Ukraine. But is that how it will work out?
The Role of NATO
This takes us to the question of Ukraine’s membership of NATO. Ukraine’s view is that it would not have been invaded if it had been a member of NATO and it will not be invaded in the future if it is allowed to become a member now.
When Moscow objects to this it is because it wants to keep Ukraine vulnerable. It argues, however, and some in the West are sympathetic to this view, that Ukraine joining NATO would be an offensive move, designed to undermine Russia’s security. This is an example of what is known in international relations theory as the ‘security dilemma’. Measures taken by one side for defensive purposes, appear as offensive in intent to the other side, and so they respond, leading to an arms race or even worse.
The role of NATO enlargement in Russia’s decision-making has been endlessly debated as an example of the security dilemma in action and I do not want to dwell on it for too long here.
NATO was aware from the start that additional members might alarm Moscow. The process began with the ‘partnership for peace’, a much looser arrangement which could accommodate a variety of forms of security cooperation with post-communist states. But this is not what the former members of the Soviet bloc wanted. They wanted to join NATO. This was in part just to get closer to the West. Because of the lengthy time horizon for joining the EU, membership of NATO was an attractive, quicker, option. But more importantly these countries wanted it for their security. They had their memories of betrayal – Munich in 1938, when they were abandoned to the Nazis, and Yalta in February 1945, when they were consigned to the Soviet sphere. Enlargement was demand and not supply led.
And who is to say they were wrong? The post-1991 members of NATO do not show much sign of buyer’s remorse, wishing that they had stayed out. By contrast substantial sections of their populations have at times regretted membership of the EU or at least considered it a mixed blessing. While non-NATO countries have been invaded by Russia NATO countries have not. Take the example of Estonia, a country with many Russian-speakers in its population, which joined NATO in 2004. In 2007 it had a major argument with Moscow. The result was a massive cyberattack, which helped turn Estonia into one of the most digitally aware nations. But it was not invaded.
We don’t know the counter-factual of what would have happened if NATO and the EU had not expanded but it is hard to believe that keeping so many states outside of established support structures would have been more stable and mutually beneficial.
Measures were taken to make the process more palatable to Moscow. In 1997 NATO and Russia signed what was described as the ‘Founding Act’ to govern their future relationships. This set up the ‘NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council’ to serve as a venue for consultations, cooperation and consensus building. The two sides insisted that they did not see each other as enemies and also promised to refrain
‘from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence.’
So there was no promise against enlargement but there was also a promise not to use force. The essential principle was that sovereign states could choose their own security arrangements and that this could include membership of NATO.
The most difficult part of the process was always going to be the potential accession of Ukraine and Georgia. This was NATO’s last frontier. Putin was concerned about Georgia and Ukraine joining, not so much because they posed an offensive threat. NATO could promise not to turn them into military base. It was because membership of NATO would consolidate their position as Western-leaning democracies and that is what he wanted to prevent.
With Ukraine there was an added and crucial reason. Putin has an absolute conviction, based on his own, tendentious historical research, that Ukraine has no right to be independent of Russia. In his notorious essay of July 2021 on ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’, NATO is barely mentioned. Putin’s purpose was to demonstrate that Ukraine was an artificial creation with an illegitimate government.
From the moment he returned to the Russian presidency in 2012, Putin was keen for Ukraine to be brought back into the Russian sphere. This explains why he put Victor Yanukovich - as pro-Russian a president in Ukraine as he was likely to get - under so much pressure in 2013 not to sign an association agreement with the EU – with the EU not NATO. Even more so it explains his reaction to the consequential ‘Revolution of Dignity’ with the annexation of Crimea and fomenting a rebellion in eastern Ukraine.
Ukraine’s view is that this would not have happened had its membership been agreed when discussed by NATO at its 2008 Bucharest summit. Instead there was a sloppy compromise which did not rule out future membership without taking any steps to make it possible. Thereafter it was not seriously on the table. If there had been no war Ukraine would still not be a member, though because of the war NATO has enlarged more with Finland and Sweden.
In discussions with Moscow prior to the full-scale invasion, NATO proposed going back to the 1997 Founding Act, which since 2014 had fallen into disrepair. It also promised non-aggression and that no offensive weapons would get too close. We know from a comment by Putin last December that Biden offered to postpone Ukraine’s NATO accession by 10 to 15 years (so contradicting suggestions that Biden had made no effort to find a compromise prior to the full-scale invasion). For Putin such a delay ‘would only be a fleeting moment’ in history. He asked: ‘How, then, does the incoming administration differ from the outgoing one?’ NATO must be ruled out permanently.
It is now assumed that the first item on any negotiating agenda would be to prohibit Ukraine from joining NATO. This was accepted by Trump and in practice by Ukraine. This has led to a search for alternatives, forms of security guarantee that will compensate for being denied NATO’s precious Article V.
Alternatives to Article V
The term ‘security guarantees’ has been so long in use and its meaning is apparently so clear that it does not get subjected to much scrutiny. The basic idea, central to the concept of alliance, is that if attacked others will immediately come to assist. Nothing is ever truly guaranteed in international affairs. As with all guarantees, there is always small print that allows the guarantor some room for manoeuvre. It is one thing to rush to support a country that has been the victim of naked aggression but quite another to back one that has been acting irresponsibly or is in so much difficulty that no rescue Is possible.
This is what NATO’s Article V says:
‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.’
Should such an attack occur each Party agrees to assist those attacked
‘by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’
So there is no automaticity. The get-out clause is that an ally will act as it ‘deems necessary.’ It may deem it necessary to do nothing at all. The unavoidable doubts surrounding whether Article V would be honoured in practice is not helped by the requirement that it must cover the most extreme contingency, that is nuclear war.
Yet it has held. Even allowing for recent provocations, Russia has stayed clear of posing an Article V test to NATO. Nato is the most powerful and durable alliance in history, led by a superpower, the United States. While nobody knows what would happen if a true test came, Moscow knows it would be taking a big risk if it tried to find out. Because alliance is preferable to standing alone, states are prepared to live with its inherent uncertainty. Despite its lack of automaticity this remains the gold standard for security guarantees.
But is not the treaty language that makes a security guarantee credible. It is not only the commitments behind it and whether the parties can be trusted to keep their word. It is also, in NATO’s case, the integrated military command, the interoperability of forces, the joint deployments and exercises. When reassurance is need because of particular threats - as with the Baltic states - then forces are moved to vulnerable areas to demonstrate that allies will be engaged from the start. It works because it is an active alliance, and not left dormant until an emergency arises.
Ukraine has had paper promises before. In 1994 Ukraine gave up the nuclear arsenal inherited from the old Soviet Union. In the Budapest Memorandum the US, UK, and Russia, and then later France and China, undertook ‘to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine’, which meant not threatening force or engaging in economic coercion, and to provide assistance ‘if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.’
Not much ambiguity there yet when Crimea was annexed in 2014 by Russia, the others did little other than complain and impose limited economic sanctions. When Putin was asked about the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty he explained that the changed government in Kyiv meant that ‘a new state arises, but with this state and in respect to this state, we have not signed any obligatory documents.’
During negotiations on a peace deal in the weeks after the 2022 invasion Zelenskyy agreed not to join NATO but sought alternative form of security guarantees. At best they pointed to another version of the Budapest memorandum, with other states asked to pledge their support to Ukraine in the event of future aggression. One reason these talks ended in April 2022 was that Russia changed the draft treaty language so that any action would require that all would-be guarantors, including Russia, acted with unanimity.
As Trump moved to get a quick deal on ending the war at the start of his second term, and with his apparent view that Ukraine was responsible for its own misfortune, there was concern that Kyiv might be put under pressure to accept an unsatisfactory settlement that would leave it vulnerable - not only without NATO but without anything else in its place. Trump was persuaded that some arrangement was necessary though not that the US would need to be part of it. When the Europeans, led by Britain and France, came up with the idea of the ‘coalition of the willing’, a collection of countries that would commit to Ukraine’s long-term security outside of the NATO framework, he not only thought this was a good idea but one that would be acceptable to Moscow.
The Kremlin rushed to make clear that European troops on Ukrainian soil was unacceptable, although as is so often the case it is not clear that Trump noticed. At any rate when the Alaska summit gave a momentary push to a deal, leading European leaders to rush to the White House, along with Zelenskyy, the issue was revived and given a bit more backing, with a greater US military involvement in subsequent discussions. Once again Moscow made clear that it could not agree to the sort of arrangements under discussion, apparently contributing to Trump’s growing irritation with Putin.
The Coalition of the Willing
In all of this what may have been missed is that the plan now connected with a coalition of the willing is not a security guarantee. As I mentioned the credibility of NATO’s Article V depends not just on the formal commitment to treat an attack on one as an attack on all but measures if place to ensure that the alliance is present from the start should an adversary attack. This is what it is being planned.
The starting point is that the ‘deter and defend’ role will remain primarily for Ukraine, and that the role of the coalition is to make that more effective and credible.
As the concept has evolved it has acquired three elements. First, boosting the Ukrainians’ own forward defences. The best deterrent will be a super-fortified front line, manned by Ukrainian troops, but with external logistical and technical support, to ensure that it is able to blunt any future Russian offensive. There might be a few European brigades but only as a back-up. Second, air defences, including manned aircraft, organised from bases in Poland and Romania. Third, a black sea fleet, possibly led by Turkey, that would clear mines and keep open trade routes. The importance of both the air and sea components is that they support economic activity, which is essential to Ukraine’s recovery.
There is a potential element of ‘tripwire’ in all of this, in that is the Russians breached the front-lines there might be clashes involving Western troops, which could trigger a much deeper involvement. But as far as I am aware the sort of issues normally raised by security guarantees, including the nuclear aspect, have not yet been discussed. This was implied by European requests that the US provide a ‘backstop’ but while Trump never quite ruled this out he hardly seemed enthusiastic.
At the start of the war, when Ukraine’s own military capacity was limited then both its current fight and its future security appeared to depend totally on its partners. In key respects this is still the case. Economic, military, and intelligence assistance remains vital. Yet something has happened to Ukraine over this period. It has built up its industrial capacity to a remarkable extent. It now provides around 60 percent of its own kit and ammunition. It has become a major innovator and producer in drone warfare. Some 4.5 million drones will be produced this year. It has unmatched operational experience which it now shares with European countries.
Recall that one of Putin’s objectives in 2022 was to ‘demilitarise’ Ukraine. He has achieved the opposite. When Zelenskyy responded to the drones dropping into Poland by offering advice on anti-drone measures, he was not being cute. Ukraine is to the fore in these technologies, as well as innovating constantly. It is now a potential exporter.
Ukraine is becoming a de facto member of NATO. When the Ukrainians say that they are defending Europe’s borders they are correct. If they fail then the risks for NATO countries will become even greater, and they will be worrying about more than the occasional probes that reveal the leakiness of their air defences. Zelenskyy turns up to alliance meetings. His armed forces work closely with alliance partners and its arms industry is cooperating with Western manufacturers. Because of the threat from Russia’s missiles and drones, Ukrainians are locating their factories in other countries, most recently Denmark. More of that may be necessary, which may in turn add to the Russian pressure on Europe.
One suggestion arising from the Russian drone intrusions into Europe is that a defensive shield be established from inside Ukraine, and if Ukraine is going to be involved then should it not also protect Ukrainian territory? Perhaps the No-Fly Zone that appeared to be such an outlandish proposal in 2022 will start to appear reasonable in the face of Russian provocations. The issue has moved beyond security guarantees, and the concept of the ‘coalition of the willing’ needs to be untethered from that role.
A lot of things we never thought likely have now come to pass as a result of this terrible war. Russia has persisted with its aggression. Despite its extraordinary battlefield losses it continues to fail to make serious battlefield gains. Its energy infrastructure is attacked on a daily basis. It has been offered a ceasefire but has refused.
NATO countries will not be rushing to declare war on Russia on Ukraine’s behalf. Nor will Ukraine join NATO yet as a full member. But the new security situation has developed through incremental steps, each one large enough to make a difference but not so large as to trigger a major war. Because of this Ukraine is becoming integrated into European security structures. It may not be a member of NATO but it is becoming part of the coalition of the willing.
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