Kremlin Recruiting "Hits Diminishing Returns" As High Pay Fails To Offset Casualties

As bonuses and other financial incentives fail to attract new recruits, the Kremlin may be forced to embark on a stealthy 'rolling compulsory mobilization of reservists' enabled by a change in Russian law.

The problem is that Russian casualties in Ukraine remain extraordinary by contemporary standards, even for a country whose indifference to human and material losses is legendary. Every Russian likely to be incentivized by the monetary rewards has already signed up while the pool of potential recruits is diminished both by other job options in the war economy as well as by reports of the bloodbath facing new recruits so that higher financial incentives generate diminishing returns while becoming a greater burden for Russia's already challenged economy. JL

The Institute for the Study of War reports:

The Kremlin’s “pay-to-play system” for attracting recruits through high bonuses and financial incentives “is likely hitting diminishing returns.” Moscow’s recruitment offices have failed to raise enlistment rates despite offering bigger payments than in 2023 and 2024. This is forcing the Kremlin to adopt a different approach using rolling compulsory mobilization of reservists in the face of its continuing high casualty rate in Ukraine.  ISW concluded that rolling compulsory mobilization could allow Russia to generate manpower more cheaply than the current costly volunteer drive but may pose greater political risks to the Kremlin.

Russia may begin to mobilize members of Russia’s active reserve on a rolling basis to sustain its combat operations in Ukraine, but it is unlikely to conduct a large-scale involuntary reserve mobilization to expand the size of the Russian military dramatically at this time.

 

The creation of a mechanism for small, rolling mobilizations would be a major inflection in Russia’s force generation strategy, which so far has sought to generate recruits through growing financial incentives and sign-up bonuses to avoid mass compulsory mobilization after the challenging involuntary reserve call up of late 2022. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers’ Commission on Legislative Activity passed a new draft amendment that effectively removes the current legal barriers against deploying reservists to combat in the absence of an officially declared mobilization or war.

 

Russia’s existing “pay-to-play” system for generating recruits is likely hitting diminishing returns and is forcing the Kremlin to adopt a different approach using rolling compulsory mobilization of reservists to sustain its manpower in the face of its continuing high casualty rate in Ukraine. This warning does not suggest that the Kremlin is likely to undertake a single large-scale mobilization at this time. 

 ISW reported 13 October that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers’ Commission on Legislative Activity approved a Defense Ministry draft amendment allowing the Kremlin to deploy members of the so-called human mobilization reserve abroad, including to Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, without declaring war. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov said the law would permit President Vladimir Putin to mobilize reservists for special tasks in conflicts and counterterrorism operations.

ISW said the change “marks a significant inflection in Russian law” by removing the legal barrier that previously forbade sending reservists to combat without official mobilization. The amendment also creates a new category of “special assemblies,” in which reservists would train for up to two months before being deployed abroad.

Russia’s paid recruitment system is collapsing

According to ISW, the Kremlin’s “pay-to-play system” for attracting recruits through high bonuses and financial incentives “is likely hitting diminishing returns.” Moscow’s recruitment offices have failed to raise enlistment rates despite offering bigger payments than in 2023 and 2024. 

Kremlin had relied on expensive incentives to avoid a repeat of the chaotic mobilization of 2022. The creation of a rolling mobilization mechanism, ISW said, “would be a major inflection in Russia’s force generation strategy.”

Active versus inactive reserves

The think tank detailed that Russia maintains two reserve systems. The active “human mobilization reserve” includes about two million volunteers who signed contracts with the Defense Ministry and remain civilians until called up. The inactive reserve, known as the “zapas,” consists of older men not affiliated with the armed forces. ISW clarified that the new regulation concerns only the active reserve, not the wider zapas.

Centralizing control and expanding eligibility and avoiding public backlash

ISW assessed that the Kremlin is likely to “formally amend restrictions” on using the active reserve and begin partial rolling mobilization without declaring war. It said officials such as Deputy Defense Committee Chairman Alexei Zhuravlyov had implied that the law would allow call ups “in far more cases than before.”

The report added that Moscow will likely misrepresent mobilized reservists as volunteers to hide the scale of compulsory service. ISW warned that “the Kremlin will pull these reservists from established pools of reserve forces, whom the Russian state will compel to fight in Ukraine.”

ISW assessed that the Kremlin is unlikely to declare large-scale mobilization of the inactive reserve because of fears over public unrest and economic disruption. Russian officials continue to emphasize that all service is “voluntary,” suggesting the regime wants to avoid asking citizens for further sacrifices.

The think tank said the new amendment will let Putin deploy reservists “more rapidly than was possible under the previous mechanism” and may also allow him to cut or eliminate mandatory pre-deployment training.

Cheaper troops

ISW concluded that rolling compulsory mobilization could allow Russia to generate manpower more cheaply than the current costly volunteer drive.

“Russia may be able to more sustainably generate forces if it uses coercion and legal mechanisms,” ISW said, but warned that the policy “may pose greater political risks to the Kremlin.”