We sometimes seem locked in a fruitless debate about whether technology benefits mankind or not.
As sometimes happens, however, this may well be the wrong question. Technology has certainly benefited mankind to date, though there have been victims as the process of adoption and adaptation renders some less well off during often lengthy periods of transition.
The more pertinent - and urgent - question is
how those benefits are distributed.
There is no real consensus about this. The battle is as fierce and as deeply felt as it has ever been in the history of capital versus labor. But as the following article explains, there is, once again, an opportunity to rethink the classic conflict in order prevent sub-optimal outcomes for all. The reason for this is that how technology impacts the lives of those touched by it, to whit, everyone extant, is a political decision, not a technological or even strictly economic one.
The techno-optimists believe, as did Voltaire's
Candide, that we live in the best of all possible worlds, we just need to give it time to work out. This may be comforting to some, but probably not to the majority faced with job loss and financial ruin in the short term - that being the sometimes lengthy period one endures between birth and death. The pessimists believe that those controlling the financial levers of power will never let go until those controls are wrested from - in that mellifluous phrase - their cold, dead hands.
There may be a middle way, but whether it exists or not is probably beside the point. The battles being fought in the streets of the Ukraine, Thailand, South Africa, Brazil and a dozen other places are the precursors to that fight about distribution. The implication is that eventually, everyone gets hurt, because without consumer purchases growth is curtailed, assuming those doing the purchasing have not decided to cut to the chase and simply grab what they want. The reality is that how this ends is a choice, not a compulsion. JL
Martin Wolf comments in the Financial Times:
In
1955,
Walter Reuther, head of the US car workers’ union, told of a
visit to a new automatically operated Ford plant. Pointing to all the robots,
his host asked: “How are you going to collect union dues from those guys?” Mr
Reuther replied: “And how are you going to get them to buy Fords?”
Automation is
not new. Neither is the debate about its effects. How far, then, does what Erik
Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee call
The Second Machine Age alter the
questions or the answers?
I laid out the
core
argument last week. I noted that the rise of information technology
coincides with increasing income inequality.
Lawrence Mishel of the Washington-based Economic Policy
Institute challenges the notion that the former has been the principal cause of
the latter. Mr Mishel notes: “Rising executive pay and the expansion of, and
better pay in, the financial sector can account for two-thirds of increased
incomes at the top.” Changing social norms, the rise of stock-based remuneration
and the extraordinary expansion of the financial sector also contributed. While
it was a factor, technology has not determined economic outcomes.
Yet technology could become far more important. Professor Brynjolfsson and Mr
McAfee also argue that it will make us more prosperous; and it will shift the
distribution of opportunities among workers and between workers and owners of
capital.
The economic impacts of new technologies are many and
complex. They include: new services, such as Facebook; disintermediation of old
systems of distribution via iTunes or Amazon; new products, such as smartphones;
and new machines, such as robots. The latter awaken fears that intelligent
machines will render a vast number of people redundant. A
recent paper by
Carl
Frey and Michael Osborne of Oxford university concludes that 47 per cent of
US jobs are at high risk from automation. In the 19th century, they argue,
machines replaced artisans and benefited unskilled labour. In the 20th century,
computers replaced middle-income jobs, creating a polarised labour market. Over
the next decades, however, “most workers in transport and logistics occupations,
together with the bulk of office and administrative support workers, and labour
in production occupations, are likely to be substituted by computer capital”.
Moreover, “computerisation will mainly substitute for low-skill and low-wage
jobs in the near future. By contrast, high-skill and high-wage occupations are
the least susceptible to computer capital.” This, then, would exacerbate
inequality.
Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia
university and Laurence Kotlikoff of Boston university even argue that the
rise in productivity might make future generations worse off in aggregate. The
replacement of workers by robots could shift income from the former to the
robots’ owners, most of whom will be retired and are assumed to save less than
the young. This would lower investment in human capital because the young could
no longer afford to pay for it; and in machines because savings in this economy
would fall.
The argument that a rise in potential productivity would make us permanently
worse off is ingenious. More plausible, to me at least, are other possibilities:
there could be a large adjustment shock as workers are laid off; the market
wages of unskilled people might fall far below a socially acceptable minimum;
and, combined with other new technologies, robots might make the distribution of
income far more unequal than it is already.
So what should be done?
First, the new technologies will bring good and bad. We can shape the good
and manage the bad.
Second, education is not a magic wand. One reason is that we do not know what
skills will be demanded three decades hence. Also, if Mr Frey and Prof Osborne
are right, so many low- to middle-skilled jobs are at risk that it may already
be too late for anybody much over 18 and many children. Finally, even if the
demand for creative, entrepreneurial and high-level knowledge services were to
grow on the required scale, which is highly unlikely, turning us all into the
happy few is surely a fantasy.
Third, we must reconsider leisure. For a long time the wealthiest lived a
life of leisure at the expense of the toiling masses. The rise of intelligent
machines makes it possible for many more people to live such lives without
exploiting others. Today’s triumphant puritanism finds such idleness abhorrent.
Well, then, let people enjoy themselves busily. What else is the true goal of
the vast increases in prosperity we have created?
Fourth, we will need to redistribute income and wealth. Such redistribution
could take the form of a basic income for every adult, together with funding of
education and training at any stage in a person’s life. In this way, the
potential for a more enjoyable life might become a reality. The revenue could
come from taxes on bads (pollution, for example) or on rents (including land
and, above all, intellectual property). Property rights are a social creation.
The idea that a small minority should overwhelming benefit from new technologies
should be reconsidered. It would be possible, for example, for the state to
obtain an automatic share in the income from the intellectual property it
protects.
Finally, if labour shedding does accelerate, it will be essential to ensure
that demand expands in tandem with the rise in potential supply. If we succeed,
many of the worries over a lack of jobs will fade away. Given the failure to
achieve this in the past seven years, that may well not happen. But we could do
better if we wanted to.
The rise of intelligent machines is a moment in history. It will change many
things, including our economy. But their potential is clear: they will make it
possible for human beings to live far better lives. Whether they end up doing so
depends on how the gains are produced and distributed. It is possible that the
ultimate result will be a tiny minority of huge winners and a vast number of
losers. But such an outcome would be a choice not a destiny. A form of
techno-feudalism is unnecessary. Above all, technology itself does not dictate
the outcomes. Economic and political institutions do. If the ones we have do not
give the results we want, we must change them.
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