A Blog by Jonathan Low

 

Aug 10, 2026

Ukraine Has Become the Ally the US Really Needs

Ukraine has now become, next to Israel, the country most able to provide the kind of military technology and advice that the US needs to fight Iran and prepare for potential conflict with China. 

It has achieved this status by developing its own, demonstrably effective weapons and tactics, but also by improving the US and NATO weapons it has received as gifts. And it has accomplished this while becoming not a supplicant, but a hard-nosed, transactional partner which understands the needs of its partners as well as the importance of lower cost and impact. In doing so, Ukraine has positioned itself as the ally best able to convert its expertise and production into an economically invaluable supplier. JL

Michael Weiss reports in The Atlantic:

If any country in Europe has the expertise to become a crucial node in America’s military supply chain, it’s Ukraine, an invaluable source of military know-how. Last month, the Ukrainian government approved exporting weapons and defense tech for the first time because the country now produces more weapons than it can afford to buy from its own companies. Ukraine currently produces 10 million drones a year; compared with the US’s 100,000. Some of these cost as little as $1,000 to make but have taken out Russian targets worth millions. Ukrainian technicians have upgraded some American products to achieve all of this. The US drone campaign against Iran now involves repurposing civilian technology for military use, as Ukraine has done. (And) a Florida-based drone company is looking for Ukrainian hardware and licenses includes investors: Eric and Donald Trump Jr.

Putin's Command Change Won't Produce Results As War Continues To Favor Ukraine

Putin keeps shuffling commanders in hopes that this tactical game playing will somehow produce a better result when the real problem is his strategic mismanagement. 

There can be no significant change in Russia's military effectiveness on the battlefield because the Kremlin's war fighting and military organization are fatally flawed by Putin's primary concern, which is holding on to power, not winning the war he initiated. There is little the new commanders can do that their predecessors have not already tried. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

The ground war continues to favor Ukraine's defense. Putin's military management reshuffle reflects his wanting to inject new ideas and energy into his war against Ukraine while messaging that those responsible for attacks against Russia’are being moved on. None of these leadership changes are likely to result in any significant change in the effectiveness of Russian military forces. The underlying strategy of Russia’s war against Ukraine is so poor, and Ukraine’s military effectiveness is continuing to improve, so there is little that these military leaders will be able to do to change the situation. Putin’s dilemma will become more acute as Ukraine’s strikes expand their reach and capacity. Crimea and the Russian interior are no longer separate problems but a single, unified target set for the Ukrainians.

Withdrawing Infiltrators, Russians Can't Hold Land South of Fortress Belt

Infiltrating is not assaulting. And it is most emphatically not taking and holding territory. Which is what the Russians are being forced to admit in sectors approaching Ukraine's Fortress Belt. 

Specifically, in Novopavlivka and Invanivka, the Russian command has withdrawn troop concentrations and left infiltrators to fend for themselves as Ukrainian interdiction of supply and reinforcement lines, as well as the destruction of artillery and rocket support has left the Kremlin's gray zone remnants incapable of doing more than being hunted down and killed or forced to surrender. This is one example of why so many analysts doubt that Russia can summon enough force to advance further in Donbas. JL

RFU News reports:
Russian forces admitted defeat in their infiltration around Novopavlivka and Ivanivka. After months of sending small groups through gaps in the Ukrainian line, the Russians stopped trying to build those penetrations into a larger advance and began pulling their forces back as Ukrainian FPV operators destroyed multiple Russian Grad multiple launch rocket systems in the sector. These repeated losses showed why the infiltration effort had become untenable, with Russian soldiers being eliminated before they could build any lasting presence. Surviving remnants were left isolated inside Ukrainian controlled territory. With the wider operation abandoned, those men lost hope of reinforcements, while even drone deliveries of food and basic supplies stopped. As Ukrainian forces began clearing the area, the Russians left behind were either killed in their hiding places or forced to surrender

The 1AM AI Job Interview: The Questioner Isn't Human. So What's Your Problem?

The AI interview has become so pervasive that job applicants no longer find it surprising. And the fact that almost 25% are scheduled late at night suggests most prospective applicants know their chances of being hired by this inhuman process are virtually nil so they are not giving up their day jobs to do them. 

That 38% of applicants withdraw from the hiring process when told they must submit to an AI interview is the most telling statistic. While some executives and companies tout 'efficiencies' and apparently pride themselves on how ruthlessly productive and with-it they are, the fact is that they are losing access to almost 40% of potential hires, which means they are missing out on skilled talent who could make them more competitive. This is one example of why AI and those promoting it are increasingly hated by the public - and why their employees have no loyalty. And this is not how organizations achieve optimal outcomes. JL

Kate Taylor reports in Wired:
As video interviews and AI become a bigger part of the hiring process, so do late-night interviews. A company that makes voice-AI HR software reports 24% of AI interviews take place between 10 pm and 2 am. For manufacturing clients, that jumps to 35%.  66% of job applicants have been interviewed by an AI agent. The interviewee is instructed to record answers to a series of questions on camera. As a question pops up on the screen, the interviewee has half a minute to think about their response. “Once the 30 seconds is up, ‘ding!’ you have two minutes to record your answer.” AI analyzes footage of the interview to evaluate how the candidate fits the rubric, and assigns them a score, which is passed along to the recruiter, along with footage of the interview - though many of the interviews go unwatched by humans. 38% of  US candidates withdrew from a hiring process rather than be interviewed by an AI. 12% won't even consider an AI interview.

Aug 9, 2026

Ukraine Drone Boats Launch FPVs To Destroy Russian Attack Near Kherson

On the Dnipro River near Kherson, Ukrainian Marines used FPV drones launched from Barracuda sea drones to attack a Russian troop rotation being carried out by boats. 

In another example of the evolving technological war, the Ukrainian drones destroyed the Russian vessels and the troops they were carrying. JL

Sofia Syngaivska reports in Defense Express:
Ukrainian Marines used unmanned surface vessels to launch FPV strike drones against Russian boats near Zaliznyi Port in the Kherson region, disrupting an attempted troop rotation and destroying the enemy landing party and its boats. The operation was carried out using Ukrainian Barracuda unmanned surface vessels, which served as launch platforms for FPV strike drones. Russian forces attempted to disrupt the operation by attacking one of the Ukrainian USVs with two Shahed-type strike drones. The cost of the Russian Shaheds was significantly higher than that of the target they were used against. One of the Ukrainian boats was damaged in the attack, but the remaining vessels continued the mission.

Coffin Prices In Russia Have Surged 105% Due To Ukraine War Casualties

A 105% increase in coffin costs is substantial and reflects growing demand driven by the massive scale of Russian casualties in Ukraine. 

But the price of grave digging has risen so much that the Russian government statistics agency has removed it from the the calculation of inflation. And almost 2,500 new funeral service companies have registered in Russia in the past 18 months, suggesting that the profession is perceived to be a growth market. JL

Ivan Khomenko reports in United 24:
The average cost of a coffin in Russia has risen by 105% since the country launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. According to data from Russia’s state statistics system Rosstat, the average price of a coffin reached 9,167 rubles ($112) in June 2026, compared with 4,469 rubles ($54) in February 2022. The cost of grave digging has also increased substantially. The service averaged 7,849 rubles (about $96) in February 2022. By December 2025, the average price had reached 12,576 rubles ( $153) about 60% above its pre-invasion level. 1,543 new funeral service companies opened in Russia during 2025. Another 995 entered the market during the first six months of 2026.

The Russian Army Is Failing Badly This Summer - And That Will Not Change

The adjectives being used to describe Russian military efforts in Ukraine this summer do not inspire hope: insufficient, extremely unlikely, unrealistic and, repeatedly, failure, failed, failing.

The harsh reality is that Russia has no answers to Ukrainian strategy and tactics. Its attacks on civilian targets have demonstrated no structural impact on Ukrainian war making capabilities or morale and Russian leadership is increasingly seen as ineffective and out of touch. Putin reportedly had a widely publicized call with the commander of Russian airborne forces to 'demonstrate' that he is in control after being mocked for announcing the capture of several cities which turned out to still be in Ukrainian hands. The question is not if, but how and when he will be forced to seek some sort of denoument. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:
The Russian military is still failing badly this summer—and that will not change. On the battlefield, the basics favor the Ukrainian strategy of causing massive Russian casualties while saving their own lives. And the data supports this. The Russian summer offensive (it is already into August—so much of the summer is gone) shows Russian advances are miniscule, far below the small advances of 2025, and Russian casualties are now more than 40,000 a month. So the Russian army is struggling, suffering massive losses and its logistic situation is getting worse.