Russia is now losing 200 to 300 soldiers a day more than it is mobilizing, which, in the inexorable math of war, means a deficit of 6,000 to 15,000 a month.
This brutal accounting does not assess the loss of skills, experience, morale, unit cohesion and other intangibles which can mean success or failure on the battlefield. And over the longer term, how does the Kremlin account for this contribution to the degradation of its entire military? The larger problem for Putin's strategic objectives is that those casualties are rising at a far greater rate while the territory they capture declines, especially when compared to the record of the Ukrainian forces fighting them. Much has been made of the Russians' stolid acceptance of futile death, but with the increasing velocity of the destructive cycle, physical limits driven by raw numbers suggest a finite continuum. JL
Giorgio Provinciali reports:
With talk of a new mobilization by the Kremlin, the decisive issue concerns Moscow’s ability to transform manpower, funds, and materiel into effective combat units. The intake of new Russian recruits is at 1,000–1,200 daily, while concurrent losses stand at 1,400–1,500. Over a thirty-day period, this amounts to 30,000–36,000 new enlistments against 42,000–45,000 losses, a deficit of between 6,000 and 15,000 men per month. The vicious cycle lies in the loss of skills that are harder to regenerate. Casualties deplete experience faster than training can rebuild it, causing the quality of units to deteriorate that masks the reality of a degraded army. The need to replace the fallen cuts training time, weakens cohesion, and increases vulnerability to further losses, triggering a self-perpetuating cycle. How long can a command afford to burn through 42,000 men a month for a gain of ninety square kilometers, while the adversary retakes one hundred and thirty?