Kremlin Claims Capture of Non-Existent Ukrainian Village

If you're the Russian Defense Ministry, the thinking must be that claiming the capture of a non-existent village is arguably better than not claiming capture of a non-existent village. JL

New Voice of Ukraine reports:

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed its forces captured the non-existent village of Shcherbakovka in Ukraine's Kharkiv Oblast on August 12. The village was officially abolished in 1997 after depopulation left the settlement completely empty. As of 2026, the community no longer physically or legally exists within Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense, General Staff and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov have also repeatedly asserted control over areas that remain securely under Ukrainian control.

Russia Firing Missiles Faster Than It Can Produce Them Signals Supply Constraint

Russia is firing a lot of missiles at civilian targets in Ukraine this summer, far more than it has before. Some appear to believe this is a sign of Putin's intransigence and evidence of his ability to continue to fighting. That Ukraine has run short on air defense weapons (as has the rest of the world, including the US) so is less able to hit the missiles which are more powerful than drones, is certainly part of the reason.

But a more informed review of the data suggests this is, in fact, a signal of supply constraint: that the missiles are being fired both because they are all he has left from his once vast and diverse arsenal. And given how little impact they are having on the ground or on Ukrainian morale suggests that the missile attacks are simply continuing the war with what inventory is on hand. The data reveal that Russia is firing them faster than it can produce them, which may also mean that this is a violent strategy to try to force some sort of conclusion before one is forced on Russia. JL 

Vikas reports in The Geopolitical Economist:

Over the past month, data have confirmed Russia is spending its missile stockpile faster than it can replenish it. Russia is paying more men, more missiles, and more Zircon hypersonics for less ground than at any comparable point since the full-scale invasion began. In attrition warfare, the side that runs out of something critical first does not necessarily collapse immediately. It degrades. It substitutes. It absorbs. But the degradation is real, the substitutes are inferior, and the absorption has a ceiling. What the July data from Ukraine tells us is that Russia reached a milestone: it began consuming missiles faster than it produces them. Russia is not firing everything at once. It is trading across categories, using more ballistics, fewer drones, and shifting the mix as stockpiles allow. That trade-off is a symptom of constraint, not abundance.

Last Major Russian Black Sea Fleet Base Struck By Ukraine Drones, Missiles

Novorossiysk was the eastern Black Sea port to which the battered remnants of Russia's Black Sea Fleet retreated after they were chased out of Crimea by Ukrainian attacks. 

But that new base proved no safer as, last night, Ukrainian drones and missiles struck ships, docks, repair facilities oil refineries and tanks, sending the umistakable message that no place in Russia is beyond reach. JL

 
Illia Novikov reports in the AP via the Washington Post:

Ukrainian anti-ship missiles and drones blitzed the major Russian naval base on the Black Sea coast. Russia relocated most of its ships to Novorossiysk after Ukrainian strikes on the base at Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula earlier in the war. Hundreds of Ukrainian drones attacked Novorossiysk, Anapa and Gelendzhik and the Temryuk district of the region overnight. The naval base in Novorossiysk is the last major stronghold of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. Ukraine’s air and sea drones have limited the movements of Russia’s once-dominant Black Sea navy, in one of the biggest accomplishments of the war. 

26 Russian Casualties For Each Ukrainian, As Kremlin Pushed Back At Huliaipole

The Huliaipole sector looked vulnerable to Russian advances in December. Ukraine then surged battle-hardened units like the Azov Brigade to stabilize the situation and turn it around. 

Now, as in so many other cases along the front, there have been 'zero' Russian offensive operations this month, Ukrainian forces are taking back ground in various areas and the casualty rate is 26 Russians for every Ukrainian. JL

Decimus reports in Daily Kos:

In December, 2025, it looked like the Russians were going to swallow Huliaipole, bypass the Ukrainian fortifications to the West and race the 60 miles from Huliaipole to Zaporizhia city. Fast forward to August 11th, 2026 and Russian forces have been halted on the Huliaipole front, with Ukrainian officers reporting enemy attempts to launch further offensive operations have been reduced to zero this month. Ukraine surged veteran units to stabilize the front, then began counterattacks which have regained territory. The casualty ratio on this section of the front is one Ukrainian soldier to 26 Russians.

76% of Companies Now Have A Chief AI Officer. Good Idea Or Waste?

To executives, investors and analysts 'of a certain age,' this will not only sound familiar, but probably spark a chuckle, if not an outright guffaw. Plumping for a Chief AI Officer to be added to already overcrowded C-Suites replete with Chief Information Officers, Chief Technology Officers, Chief Innovation Officers, Chief Knowledge Officers, ad infinitum, this seems bureaucratic - just what AI is not supposed to be. And for those with some insight into business history, there were, once upon an innovation, chief telephone, auto and electricity officers.

Why, in the name of good management, would an organization that has bought into the argument that AI is transformative, then create a silo for it? While possibly helping with staying on top of trends and offering opinions (if not authority) on how to deploy it, this is likely to delay and possibly limit dispersion throughout the organization while serving as a locus of discontent and blame. The reality is that if AI is going to work - and it appears it will, in many instances - though enhancing production of Pringles' potato chips? - then it will be, like mobile phones, through the iterative, individual efforts of employees on their own rather than by corporate fiat. The CAIO is a transitory organizational nod to the perceived need to convince customers and investors that the company 'gets' AI, not because it serves an important strategic purpose. JL

Grant Gross reports in CIO Magazine:

76% of surveyed organizations now have a CAIO, up from just 26% in 2025. "There’s the infrastructure job, keeping systems running, and there’s the value job, deciding where AI changes how work gets done. AI is pulling those apart," The CAIOs gaining scope inside their organizations tie every AI initiative to revenue growth, margin protection, risk reduction, or speed. Proactive CAIOs also take on difficult AI governance issues. (But, many executives and investors believe) AI adoption is too important and pervasive to be confined to a single department. A CAIO can bring focus and expertise to AI deployments, but the role often doesn’t have the authority to change systems, workflows, and operating models across the enterprise. “A chief AI officer can accelerate the AI agenda but cannot substitute for the authority required to transform the organization.”  As a result, the CEO needs to be the main champion of the technology. 

Putin's Black Sea Holiday Palace Air Defenses Destroyed By Ukraine

First, the Ukrainians destroyed the electronic warfare system overseeing the palace. Then they took out the surface to air missile battery. 

 It's almost as awkward as forcing Putin to cancel his annual St Petersburg navy ship parade. Almost.  JL

Daryna Vialko reports in RBC/Ukraine:

Ukraine has carried out successful strikes on electronic warfare systems and S-400 air defense systems protecting Putin's palace near Gelendzhik on the Black Sea coast. The 17,700-square-meter complex has a no-fly zone, while 7,000 hectares of surrounding land are owned by the FSB. The construction cost of the complex was estimated to be 100 billion rubles. On August 7, the Volna Kupol Garant electronic warfare system was hit. On August 9, an S-400 surface-to-air missile system located nearby was struck.

Large Russian Convoy Destroyed 20 Km Behind Frontline

Ukraine's Azov Brigade destroyed a Russian convoy moving in what it thought was a safe distance behind the front. 

Ukraine's drone capabilities to strike Russian targets at previously unheard of ranges are, by now, well known. And videos show the Russians were travelling on a road littered with the burned out shells of previously destroyed Russian vehicles. But as we noted many times, the Russian Army is not a learning organization. JL

Sania Kozatskyi reports in Militarnyi:

Operators of Ukraine's 12th Azov Special Forces Brigade destroyed a large convoy of Russian military vehicles 20 kilometers from the front line near the settlement of Malynivka in the Donetsk region. The Russians were attempting to move in convoy, believing they were at a safe distance from the line of contact. Footage shows the Russians driving past dozens of destroyed vehicles that their predecessors had used in attempts to move near the front line in this area.