Ukraine Sea Drone Lands Ground Drone On Kinburn Spit, Attacks Russian Positions

A Ukrainian sea drone landed an armed ground drone on the beach of the Russian-occupied portion of the Kinburn Spit, a peninsula near where the Dnipro River enters the Black Sea.

The ground drone, controlled remotely by Ukrainian troops, then attacked Russian positions on the Spit. What the drones may or may not have accomplished is less important than the fact that the mission was carried out, demonstrating the potential for autonomous warfare, particularly in extremely dangerous environments. JL 

Roman Sheremata reports in his substack:

In  the "first combat mission of this type known," a Ukrainian sea drone delivered a ground drone to Russian-held territory on the Kinburn Spit, Ukraine's 123rd Territorial Brigade said. "A ground-based robot was delivered to the enemy shore by an unmanned sea platform, landed on the occupied territory and performed a combat mission," Russian troops entered the 40-kilometer-long (about 25-mile) Kinburn Spit in March 2022. The spit remains strategically important due to its location, as control of the area has enabled Russian forces to influence access to parts of the Black Sea. Shipping routes from the ports of Kherson and Mykolaiv converge nearby.

Storm Z "Frontline Felon" Units' Fatality or Severe Injury Rates Reach 80-90%

The Kremlin touts convicts who 'volunteer' to serve in the Russian army in Ukraine as 'heroes' who are exchanging guilt for redemption at the front. 

But data reveal that the casualty rates for those units can be as high as 80-90% killed or severely wounded. JL

Mykyta Vorobiev reports in the Center for European Policy Analysis and Reuters reports:

Estimates suggest 200,000 prisoners have so far been mobilized for the Russian Army. The Kremlin has built a public narrative around it. Military service is presented as the only path where violence can be used to exchange guilt for redemption, marginality for social recognition, and prison for freedom. Putin describes former prisoners as heroes, dismissing their offences as “mistakes” that “could happen to any of us.” State-controlled media portray enlistment as a voluntary choice offering purpose, belonging, and a second chance, rather than a response to the realities of Russian prisons or the limited alternatives after release. Combat is presented as a more effective form of correction than prison itself, though prisoners often die in battle, in line with the exceptionally high casualty rates in penal units.

Ukraine Gains Momentum As Local Counterattacks Outflank Russian Operations

Ukrainian forces have gained momentum by employing an age old military tactic: 'hit 'em

where they ain't.' That colloquialism means using reconnaissance and intelligence to attack the enemy where they are weakest or have left gaps in their defensive lines.  

Ukrainian counterattacks have negated Russian gains across the southeast, from Donbas to Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, by fighting holding actions against Russian assaults while outflanking those Russian movements, forcing them to either bring up reserves to defend their lodgments or withdraw. The result is that the Kremlin has been unable to achieve any of its objectives on the battlefield so far this year. JL

David Axe reports in Trench Art:

The Ukrainians have the momentum in the fight in the southeast. It's one of several axes where Ukrainian forces have the edge. Overall Russian gains have decreased to nearly zero in recent months because the Ukrainians are successfully counterattacking, resulting in a zeroing out of Russian advances. The Ukrainians have turned the tables on the Russians (because) Ukraine has the advantage in the air over the gray zone and over the logistical zone stretching 200 km behind the gray zone (meaning) Ukraine can find times and places to counterattack, even though Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian troops in most sectors. To achieve its strategic aims in Ukraine, Russia must advance. By contrast, Ukraine's own main aim is to survive as an independent state. By those standards, Ukraine has the edge.

What If Anthropic and OpenAI Aren't the Future of AI?

This is a conundrum as old as time. How to profit without killing the proverbial goose that laid the golden egg? 

Anthropic, OpenAI and others changed their financial model to demand token-based (eg, use-based) pricing. It certainly reduced the gap between cost of AI models' production and for what they were selling, but it forced customers to take a hard look at the cost-benefit equation. And what they found did not inspire confidence in the benefits. Meanwhile, the Chinese were offering AI that was about as good, especially given the way corporations were deploying it. An analogous example might be the introduction of Japanese cars into the US market in 1960s: maybe not as good or fancy as Detroit's, but good enough - and a lot cheaper. The looming economic question, then, is whether Anthropic, OpenAI et al, have not only priced themselves out of market, but exposed their entire paradigm to scrutiny about control and future projections which, increasingly may not stand that scrutiny. JL

David Wallace-Wells reports in the New York Times:

Even if the A.I. economy is rapidly growing, it looks less inevitable that big, brand-name labs will be the titanic profit engines of that future. Perhaps they will function more like utilities, providing machine intelligence to others. The A.I. investment cycle is built on the same underlying paradigm: historic capital expenditures are justified because the returns from winning the race would be enormous. But can the race be won? Can any lab open an enduring advantage over others? No model has retained a long-lasting advantage, and cheaper, open-source alternatives have kept pace with best-in-class. When A.I. companies raised prices to match the cost of producing, clients balked, realizing frontier models were not generating enough profit to justify the expense. Corporate uptake flatlined as cheaper, open-source models exploded. For most users it does not make sense to pay a premium for an only slightly better product, making leading A.I. labs less central to the A.I. future

Over 230,000 Russian Troops Killed In Ukraine Identified By Media Research

The significance of this reports is that 

although the Kremlin has obfuscated about the true nature of Russian deaths in Ukraine, bureaucratic sources like forms for insurance, legal records and promised government death benefits will ultimately be able to provide a true accounting. JL

Dmytro Basmat reports in the Kyiv Independent:

Russian independent media outlet Mediazona, in collaboration with the BBC Russian service, has confirmed the identities of 230,624 Russian military personnel killed in Ukraine. Since the media outlets' last update in mid-June, the names of 2,890 Russian soldiers have been added. The actual figures are significantly higher, as verified information comes from public sources such as obituaries, posts by relatives, regional media reports, and statements from local authorities. The date of death is known in 212,600 cases, accounting for 92% of confirmed casualties.

The Final Battle Of Russia's War With Ukraine May Be In the Kremlin's Corridors

Russia's war against Ukraine was always primarily about Putin's delusions than about economic or military necessity. And now, as the carefully constructed edifice of Soviet and then Russian power have crumbled due to Putin's hubris and his system's corrupt malfunctioning, it is being fought almost exclusively for his political and human survival. 

Which means the war's outcome is as likely - or more so - to be decided in the treacherous halls of the Kremlin as on the drone-blasted battlegrounds of eastern Ukraine. JL

Holman Jenkins reports in the Wall Street Journal:

A Putin-loyal oligarch, fertilizer kingpin Andrey Melnichenko suggests a lobby exists inside Russia to continue the war even in Mr. Putin’s absence, viewing the conflict as “existential” though whether he means existential for Russia or for the privileged positions of the lobbyists (is not clear. But) the problem always has been Mr. Putin. He must exit or the West must impose a settlement to prop him up at the expense of 40 million Ukrainians. Such an outcome was unrealistic four years ago when Mr. Putin first sought it. Maybe it wasn't at peak Trump, over 18 months ago. But we’re in a different place now. The future rests on a stack of wild cards, importantly in the halls of the Kremlin itself.

Putin Now Has A Deeper Strategic Problem Beyond Battlefield Failure

Thanks to Ukraine's disciplined, technologically superior capabilities, Putin's strategic challenge has gotten even worse. Not only is he failing to win, or even sustain gains, on the battlefield, but he must now defend Crimea AND his economically-critical Russian heartland industrial base, both of which are under constant Ukrainian attack. 

In addition to the drain on Russian resources - and Putin's shrinking credibility - this gives Ukraine the ability to choose the time and place of the fighting, giving it an advantage in resource deployment and potential impact. This translates into rumors about Ukrainian offensives towards Crimea, other areas of Zaporizhzhia or in the Donbas, all of which Russia must try to defend with a diminished collection of men and materiel. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

The ground war continues to tilt in Ukraine’s favor. Kostiantynivka remains contested. Analysts report a concentration of some of Ukraine’s most capable units, including the 79th, 80th, and 95th Air Assault Brigades and the 92nd Mechanised Brigade, in the Zaporizhzhia sector. This suggests Zaporizhzhia and Crimea as the “most promising” areas for future Ukrainian offensive operations. Kyiv may be preparing a move toward the Perekop land bridge as the terrain favors Ukraine’s drone edge: open steppe, reliable weather, and small, well-trained infantry operating behind masses of tactical drones. This could also another deception campaign, similar to the lead up to the 2024 Kursk operation. (But) Putin has a much deeper problem than his inability to achieve decisive outcomes on the battlefield. Russia must now defend Crimea; and the economic and industrial base of Russia, which were assumed safe but are no longer.