What It Takes To Drop Ground Drones That Attack Behind Russian Lines

The photo to the left shows a Ukrainian ground drone being airlifted by a bomber drone to attack behind the Russian front line. 

As the following article reveals, developing the technology and the tactics, as well as perfecting the planning and training, took time and practice. This process illustrates not just the idea, but the intensive work required to make such innovations successful at an operational level. JL

Kateryna Lisunova reports in Ukraine Pravda:

The new tactic involves deploying kamikaze UGVs - ground robots - deep behind enemy lines using heavy bomber drones. The "NC13" strike UGV unit of the 3rd Assault Brigade, which carried out this mission, has successfully carried out more than 100 similar operations, which included capturing Russian positions without deploying infantry, using only UGVs and drones. "We spent quite a long time developing the tactic  and modifying the equipment because standard systems were not designed for this. The engineers spent a great deal of time making it work. The pilots had to learn how to operate with these systems and deploy them correctly. Our first operation went 15 kilometers (9.3 miles) deep behind enemy lines. The enemy started to panic because they did not understand what was happening or what struck them. They thought a sabotage and recon group had broken  into their rear. As a result, they canceled the mechanized assault they had planned for that day."

How Ukraine Rebuilt Its 60th Mech Brigade To Be Key Part of Operation Vivaldi

The story of Ukraine's 60th Mechanized Brigade is remarkable because of the obstacles it had to overcome to go from being one of the Ukrainian Army's most reviled units to one now at the heart of Operation Vivaldi's success, all of which occurred in the space of a year. 

The 60th began defending Lyman in 2024, when Russian forces began attacking in an attempt to retake it after losing it in the Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2022. It was plagued, from the start, by supply deficiencies and by inadequate officers. It spent most of that first year and a half retreating. It was later determined that its commander had been embezzling funds intended for drone purchases. When Ukraine adopted its corps structure, the 3rd Corps took it over and began making wholesale leadership, culture and supply changes - all while the brigade was continuing to battle a determined Russian offensive. But the changes took hold, the Russians failed to see the difference and within a year, the 60th was not just counterattacking but taking the lead in parts of Operation Vivaldi. It is a story of extraordinary perseverance, determination and leadership in the face of life-threatening obstacles. JL

The New Voice of Ukraine reports:

Ukraine's 60th Mechanized Brigade was defending positions on the Lyman front long before Operation Vivaldi began. (But) it's path to the counteroffensive (included) a corruption scandal, retreat from several positions, a transfer to the 3rd Corps and overhaul of its command. In 2025 "key officers had gone AWOL. The number of soldiers going AWOL was catastrophic. And all this was happening while the enemy was launching massive assaults towards Lyman. The situation was extremely difficult, worse than the public knew. Then we started making changes. Experienced officers and soldiers from the 3rd Assault Brigade transferred to the 60th Brigade in fall 2025. Russian commanders failed to adapt to the changes taking place within Ukrainian units in the sector. Within a year, the brigade went from struggling to hold its positions to taking part in one of  Ukraine's most successful offensives. 

Putin Has Been Halted Short of His Strategic Objectives By Operation Vivaldi

As Ukraine's has begun planning the fourth 'movement' of its Operation Vivaldi counteroffensive, the growing consensus among informed military and diplomatic observers is that Putin's claims of 'inevitable' victory in Donbas ring increasingly hollow. 

The defeat of Russian forces there is considered decisive, at least for the immediate future as the Kremlin's military appears incapable of reversing its declining fortunes on the battlefield. This has led to a dramatic increase in terror missile attacks on civilian targets, but so far, the casualties and destruction are less than those inflicted by Nazi, American and British bombing in WWII, which, even at that scale, failed to force their enemies to waver, let alone surrender. JL

Marc Santora and Josh Holder report in the New York Times:

Russian gains across Ukraine have slowed markedly in 2026 from their already glacial pace of last year. September was the worst month in net gains for Russia since June 2023. Ukraine's Vivaldi operation shows that when it lays the groundwork, mechanized advance is possible even under dense drone surveillance. Kyiv’s mid range strike forces targeted Russian logistics, including destruction of an oil pipeline, cutting fuel Russia's force needed.  Ukrainian troops also eliminated Russian drone pilots, using signals intel. Where Russia used fiber-optic cable drones, scouts traced spools back to launch sites. Ukraine used robotic mine removal to clear paths for its troops. It also saturated Russian routes with mines laid by drones. Behind the front, ground drones dropped from the air attacked to sow chaos in the rear as Ukraine's armor cleared Russian positions. The Russians, caught by surprise, often deployed reinforcements where Ukrainian forces had already advanced, leading to ambushes. Russia has been halted short of its strategic objectives. 

AI Task Costs Are Hard To Tally: Only 11% of Businesses Can Forecast Spend

Not being able to forecast how much it costs to use AI for a specific task is another impediment to faster and broader AI adoption by corporate customers. That unpredictability makes it harder to budget and risks unexpectedly - and unaffordably - high spending.

This does not mean businesses will stop experimenting with and using AI, but it may mean that they are becoming more cautious about how they do so. The problem with that is that AI companies and their investors have been projecting revenues and profits based on maximized expectations. Forecasts of spending accuracy will increase with experience, but that 'in the meantime' period  could take more than impatient investors and lenders are willing to wait. JL

Jillian Vordick and Stephanie Stamm report in the Wall Street Journal:

A recent study found that only 11% of nearly 400 businesses surveyed were able to accurately forecast AI spending. Unlike traditional software, AI behaves more like a human worker: It takes action, makes decisions, sometimes even makes mistakes—all on the clock. While more-advanced models tend to cost more per token, they can sometimes perform tasks more efficiently, leading to lower overall costs. Likewise, asking a “cheap” model to do something it isn’t suited to handle could cause a token run-up.“Total costs depend on many factors for a given task, which can make it hard to forecast new and evolving technology with precision.” As more companies add AI to their daily workflows, they will also need strategies to manage their use

Russian 11th Tank Regiment CO, Who Executed POWs, Killed By Ukraine Strike

The commander of Russia's 11th Tank Regiment was killed by a direct Ukrainian artillery strike on his vehicle as he was inspecting his unit's forward positions. 

If that sounds more like intent and random luck, it probably is. Karaev had been accused of murdering Ukrainian prisoners of war. JL

Vlad Litnarovych reports in United 24:

Major Alexei Karavaev, commander of Russia’s 11th Tank Regiment, was killed by a direct hit from a Ukrainian artillery round on his vehicle while he was traveling to inspect forward positions in the Kharkiv sector. Karavaev is (an accused) war criminal known by the call sign “Father,” who executed prisoners of war in the Kharkiv Region. Investigators linked him to the unit through phone-book records in which his number had reportedly been saved under entries including “Sasha’s Battalion Commander Vovchansk” and “Father SVO 82 Regiment 1 Battalion.” 

The Front Is Still There But Ukraine's Soldiers Are Running A Robot War On Screens

Among the lessons learned during Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi is that there will soon be as many new types of military ground drones as there are soldiers. 

They are successfully preceding and accompanying infantry assaults, not just reducing human risk, but increasing the odds of Ukrainian offensive goal achievement. JL

The World Strategist reports:

A Ukrainian soldier crouches in a dugout in the Donetsk region, eyes on a video screen. Miles away, a tracked robot the size of a wheelbarrow is inching toward a Russian bunker. There is no hope of survival. It carries 30 kilograms of explosive. The robot explodes. The bunker crashes. “Not one Ukrainian foot soldier's life has been put at risk." In assault operations, unmanned aerial vehicles and ground robotic systems always move ahead of infantry. The trenches are still there. But there are no soldiers in them now. They are in bunkers, running robots. Operation Vivaldi has shattered not only Russian defenses but the very assumptions about how wars are fought.

Armored Russian Assault On Huiliapole "Crushed" By Ukrainian Forces

In the 'here we go again' merry-go-round of evolving Russian offensive tactics, infiltration has again been supplanted by mechanized attacks with up-armored vehicles in the Huilaipole sector. 

But Ukraine's drones and their operators have become even more effective, resulting in the destruction of the mechanized assaults before they can reach Ukrainian lines - again. JL

RFU News reports:

At Huiliaipole, in a desperate bid to overturn their stalling progress as infiltrations become less viable, Russian armored assaults return as an option to sustain offensive pressure. They are launching assaults with heavily up-armored mechanized vehicles, frequently accompanied by Russian soldiers driving motorbikes or other all-terrain vehicles. (But) these fast-moving Russian assaulters rarely make it to their mission target alive. Additionally, the Ukrainians have discovered that while extra armor cages protect it against direct strikes, dropped munitions are extremely effective against them. Attacks using heavily up-armored vehicles that only rarely worked the year before are now even less effective through Ukraine’s increased use of bomber drones, FPV drones, and pilots that allow them to take out both the fast-moving all-terrain vehicles and the heavy armor simultaneously.