Jonathan Riley reports in The Geopolitical Economist:
A Russian net gain of only five square miles from 4 August to 1 September 2026, in strategic terms, are not the gains of an army on the verge of victory; but of an army making costly, local progress across a heavily contested war zone. Russian forces can infiltrate and pressure Ukrainian defenses, but cannot converting that into significant breakthroughs. Statistics from the last six months do not show Russia achieving decisive success. The slowing rate of advance suggests Ukrainian defenses, drone warfare, and attrition are imposing real limits. Ukraine has enough technological initiative to make the war costly for Russia far beyond the front. Its deep-strike campaign and software-enabled targeting have changed the strategic geography of the war. Russian refineries, airfields, depots and command nodes are increasingly part of the battlespace. This means Russia cannot treat the war as only in Ukraine, but as a campaign fought in the Russian homeland as well.























