Russia Deemed Unlikely To Take Ukraine's Donbas Fortress Belt This Year, If Ever

Ever since Ukraine surprised Russian forces in late January with probing attacks that became a counteroffensive as Russian weaknesses became more apparent, predictions about the Kremlin's ability to realize its plans for 2026 have become more pessimistic. 

Now, the highly respected and frequently definitive Institute for the Study of War has revealed in its latest analysis that Russia's goal of taking Ukraine's 'Fortress Belt' cities in western Donbas is unlikely this year due to the weakened state of the Russian military and the comparatively strong Ukrainian showing thus far. Taking the Fortress Belt has been a Kremlin goal for several years because it holds the key to the rest of Ukraine. The Russians have been unable to take it so far - not for lack of trying - but the emerging question is whether that goal is permanently out of reach militarily. JL  

The Institute for the Study of War reports:

Russian forces are unlikely to seize Ukraine's Donbas Fortress Belt in 2026. The Russian Western Grouping of Forces, including the 20th CAA and 1st GTA, lack the strength to seize Lyman as they have diverted significant forces to counter Ukrainian counterattacks that liberated most of Kupyansk. Ukrainian countermeasures will further complicate Russian advances, such as intensively targeting Russian multiple launch rocket systems in the Slovyansk and Kostyantynivka sectors to disrupt Russian artillery, degrading Russia's offensive and defensive capabilities. Ukrainian forces will continue to impose high costs on the Russian spring-summer offensive as they degrade Russia’s capabilities, particularly in the Slovyansk direction.

'Horrific' Losses, Ukraine Advances Force Kremlin From Offense To Defense

Ukraine's counteroffensive may have altered the strategic balance for the fighting this year, if not for the entire war. 

Russia has suffered such 'horrific' casualties in attempting to fend off Ukrainian advances, that it has been forced to redeploy its units preparing for a spring offensive and has also been compelled to commit reserves intended for assaults to defensive duties. This has had a destabilizing effect on the Russian military posture in the war this year and has sapped the Kremlin's plan of much of its intended punch before it even began JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

The Russian military now faces competing dilemmas. Ukraine has inflicted 4,840 casualties on the Russians over a three-day period, one of the highest daily casualty rates for the Russians since the start of the invasion in 2022. Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction threaten the rear of Russian 5th Combined Arms Army pushing west from Hulyaipole, compelling them to shift from offensive to defensive posture. Elements of Russia’s operational reserve have been committed to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks. This is a good indicator that Russian forces are burning through reserves earmarked for the spring offensive.

Ukraine Manpower Improves With Better Leadership, Training, Pay

Ukraine's manpower shortage compared to Russia's much larger population has begun to improve in the last year. Much of that success is due to management and intelligence which helped the military embrace the reality of their situation and encouraged building on what the Ukrainians do well - and what works. 

Among these improvements include the promotion of younger, battle-tested commanders, many of whom were not professional soldiers and who volunteered when Russian invaded. Many of them served initially in self-funded and organized volunteer units whose bravery and success have led them to integrated into the regular army. Another change has been better training, with a focus on survivability and mission accomplishment. And thirdly, the Ukrainians have embraced technology, learning, as the US and British in WWII, that substituting equipment and technology for lives made the most strategic sense. JL

Decimus reports in Daily Kos:

The current top young Ukrainian field commanders mostly joined the war as volunteer leaders in ad hoc self-funded (units such as) the “Azov Battalion," the “Carpathian Sich”, “Magyar’s Birds”, "Da Vinci Wolves," and, “Skala Battalion" are now fully integrated into the formal army. Issues regarding manpower are slowly getting better as increasing number of Ukrainians residing overseas and foreign volunteers sign up thanks to better pay and training.

Russian Command Depended On Starlink, Which Is Why Cutoff Is 'Catastrophic'

Ukrainian forces are learning that the Russian command had become dependent on Starlink for conveying orders, deploying soldiers and coordinating with drone units. All this despite the fact that the Russians were using Starlink illegally and should have prepared for the risk of losing it. They evidently believed that due to Musk's and Trump's tacit support for Putin that their use was secure. And that was wrong. 

Ukraine's recent offensive success is due, in no small measure, to Russian commanders' inability to give orders or coordinate with drones. JL

Nikita Nikolaienko and colleagues report in the Wall Street Journal:

Ukrainian forces have notched their biggest territorial gains in more than two years. When years. When Russian forces lost Starlink connections, Ukraine’s military went on the offensive. Russian commanders had gotten used to sending orders to infantrymen about where to move. Russian soldiers were deployed with a Starlink device and “had to send video confirmation of their location to prove they hadn’t deserted. With Starlink, the Russians controlled units. That level of control is now gone. (Previously) at command posts, Russian officers would watch live drone feeds and deploy resources based on what they saw. The system let them coordinate instantly and securely with drone pilots, who would then dispatch attack drones at Ukrainian targets. Once Starlink was cut off, Russian commanders lost access to live video of the battlefield and communications with troops.

30% of Ukraine Infantry Can Be Replaced By Ground Robots This Year

Ground robots of various types replace as many as 30% of Ukrainian infantry this year and may be able to increase that number to 80% in the future. 

The Ukrainians have already used such robotic systems to accomplish tasks as diverse as evacuating wounded, bringing up supplies, defending static strong points or trenches, taking prisoners and even attacking Russian positions. JL

Anatoly Buryak reports in Espreso Global:

Ground -based robotic systems (GROS) can replace a third of the infantry of the Ukrainian Defense Forces on the front line.  "If we go in the direction of technological innovation, then this year, I am convinced, we can remove up to 30% of infantrymen behind the LBZ, and in the near future - up to 80%," said Andriy Biletsky, Commander of Ukraine's 3rd Corps. According to him, under such conditions, the infantry will become an "elite specialized force" to perform tasks that the NRC cannot handle.

Russians Lose 2 KA-52 'Copters In 24 Hours, the First To Ukraine Fiber Optic Drone

Russian forces in Donetsk lost two KA-52 "Alligator" helicopters within 24 hours in the past few days. The first was especially significant because it was taken down by a Ukrainian FPV fiber optic drone. 

The implication of this chain of events - the loss of one helicopter being noteworthy but of two within a day being almost unheard of - is that Russian electronic warfare and air defenses have been degraded, which confirms reports of the Ukrainian strategy which has intentionally targeted such assets precisely to create these types of opportunities. JL

Julia Struck reports in the Kyiv Post and Roman Pryhodko reports in Militarnyi:

Ukraine destroyed a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter in the Pokrovsk sector using a fiber-optic (FPV) drone. The helicopter was “hunted down” with a drone by pilots from the “Baltika” crew of the “Predators of Heights” battalion in the Donetsk region. Following an emergency landing, the crew attempted to escape but drones of the 1st Battalion, 414th Unmanned Systems Brigade “Birds of Madyar,” eliminated them. Russian forces then lost a second Ka-52 attack helicopter in the past 24 hours. The crew attempted to eject, but one of the pilots was killed immediately upon the helicopter being hit. 

Russia Tries Armor Again To Reduce Casualties. They've Being Massacred

The winter of 2026 did not go well for Russian forces in Ukraine. Spring, if anything, is proving to be worse. 

During the winter campaign, the Russians gained no appreciable ground and actually ended up seeing the Ukrainians advance. And, for the first time, Russian casualties were no longer easily replaced. So the Kremlin has decided to go back to the previously failed strategy of attacking with armor in hopes it may reduce the number of Russian killed and wounded. But if the first week's experience from multiple assaults along the entire front line, that hope is as vain as all its predecessors as Ukrainian drones, mines and artillery decimate Russian forces. JL

David Axe reports in Trench Art:

Russian tanks and other armor are back as the weather warms up along the 1,200-km front line. But the renewed mechanized offensive is off to a disastrous start for the Russians. An armored assault in eastern Ukraine on Thursday ended in a hardware "massacre." More massacres are likely. The Russians may be hitting their manpower limit. After 418,000 casualties in 2025, they bury more troops than they recruit. Hence armor again. (But) Moscow is trading one dwindling resource for another. The Russians have tried this before. Vehicle-led assaults in the first two years of the war got a lot of hardware destroyed in exchange for modest advances. Toward Lyman this week, "We knew they were planning to attack. Remote mines, emplaced along the likeliest assault lanes, wiped them out. Massacre"