The Reason Ukraine's Use of Off-Shelf Software Is Destroying Russia's Military

Silicon Valley has long known of - and hired - Ukraine's deep reservoir of geospatial tech talent. And they turn out to be ideally suited to help adapt off the shelf software and hardware to the practical necessities of target identification and destruction - without revealing sources and methods. It has made them very effective electronic warriors. JL 

Trent Telenko reports in Twitter, image Lawrence Geai, MYOP:

Ukraine's software package is reminiscent of Uber or Lyft's software in that it assigns targets to the nearest gun, mortar, rocket launcher or drone. It transitioned from a Sun Microsystems SPARC computer running the Linux kernel to a version based on laptops running the Microsoft Windows operating system. GIS artillery has evolved into a multi-profile command and control system that can process data from drones, smartphones, rangefinders and commercial satellites. A SATCOM link at Ukrainian command nominates targets in the app to the nearest fire drone or convoy hunter killer teams throughout the entire Ukrainian battle space without tipping intelligence sources & methods. Ukraine has an abundance of well-trained geospatial talent. When my previous employer in Silicon Valley wanted to to hire GIS analysts, they chose Kyiv.Ukraine's software package is reminiscent Uber or Lyft's taxi software in that assigns targets to the nearest gun, mortar, rocket launcher, Aerosvidzka drone or SF team.

 

The 2009 AFATDS transitioned from a Sun Microsystems SPARC computer running the Linux kernel to a version based on laptop computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system. GIS Art for Artillery, or "GIS Art" for short, isn't the 1950's "Star" style Mainframe-terminal (TACFIRE) or Mainframe-Minicomputer-terminal (AFTADS) ported over to laptops. It is a true distributed software environment that reduced request for fire to trigger pull from ...20 minutes to 30 seconds. By comparison, the US Army did that call to trigger pull in 5 minutes in WW2, 15 minutes in Vietnam and one hour currently. No, that isn't a typo. The increased US Army time 'from call to trigger pull' has to do trying to prevent friendly fire plus the inclusion of JAG officers in Division artillery fire control centers doing rules of engagement/collateral damage vetting of calls for fire. In 2006, when US Army Special Forces task force hunting high value targets was given direct access to an MLRS battery with GMLRS rockets - without a JAG officer poisoned chain of command - got it back down to Vietnam 15-minute levels in Iraq, thanks to the Blue Force Tracker. This didn't last long with the Obama Administration thanks to Taliban high value targets using their own kids as human shields followed by cellphone photos of dead kids. Then everything went back to the JAG officer game & the Special Forces started buying loitering drones.

 

Returning to the "GIS Arta" app, (GIS meaning geospatial) it has evolved into a multi-profile command and control system that can process data from drones, smartphones, rangefinders and commercial satellite images.Ukraine has a lot of earth observation/GIS (geospatial) talent. When my previous employer in Silicon Valley wanted to create a remote office to hire GIS analysts, they chose Kyiv. Abundance of well trained talent. Must serve them well wrt drones etc This has a lot of implications. The biggest being that with a good SATCOM link Ukrainian high command could nominate targets in the the "GIS Arta" app to the nearest fire support, drone or convoy hunter killer teams throughout the entire Ukrainian battle space without tipping local units to intelligence sources & methods. Western Intelligence is either ignorant or discounts the "GIS Arta" app because of a CROWDSTRIKE cybersecurity firm December 22, 2016 article claiming the Russians hacked "GIS Arta."And that the "Fancy Bear" group used the same hacking method to to get into the DNC. The problem is that hacking of the "GIS Arta" app CROWDSTRIKE claimed never happened.

 

I was told the most likely Ukrainian sensor directing the artillery fire was a Su-24MR FENCER E M-101 Shtik side looking aerial radar (SLAR)'The radar centroid error I described was spot-on for 1985 Soviet era kit. The Su-24MR FENCER E had long range air to ground data links, but directing artillery with it implied some distinctly non-Soviet era command and control doctrine. There was also the fact the barragelooked wrong. And by looked wrong I mean it was all landing in one spot with explosions indicating shells from radically different azimuths. It was kinda, sorta, a time on target (TOT) from lots of individual guns.Usually Russian doctrine artillery batteries fire a "battery solution" and the barrage lands in the pattern of the ground formation of the firing guns. A TOT from several Russian gun batteries would cover a significant area. So the Ukrainians were doing something else.I systematically searched through Donbas artillery videos of UA artillery strikes & photos of UA artillery positions (single guns). The thing that stood out was the timing of the barrages, the tightness of the barrages and the variability of the shell bursts.UA artillery were not firing as batteries. They were firing as individual guns and launchers, then displacing immediately. Multiple individual guns & mortars of different calibers were shooting dispersed across a large area at the same target in the TOT manner.1. A radar or laser range finder equipped forward observer with a GPS unit, 2. A gun with a digital radio, digital artillery fire control computer and a GPS unit, and 3. A digital internet data link radio communications tying them together.

 

It then becomes relatively easy to program a multi-gun, multi-ammunition caliber time on target from whatever guns are in range. You can even call down multiple TOT barrages in a short amount of time using different guns for each barrage-strike on the same target.That meant Russian counter-battery radars were not seeing battery shoots. They were seeing lots of individual guns across the front, with multiple trajectories, shooting less than three shells, at the same or different targets, across a whole front.That was why the Russians were not killing a lot of UA towed artillery with counter-battery in the Summer of 2015 onward. Russian counter-battery radars were not seeing "worthwhile" battery sized targets for MLRS shoots.It also made Russian airpower much less effective in the counterbattery role when it showed up. What cost Ukraine it's towed 122mm guns wasn't destruction by counter battery. It was abandonment when the Debaltsevo pocket fell.The Ukrainians had multiple dug in positions per 122mm towed gun. They didn't have the resources to do the same with their truck prime movers. They could camouflage them, but not get them into cover. The sheer weight of fragmentation damage over time disabled thembeyond the local ability to repair the day the Debaltsevo pull out came. The Ukrainian Army chose to save its troops over its heavy weapons and disabled heavy weapons as best they could at short notice.