A Blog by Jonathan Low

 

Jul 31, 2022

Why Russian Troop Redeployments From Donbas To Kherson May Not Matter

In effect, it's already too late for Russian forces in Kherson. Their forces are isolated by the damaged bridges and other supply routes, thus unable to either reinforce or to evacuate at scale. 

The redeployment of better Russian troops from Donbas to the Kherson region may actually be not to defend Kherson, which is effectively already lost, but to prevent a broader counteroffensive aimed at liberating Crimea. Today's Ukrainian drone attack on Russian Naval headquarters in Sevastopol, Crimea was a warning of what it come. JL  

Michael Kofman reports in Twitter:

Russian forces are shifting units in anticipation of Ukraine's counteroffensive in the south. (But) that deployment may not make defense of Kherson more practicable. With HIMARS dropping bridges, Russian ability to sustain forces west of the river will grow severely constrained. Ukraine's incremental advance, steadily isolating forces, makes the position untenable. Hence (Donbas) units may function as an operational reserve against a broader counteroffensive. If Ukraine take the city they take back the key regional capital & they deny Russia any further opportunities for a campaign along the southern coast.Note the post below, suggesting a redeployment of 8-9 Eastern MD BTGs from Donbas to Crimea. Russian forces are shifting units in anticipation of a UA counteroffensive in the south.

 

- 14 Spetsnaz Bde to set up 32 recce-sabotage groups - 8-9 new BTGs from Estern MD to #Crimea - 5 BTGs from 76 Airborne Div augmented with tanks - VDV force may increase from 8,5k to 11k soldiers - 19 MRDiv aug with T-90.

 

However, that deployment may not make defense of Kherson more practicable. With HIMARS dropping bridges, Russian ability to sustain forces west of the river will grow severely constrained. Hence EMD units may function as an operational reserve against a broader counteroffensive.

 

The war is likely entering an inflection point relative to the past several months, as UA looks to steadily isolate Kherson, generate momentum of its own, and press Russian forces west of the river where they're quite vulnerable. I will just add, that in Kherson there has been a sustained incremental advance, with strikes constraining Russian ability to resupply or move across Inhulets within this part of Kherson. Steadily isolating forces, making the position untenable over time.

 

Ukr has the possibility of conducting a successful offensive & they're telegraphing as though that's what they're going to do...If they take the city they take back the key regional capital & they deny Ru any further opportunities for a campaign along the southern coast.

 

There's a good chance that in September, one of the other additional problems of them [Russia] annexing [Kherson & other areas], is they will then begin to mobilise personnel from those regions, whoever hasn't left. Russia lacks forces to exploit breakthroughs, allowing Ukraine to conduct tactical withdraws rather than getting encircled. They're not being pressed sufficiently quickly enough.Bottom line: [Russia's] problem remains they don't have enough additional force to rotate the current units they have...that's why the force faces exhaustion, right? How many months in a brutal war of attrition can you sustainably be on the battlefield?

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