Mick Ryan reports in War In the Future:
The Ukrainian consistency in implementing their strategy of corrosion now sees the Russian Army under pressure, with insufficient reinforcements to replace an increasingly exhausted force that is under attack physically and psychologically. In corroding the Russian military physically, morally, and intellectually, the Ukrainians have evolved the military art. This is what 21st century war looks like. The Ukrainians have proved to be masters of it. Ukraine, largely, has refused to fight how Russia wants to fight. It has developed & implemented its own military strategy with great discipline. Strategically, the Ukrainians are corroding Russia’s international standing with their global influence operations.It is important we study the Ukrainian military #strategy and how they fight. It offers important insights for the modernisation of western military forces, many of whom remain mired in an intellectual quicksand of Cold War and COIN doctrines.During their invasion, Russia’s military has been forced by the Ukrainians to continually re-assess its strategic objectives. Russia has downgraded their political goals for #Ukraine, and the strategy for achieving them. The Ukrainians have fought & subverted Russian strategy.
While political objectives shape how war is conducted and what battles are fought, so too do battles reshape political objectives. It has been the Ukrainian military strategy, implemented with courage and discipline, that has driven this.The Ukrainians have achieved this through the adoption of a simple military strategy: corrosion. The Ukrainian approach has embraced the corrosion of the Russian physical, moral, and intellectual capacity to fight in #Ukraine - and in the global information environment.
This strategy of corrosion sees #Ukraine attacking the Russians where they are weak, while also using some of their combat power to delay and frustrate Russian combat forces. It extends beyond tactics & operations - as I noted before, it also attacks Russian military strategy.British military historian and theorist, Basil Liddell Hart described this as the indirect approach. He wrote writes how “effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponents unreadiness to meet it.”
The Ukrainians have taken this advice to heart. They have attacked the weakest physical support systems of an army in the field – communications networks, logistic supply routes, rear areas, artillery and senior commanders in their command posts.n the Battles for #Kyiv and #Kharkiv, the Ukrainians were able to fight the Russians to a standstill because they were able to penetrate Russian rear areas and destroy parts of their logistic support. And in doing so, they had a significant impact on Russian morale. The Ukrainians therefor corroded the northern Russian expedition physical and morally from within, and forced its ejection from Ukraine.
The Ukrainians had less success with this approach in the Donbas however. Due to the alignment of the front line, and the concentration of most Russian offensive capacity, the Ukrainians were drawn into an attrition fight there for many weeks.This is a way of war that Russians embrace and one which the Ukrainians would have preferred to avoid. It was a crunching and destructive fight, with many lives spent on both sides for minor tactical gains by the Russians.
The introduction of #HIMARS changed this dynamic. It allowed the Ukrainians to realign their defensive operations in the east and adapt to attack the Russian strength (artillery) by targeting its ammunition supply depots.The Ukrainians are re-adopting the asymmetric conventional tactics they used so successfully early in the war. This is the Ukrainian ‘deep battle’, an integral part of their strategy of corrosion.Another key target is command and control nodes, or in other words, command posts with senior Russian commanders. The ability to rapidly target these & use #HIMARS to inflict maximum destruction is vital.
Because beyond the physical, there is a psychological impact. Removing headquarters also removes important coordination nodes, breaking down force unity of effort. Targeting soldiers and units degrades (further) their morale and cohesion.Russian morale is being corroded because of its battlefield defeats in the south, declining availability of artillery and destruction (seen on social media) of supply depots. And clever Ukrainians innovations like this are also having an impact.
The use of social media, showing off Russian deficiencies, has magnified this moral corrosion. The corrosion in morale has resulted in declining battlefield discipline, with Russian desertions, battlefield refusals and – horribly – frequent war crimes.The Ukrainians have also forced on the Russians a deeper form of intellectual corrosion. Under pressure to achieve some form of victory due to previous setbacks, the Russians are taking greater tactical and operational risks with their military operations.
More broadly, the Russians are having to form volunteer battalions which will not be as well-equipped, led or trained as the Russian forces that entered Ukraine in February. This is corroding the Russian military and its capacity to sustain operations in the long term. The Ukrainian consistency in implementing their strategy of corrosion now sees the Russian Army under pressure, with insufficient reinforcements to replace an increasingly exhausted force that is under attack physically and psychologically.
Strategically, the Ukrainians are corroding Russia’s international standing with their global influence operations. And they have secured strategic commitments from the EU .
In corroding the Russian military physically, morally, and intellectually, the Ukrainians have evolved the military art. This is what 21st century war looks like. The Ukrainians have proved to be masters of it.Ukraine, largely, has refused to fight how Russia wants to fight. It has developed & implemented its own military strategy with great discipline. What might other nations learn from the Ukrainian Armed Forces? In short – a lot. That is the topic of my next thread
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