How Russia's Winter Offensive Against Ukraine Failed

Russia has almost nothing to show for three months of winter attacks which cost it tens of thousands of casualties which frittered away its fall mobilization. 

The underlying reasons are poor training and equipment, inadequate leadership driven primarily by political rather than military considerations - and strong Ukrainian defenses utilizing superior intelligence and strategy.  

Josh Holder and Marco Hernandez report in the New York Times:

After months of pouring soldiers into eastern Ukraine, Russia’s progress adds up to three small settlements and part of the city of Bakhmut, a high-profile battlefield with limited strategic value. Moscow’s inability to gain substantial ground in the Donbas shows how little its offensive achieved and how much its military has struggled to capture urban areas throughout the war, encountering well-prepared Ukrainian positions, protected by basements and buildings, with defensive lines heavily fortified from nearly a decade of fighting. “The Russian military doesn’t have the force quality. It doesn’t seem to have the ammunition and it can’t replace junior leadership."

After months of pouring soldiers into eastern Ukraine, Russia’s progress essentially adds up to this: three small settlements and part of the city of Bakhmut, a high-profile battlefield with limited strategic value.

Settlements captured by Russia this year

A grid of the cities that Russia has taken this year so far

5 miles

Bakhmut

Krasna Hora

Kurdiumivka

Soledar

Contested

Captured in

Feb. 2023

Captured in

Jan. 2023

Captured in

Jan. 2023

Compare that with what Moscow had hoped to achieve from its winter offensive by now: to seize the entire Donbas region — which contains dozens more settlements, some of them much larger than Bakhmut. To do that, Russia would have to recreate and win battles at the scale of Bakhmut again and again.

Settlements in the Donbas still controlled by Ukraine

A grid of the cities Ukraine still controls in the Donbas

5 miles

Just 30 miles northwest

of Bakhmut, but much

larger, with more than

twice the prewar

population.

Zalizne

Pokrovsk

Kramatorsk

Prewar population: 185,000

Selydove

Sviatohirsk

Chasiv Yar

Druzhkivka

Reclaimed by Ukraine

in September after

four months under

Russian control.

Niu-York

Lyman

Myrnohrad

42,000

Siversk

On the front line of the war

near the city of Donetsk.

Regular shelling has almost

completely destroyed the city.

Bilenke

Kurakhove

Dobropillia

Avdiivka

32,000

Kostiantynivka

Sloviansk

Yasnohirka

Novogrodovka

Toretsk

Note: Population estimates according to the 2020 Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine. Sources: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Institute for the Study of War with the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project (areas of control) and OpenStreetMap (base map data) The New York Times

A breakthrough for Russia appears increasingly unlikely. Regardless of the outcome in the fierce battle of Bakhmut, Moscow’s inability to gain substantial ground in the Donbas shows how little its offensive has achieved and how much its military has struggled to efficiently capture urban areas throughout the war.

After mobilizing hundreds of thousands of troops, Russia is no longer severely understaffed, as it was in the fall, when it lost large parts of the northeast in a surprise Ukrainian counteroffensive.

But even with more troops and firepower, Russia has, at best, only managed to inch forward, encountering well-prepared Ukrainian positions, protected by basements and buildings, with defensive lines heavily fortified from nearly a decade of fighting.

A map of the Donbas region showing areas held by Russia and Ukraine as of April 4, 2023.

Detail

area

UKRAINE

KUPIANSK

RUSSIAN-HELD

AREAS

UKRAINIAN-HELD

AREAS

IZIUM

Front line

as of Jan. 1

SLOVIANSK

Front line

as of April 4

BAKHMUT

LUHANSK

SNIZHNE

DONETSK

VUHLEDAR

MARIUPOL

20 miles

Sources: Institute for the Study of War with the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project (areas of control) and OpenStreetMap (base map data) The New York Times

Ukrainians fought Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region for years before the full-fledged invasion in February last year.

A Russian attack near the coal-mining town of Vuhledar this year ended in a rout after Ukrainian soldiers ambushed poorly organized columns of tanks. An attempt to capture the town of Avdiivka in recent weeks has not broken through, although Russian shelling barely seems to stop.

And a tenacious Ukrainian defense has held up against wave after wave of Russian attacks aimed at encircling Bakhmut, which was once home to around 70,000 people. The casualties on both sides have been enormous, but the land changing hands is minuscule.

The front line

Russian movements and frontlines around Bakhmut and Avdiivka as of March 31, 2023

Detail

area

UKRAINIAN-HELD

AREAS

SOLEDAR

KRASNA HORA

Front line

as of April 4

Front line

as of Jan. 1

BAKHMUT

CHASIV YAR

RUSSIAN

MOVEMENT

RUSSIAN-HELD

AREAS

KOSTIANTYNIVKA

KURDIUMIVKA

TORETSK

HORLIVKA

YENAKIJEVE

RUSSIAN

MOVEMENT

AVDIIVKA

4 miles

Source: Institute for the Study of War with the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project (Areas of control), Rochan Consulting (Russian Movement) and OpenStreetMap (base map data) The New York Times

Russia has struggled to make gains because it had barely stablized itself after its losses in the fall before launching its winter offensive, Michael Kofman, the director of Russia studies at CNA, a research institute in Virginia, told the “War on the Rocks” podcast last month.

“The Russian military doesn’t have the force quality,” Mr. Kofman said. “It doesn’t necessarily seem to have the ammunition either. And it can’t replace junior leadership in such a short amount of time.”

Russia’s grinding advances in Bakhmut have been led by the Wagner private military company, which recruited tens of thousands of convicts from Russian prisons in exchange for the promise of freedom.

The prolonged and bloody fight for Bakhmut has depleted Wagner’s supply of prisoner recruits, according to Ukrainian officials, forcing it to use more of its professional recruits. Military analysts are skeptical that Russia could repeat its strategy of near-suicidal prisoner assaults that it has used in Bakhmut on any future Ukrainian cities.

The battles have imposed significant costs for Ukraine as well. Ukraine’s military is poised to launch a major counteroffensive this spring, and in continuing to try to hold Bakhmut, it has lost scores of battle-hardened soldiers that could have been used in its offensive. In the south, Kyiv will face Russia’s own well-prepared network of trenches, tank traps and minefields.

Ukrainian forces will also have to contend with persistent ammunition shortages. Western officials have raised concerns about the rate at which Ukraine is exhausting artillery stocks, firing thousands of shells per day as it defends Bakhmut at all costs. Western manufacturers are ramping up production, but it will take many months for new supplies to begin meeting demand.

How Russia’s Advances in the Donbas Region Have Slowed Since the War Began

For Russia’s winter offensive to have successfully captured the Donbas by the end of March, its military would have needed to recreate the momentum it had at the start of the war, when it caught Ukraine off guard and seized large areas of the country in a matter of weeks, including scores of settlements in eastern Ukraine.

But within months of the invasion, Russia’s rapid advances ran out of steam, even as it narrowed its ambitions and focused on eastern Ukraine. Despite mobilizing hundreds of thousands of fresh recruits, Russia’s winter offensive has fared even worse.