What Happens When Russia Is Forced To Go On the Defensive?

It appears that Russia's improvident attacks this winter have done more to exhaust its reserved of men and materiel than has Ukraine's successful thwarting of them. 

The question now is to what degree Ukraine can surprise and overwhelm Russian forces as it has in the past - and follow up with a sustained push. JL 

Michael Kofman reports in War On the Rocks:

The Russian offensive is going about as poorly as expected. The question is how much will Russian forces exhaust themselves and be forced to ration ammunition. I hold to the argument that Gerasimov is exhausting the force with an ill-timed feckless set of offensive operations, whose gains will not change the strategic picture for Russia, but could leave Russian forces more vulnerable. UA has consistently overperformed, while RU forces underperformed, relative to expectations. The Russian offensive in the Donbas has not yet ended, but it has weakened in pace of operations and intensity. Having achieved little, Russian forces are probably preparing to shift to a defensive posture in anticipation of a Ukrainian offensive. At Vuhledar Russian forces fed the better parts of two brigades into UA minefields and ATGMs, then eventually switched to Avdiivka. There they created a partial encirclement, but UA may have stabilized the situation at this point (its unclear).

 

Many of the complaint videos seem to come from around Avdiivka, where Russian mobilized territorial troops have been assigned to the DNR’s corps. They are being rotated onto the battlefield probably in battalion or company sized elements and thrown into infantry assaults. Other battlefields: Kreminna -> Lyman, Bilohorivka, Marinka, could be summarized as see-saw battles where RU struggled to attain an advantage. Overall, RU force quality appears insufficient to restore offensive potential, hence most attacks are by VDV or Naval Infantry.

 

Consequently, the Russian offensive is going about as poorly as expected. The question is how much will Russian forces exhaust themselves and be forced to ration ammunition. Putin has publicly commented on artillery ammunition constraints forcing them to limit use. I hold to the argument in an earlier thread, that Gerasimov is exhausting the force with an ill-timed feckless set of offensive operations, whose gains will not change the strategic picture for Russia, but could leave Russian forces more vulnerable.

 

Meanwhile, UA is building out a sizable additional force: three corps, consisting of six maneuver brigades, and supporting elements. How many of these units will be complete and trained by the time of the offensive is unknown. Some brigades will be equipped entirely with Western AFVs. However, they may be composed of recently mobilized personnel, and on a very tight training regimen. Operating cohesively as units, and attempting combined arms maneuver may prove difficult. My impression is that capability gaps remain in breaching equipment, mine clearing, combat engineering, bridging, support, and core items like communication, night vision, ISR.

 

The Russian military likely has the manpower and reserves to mount a stubborn defense, along with minefields and entrenchments. This doesn't mean UA can't break RU lines, but past offensives suggest that UA has challenges sustaining momentum after a breakthrough is achieved.

 

Turning briefly to manpower, the Russian military still has a long-term manpower problem. The leadership is keen to avoid another mobilization wave. At this stage they are attempting to recruit 400k contract servicemen instead. There is a nation-wide contract service recruitment drive with advertisements and mobile recruitment centers across Russia. Draft notices still go out seeking to update information and pressure people into signing contracts. Regions likely have quotas & state enterprises are used as recruitment instruments. This was tried last year, and the results proved underwhelming. While elements of Russian society support, or acquiesce to the war, most do not want to participate despite the money offered. Hence I suspect that to rotate forces and replace losses Moscow will resort to mobilization once again later this year. My guess is that if there is another mobilization wave, then it will be summer/fall, depending on what happens on the battlefield. Russia has just begun processing the biannual conscript intake, enrolling 147,000, a significant increase compared to recent years. For more on this check out CIT’s recent posts.

 

Turning to Bakhmut. Over the past couple weeks RU changed approach, advancing northwest of the city towards the water canal, and into the city itself along three sides. While UA forces have not been encircled, the situation remains precarious, and unstable. The reason why RU changed approach is unclear: inability to sever the supply route, force exhaustion, concern over exposed flanks, infighting between Wagner and GenStaff, or concerns about committing reserves and getting fixed at Bakhmut as Ukraine’s spring offensive looms.

 

In Bakhmut UA sought to attrition Russian forces and fix them long enough to launch the spring offensive. But, the evidence is scant that UA still enjoys a significantly favorable attrition ratio, or that it is fixing a substantial Russian force.

 

Whether holding Bakhmut makes military sense is best judged later. This is an incomplete picture at best, and UA has no easy options: hold, withdraw, counter attack, move up spring offensive timing. But over the past month Wagner forces have advanced further into the city. The reason Bakhmut matters is not because it will directly impede UA offensive prospects, but because force quality is difficult to regenerate (and ammo finite). What UA spends now it may miss later this year when the offensive is over, and may struggle to sustain momentum.

 

The Ukrainian military is better motivated and more adaptable than Russia’s, but after more than a year of fighting force quality issues have risen to the fore, and there are internal clashes as two military cultures uncomfortably coexist within the same army. UA cannot afford to be profligate, because what follows a series of successful offensives could prove similar to the attritional period December-February. Even if an outright military victory is achieved, the war may continue as a cross-border war of attrition.

 

To get past short-termism in the conversation it is important to consider what will follow Ukraine’s offensive. US and European countries can sustain Ukraine's war effort, but may not be able to provide a decisive military advantage over RU for some time after this period. Consequently, UA has a critical window of opportunity, which will set expectations. UA has consistently overperformed, while RU forces underperformed, relative to expectations. Hence I am cautiously optimistic, but concerned about the uncertainty on what will follow