How US Policy Enables Russia's Kharkiv Assault, Missile Attacks On Ukraine Cities

US policy prohibits Ukraine from using US supplied weapons to attack many targets inside Russia, ostensibly for fear of escalation. 

But Russia has used that sanctuary to build up forces north of Kharkiv as well as to launch missiles from Russian airspace at Ukrainian cities and other civilian targets. There is growing pressure on the US to face the reality and remove such prohibitions on the use of military aid. JL 

Institute For the Study of War reports via Annieli in Daily Kos:

US policy prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided weapons in Russia is severely compromising Ukraine's ability to defend itself. The Russian military is exploiting Russia’s sanctuary space to facilitate ground operations in Kharkiv Oblast. Russia used its (US-mandated) sanctuary to assemble a force on the Russian side of Ukraine’s northeast border. (And) defeating Russian glide bomb attacks against Kharkiv City requires the interception of Russian aircraft in Belgorod Oblast before they come within striking range of Kharkiv City. Ukraine’s air defenders have limited reaction time to intercept Russian projectiles if the projectiles must first enter Ukrainian airspace before they can be interdicted.

The Russian military is further exploiting Russia’s sanctuary space to facilitate ground operations in Kharkiv Oblast. Meat continues to be ground.

Defeating Russian glide bomb attacks against Kharkiv City requires the interception of Russian aircraft in Belgorod Oblast before they come within striking range of Kharkiv City.

 

The Russian Air Force began to strike Kharkiv City with glide bombs in March 2024.[12] Ukraine has not been able to effectively counter these strikes because Ukraine is running low on its indigenous S-300 air defense systems and lacks sufficient other non-US long-range air defense systems to intercept Russian fighter-bombers before they release their glide bombs.[13] Ukraine needs more Patriot systems and interceptors, but no number of Patriot systems can protect Kharkiv City from the Russian glide bomb threat so long as the Russian Air Force can continue to use Russian airspace as a sanctuary and safe space.

Russia also leverages its airspace sanctuary to conduct devastating missile and drone strike attacks against Ukraine. Russia conducts routine large-scale strikes targeting Ukraine employing drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, and other ordinances. Russian strikes have become more effective over time as Russia has incorporated tactical adaptations to overcome Ukrainian air defense capabilities and as Ukraine has run low on interceptors.[14] Russia’s airspace sanctuary compounds the challenges in defeating Russian strike packages. Ukraine’s air defenders have limited reaction time to intercept Russian projectiles if the projectiles must first enter Ukrainian airspace before they can be interdicted.

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Current US policy prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided weapons in the territory of Russia is severely compromising Ukraine's ability to defend itself against the renewed cross-border invasion Russia has recently launched in Kharkiv Oblast.

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The more physical distance and therefore time that Ukraine has to track and intercept Russian missiles and drones, the more effective Ukrainian air defense will be. Israeli and allied forces managed to successfully defeat Iran’s unprecedented Russian-style strike package against Israel on April 13 because Israeli and allied forces tracked and intercepted the projectiles as they flew extended distances over Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and did not wait for them to enter Israeli airspace before intercepting them.[15] Ukraine would be able to more effectively defend itself from Russian strikes if Ukraine’s air defenders could similarly track and intercept Russian missiles and drones from the source as they approach Ukraine over an extended distance, as opposed to waiting until they cross into Ukrainian airspace. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated on May 10 that Ukrainian authorities in Kharkiv City have very little time to identify and neutralize air threats that originate from the nearby areas across the Russian border, reflecting the challenges posed to Ukraine's air defenders by policies creating sanctuary for Russian combat forces in the Russian Federation.[16]

Geolocated footage published on May 13 shows that Russian forces have advanced into Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) and raised a flag in the center of the village, but Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have not yet seized the entirety of Hlyboke and advanced west of the settlement along the west (left) bank of the Kharkiv River. Additional geolocated footage shows that Russian forces advanced southwest of Oliinykove (northeast of Lyptsi) and north of Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi and southeast of Oliinykove). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces achieved unspecified tactical success near Lukyantsi. Russian forces also continued attacking in the Lyptsi direction near Pylna (northeast of Lyptsi and Oliinykove), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hlyboke.

Russia used its sanctuary to protect and assemble an operationally significant force on the Russian side of Ukraine’s northeast border over the past several months. The Russian military has gathered roughly 50,000 personnel in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts as part of its Northern Grouping of Forces — the operationally significant force now conducting the offensive against Kharkiv Oblast.[17] The vast majority of these forces are not yet committed to battle and are waiting in reserve at staging areas very close to Ukraine’s border, very likely outside of the range of Ukrainian tube artillery. Russia will likely commit these forces to battle in the coming weeks and months, forcing Ukraine to redeploy manpower and materiel to Kharkiv Oblast to defend against Russian forces, potentially at the expense of reinforcing other critical parts of the front in Donetsk Oblast.