Russian 'Armor-geddon:' Tanks 3-5X Less Repairable, BTRs "Combat-Unsuitable"

The Russian military is learning the hard way after almost three years of war in Ukraine that much, if not most, of its armor is sub-standard. 

Leaked analyses reveal that Russian tanks are 3 to 5 times less repairable than they were expected to be. And that's probably the good news. Russian BTR 70 infantry fighting vehicles - ostensibly designed to protect the infantry riding in them - are so vulnerable to everything from machine guns to mines - that they have been declared 'completely unsuitable for combat operations.' Which is probably not what troops riding into battle in them want to hear. JL

Defense Express reports:

The Russians have discovered that the repairability of their tanks is 3–5 times below expected, and  that "the BTR-70 infantry fighting vehicle has shown its complete unsuitability for use in combat operations." The armor throughout the entire hull and from all angles is penetrable by large-caliber machine gun fire. Also, there were instances of damage caused by landmine fragmentation and vehicles destroyed by RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers, aimed at the passenger and engine compartments. "In the use of fire extinguishing systems, thermal sensors don't provide reliable extinguishing of fires in the engine and crew compartments."

A look into russian reflections about the drawbacks of their armored military equipment

Earlier Defense Express pointed out how russians suddenly discovered that the repairability of their tanks is 3–5 times below expected, reading through the pages of the recently published Material and Technical Support magazine, issue No. 10 for October 2024. There's actually more to take note of.

For instance, in the same journal, we can also find interesting assessments in general regarding the protection of light armored vehicles in the russian army, and particularly how it shows in the battles against Ukraine. These conclusions practically answer why the russian attackers do not use their BTR-70s for assaults and prefer BTR-80s and BTR-82s for this role — despite suffering from a shortage of armored vehicles on the frontline.

Read more: Repairability of Tanks Turned Out 3 to 5 Times Below Expected, russians Suddenly Discover

A russian BTR-80 / Open-source illustrative photo

Turns out, the russian troops are not satisfied with the level of protection and ergonomics of the BTR-70. The article states that "the BTR-70 has shown its complete unsuitability for use in combat operations," so instead they opt for BTR-80 and BTR-82 to support assault operations. All because those vehicles are more convenient and safe, and equipped with powerful diesel engines.\

 

For a quick reference, according to The Military Balance 2024 study by IISS, the russian army had almost 3,000 armored personnel carriers in service:

• 700 BTR-82A/AM, 1200 BTR-80, and 100 BTR-80A (for some reason classified as infantry fighting vehicles),
• 800 BTR-60 of all variants,
• and only 200 BTR-70;
• plus 1,300 BTR-60 and BTR-70 vehicles were kept in storage at the beginning of this year.

As for specific problems with BTR-70's protection, the russian magazine mentions that the armor throughout the entire hull and from all angles is penetrable by large-caliber machine gun fire. Also, there were instances of damage caused by landmine fragmentation and vehicles destroyed by RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers, aimed at the passenger and engine compartments.

BTR-82 armored combat vehicles of the russian army / Open-source archive photo

There's also qualitative data on the nature of combat damage inflicted to BMP-1, BMP-2, and BMP-3 IFVs during the battles against the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Most common places where damage was caused by hits from anti-tank grenade launchers and from direct or fragmentation hits from mines are the hull, the engine unit, and the passenger compartment. When hit by an RPG-7 grenade, the armor was pierced through, or the turret got displaced due to the breakdown of the turret ring (observed in the BMP-2), or hatches and doors got jammed (observed in the BMP-3).

If a landmine detonated close enough, its fragments pierced the armor and fuel tanks, located beside the doors of the passenger compartment. Then, the IFV caught fire, with subsequent ammunition payload cookoff, and its characteristic feature — the turret getting flown away 5–7 meters from the vehicle body.

Field repairs of damaged russian BMPs / An illustration from the article by Material and Technical Support magazine, No. 10 for October 2024

The general conclusion the russian authors draw is that "during the identification of the causes of ammunition explosions in tanks and IFVs, a number of design flaws were found in the layout of the crew compartment, in the placement of ammunition and fuel in unarmored compartments, and in the use of fire extinguishing systems with thermal sensors which don't provide reliable extinguishing of fires in the engine and crew compartments."

Simply put, the russians admitted the problems are fundamental, and in order to eliminate them, a complete revision of the whole internal layout must be done.

Though worth noting that, further down the text, they provide an example of an interesting proposal: to install automated smoke screen systems on tanks and armored vehicles either to facilitate safe evacuation of crews from damaged equipment, or to simulate damage. Such a know-how may eventually find their way to the Ukrainian battlefield. Issue No. 10 of the russian magazine Material and Technical Support has been made publicly accessible, featuring an article on the russian army’s experience with tanks and other armored vehicles in its ongoing full-scale war against Ukraine.

The central takeaway from this publication is that the actual repairability of russian tanks is 3-5 times lower than what is claimed in official manuals. This discrepancy has extended repair times for equipment by at least 15-20%. However, on a note from Defense Express, this issue is merely the tip of the iceberg.

Read more: Typical Problems With Putting Mothballed Tanks Back to Service, Exemplified by russian T-80

Tanks of the russian army / Open-source archive photo

The publication reveals that russians discovered a critical lack of unification of weapons and equipment used in their armored vehicle fleet — a problem that had already reached a "critical limit" before the full-scale invasion began.

For instance, fire control systems in T-72 and T-80 tanks have non-interchangeable components. Additionally, there are as many as seven different engine types used in russian armor, further complicating logistics and repairs.

The magazine also draws attention to how incomplete the armored vehicles arrive from storage bases. Upon receipt, these vehicles require engine replacements, battery charges, and replenishments to the spare parts and tool kits.

Compounding these issues, numerous malfunctions were reported in communication systems, electrical equipment, and fire control systems. Addressing all these faults required specialists from repair plants, manufacturing plants, and storage bases. As a result, preparing tanks from mothballed reserves for combat operations could take up to 10 days.

An example of an armor-penetrating hit received by a T-72B3 of the russian army in combat / Photo source: Material and Technical Support, No. 10 for October 2024

The article also provides insight into how different types of damage affect tank functionality. When armor is penetrated, the power plant units, stabilizers, automatic gun loaders, fuel tanks, optical and electro-optical systems, and communications equipment can be destroyed or disabled.

When a tank is struck by a shaped-charge projectile, its effects depend on what components lie in the path of the blast. If the affected area contains powder-based propellant charges, detonation and fire may occur. Damage to the engine or transmission system often results in a fire, which can lead to fuel tank explosions and, in some cases, ammunition detonation.

Even non-penetrative impacts have caused serious problems. Hits from grenades or collisions with building walls have been known to disable stabilizers, automatic loaders, and sights, rendering the tank inoperable.

An example of improvised protection reinforcement applied to a russian tank / Photo source: Material and Technical Support, No. 10 for October 2024

Other operational issues were also recorded. For instance, the thermal imaging channel of the Sosna-U tactical sight requires up to 11 minutes to enter operational mode, which is unreasonably long in fast-paced combat situations. Emergency rotation of hatches is not always possible thus hindering the driver’s ability to exit the vehicle quickly. Besides, tanks are poorly adapted to meet the personal needs of crew members, which negatively impacts operational effectiveness during combat.

Earlier Defense Express analyzed the most common failures recorded in russian T-80 main battle tanks when trying to put them back to service after long storage and exposure to the environment, and how these failures correlate with the amount of time they spent rusting out without as much as a roof to protect them from rain.