Russian forces have spent the last 13 months and lost over five divisions' worth of tanks and thousands of troops attacking and trying to seize Pokrovsk. Russian forces have only made marginal advances due to Ukrainian counterattacks and improved integration of Ukrainian ground and drone forces. Russian forces continue to deplete manpower and materiel in unsuccessful mechanized assaults and ongoing infantry assaults with armored vehicle support further southwest of Pokrovsk..Russia's defense industrial base cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery that can offset losses. Russian forces fielded fewer armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove direction in late 2024 in response to dwindling armored vehicles, The recent uptick in Russian armored vehicle use in these areas highlights Russia's desperation to make further gains at any cost
Russian forces have spent the last 13 months and lost over five divisions' worth of tanks and thousands of troops attacking towards Pokrovsk and trying to seize the town. Ongoing Russian offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka highlight Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to seize all of Ukraine through military means at whatever cost if he cannot do so through negotiations. Trehubov estimated in February 2025 that Russian forces were losing 14,000 to 15,000 casualties, including roughly 7,000 killed in action (KIA), each month in the Pokrovsk direction — suggesting that Russian forces lost up to 45,000 casualties in the Pokrovsk direction in the first three months of 2025.[29] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces have lost over 15,000 Russian KIA in Toretsk since mid-July 2024 and estimated that Russian forces have lost over 50,000 total casualties in this direction.[30] ISW previously reported that Russian forces had lost at least five divisions' worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion as of early October 2024, and Russian forces have only sustained further losses over the last six months.[31] ISW has previously assessed that Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term.[32] Russian forces temporarily fielded fewer armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove direction in late 2024, likely in response to concerns about dwindling armored vehicle supplies, although the recent uptick in Russian armored vehicle use in these areas highlights Russia's desperation to make further gains at any cost. Future Russian attacks on and into Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka would only generate greater manpower and materiel losses if the Russian military is even capable of conducting such operations after having suffered significant armored vehicle and personnel losses over the last three years of fighting.
Putin and the Russian military command appear determined to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka despite these losses, however. Ongoing Russian attacks towards Kostyantynivka from several directions highlight Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the fortress belt, despite the fact that an offensive operation against the wider Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast would likely take Russian forces several years to complete, assuming that the West continues to provide aid to Ukraine.[33] ISW previously assessed that Russian commanders are likely willing to undertake these long-term operations because they are operating under the assumption or with direct knowledge that Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the near future.[34] Putin has previously articulated a theory of victory that assumes that the Russian military will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely and has repeatedly indicated that he has no interest in a resolution of the war on any terms but those he dictates.[35] The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2025 Annual Threat Assessment assessed in March 2025 that Putin remains committed to pursuing Ukrainian surrender through both diplomatic and military means.[36] ISW continues to assess that Putin has no interest in ending the war and intends to continue fighting until he accomplishes his objectives in Ukraine, which are the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and the categorical destruction of the Ukrainian military.[37]
Russian forces have only made marginal advances throughout the Pokrovsk direction due to localized Ukrainian counterattacks and improved integration of Ukrainian ground and drone forces. The Russian military command has historically struggled to conduct and connect multi-directional offensive operations in Ukraine, and Ukrainian drone operations are further complicating this effort. Russian milbloggers have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian drones have low altitude air superiority and are forcing Russian forces to conduct rotations on foot over 10 kilometers and complicating Russian supplies of ammunition, water, and gasoline.[25] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones are preventing Russian forces from operating more than three kilometers north and west of Selydove (currently 10 kilometers south and 30 kilometers east of the frontline) and that Ukrainian drones are monitoring and restricting access to all roads in this direction.[26] A Ukrainian battalion command operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported in February 2025 that Ukrainian drone operators hold some areas of their defense lines in the Pokrovsk direction almost completely independently from infantry support.[27] ISW previously noted that Ukrainian drone operations have been key in defending against Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction and throughout the frontline over the last year, although Ukraine must address its morale, force generation, and training issues to completely stall the Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast.[28]
Russian forces continue to deplete manpower and materiel in unsuccessful mechanized assaults and ongoing infantry assaults with armored vehicle support further southwest of Pokrovsk. A Ukrainian tactical group operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 8 that Russian forces recently conducted a company-sized mechanized assault near Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) in an attempt to seize Bohdanivka, Troitske, and Horikhove (all west of Yasenove) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks, two armored personnel carriers, four all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), four motorcycles, and 50 Russian troops during the assault.[20] Additional geolocated footage published on April 7 shows that Ukrainian forces repelled another company-sized Russian mechanized assault near Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk) on April 6 and damaged three armored vehicles and five tanks during the assault.[21] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 8 that Russian forces have recently begun using more armored vehicles in the area but have also resorted to using motorcycles and golf carts to make advances.[22] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated on April 2 that Russian equipment losses have tripled in the area since the start of negotiations (likely referring to mid-February 2025).[23] Russian forces have advanced marginally closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk administration border as a result of mechanized assaults in the area in recent weeks, particularly west of Preobrazhenka (southwest of Pokrovsk), but Russian forces have not advanced the remaining three kilometers into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as of this report.[24]
0 comments:
Post a Comment