With Russia Daily Shell Firing Down By Half, Ukraine's Munitions Strikes Hurt
Ukraine's strategic targeting of Russian munitions and energy infrastructure is having a decided impact on the battlefield.
Russian artillery shell firing is down by half, and hits on oil and gas also affect the Kremlin's ability to launch attacks. The result is more opportunity for Ukrainian forces to attack in more places with less risk. JL
Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:
Ukraine is demonstrating a skill for hitting Russian oil and munitions facilities, which is having an impact on Russia’s war making capacity. The Russian army’s daily artillery shell usage has been reduced by half. which has had a significant impact on the tempo of Russian battlefield fire support activities enhancing Ukraine's freedom of maneuver. The destruction of Russian munition depots also has reduced the number of drone and missile attacks against Ukraine. This helps Ukraine to preserve its stocks of air defence missiles - and has given it time to develop improved defences against Shahed drones over the past year.
Long range strike has been a crucial development for the Ukrainian Armed Force since February 2022. They have developed an increasingly capable range of weapons to hit further into Russia and hold a wider range of strategic targets at risk. Ukraine has done this to degrade Russian military capability, executing active measures to reduce Russian missile strikes on its citizens and infrastructure. But these long-range strikes are not just military affairs; they are also a political necessity.
The timing of this assessment is based on the convergence of three factors. First, Ukraine has recently unveiled multiple new long-range strike weapons which will add to its ability to penetrate Russian air defences and hit targets deep inside Russia. Second, Ukraine is demonstrating a particular skill for hitting Russian oil and munitions facilities, which will be having an impact on Russia’s war making capacity. And finally, having just returned from a recent visit to Ukraine, I gained useful insights on the latest Ukrainian thinking and approaches about long-range strike (although I won’t reveal anything too sensitive).
There are three objectives for this article. I seek to re-examine the objectives of Ukraine’s long-range strike capability as the first task. Second, I will explore how the Ukrainian long-range strike complex operates and its key components. I will conclude with an assessment of the implications for other nations who might wish to develop their own indigenous long-range strike capabilities.
The Objectives of Ukrainian Strategic Strikes
Ukraine’s evolving strike supports multiple outcomes for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and for the government of Ukraine’s strategy for the war.
The first function is to support achievement of Ukrainian operational and tactical activities. A 2024 example of this was the downing of Russian air force A-50 Mainstay command and control aircraft. It was providing sensor coverage of Crimea and southern Ukraine, which potentially degraded Ukrainian strikes in those locations. Its downing increased the effectiveness of the Ukrainian strike system in that area. Other examples of this would be attacking key Russian headquarters, transport routes and logistics nodes in occupied Ukraine.
Airfields have frequently been targeted by the Ukrainians. While this campaign against Russian airfields began in 2022, it has broadened over the past three years. One of the most spectacular was the attack on 22 August 2023 which resulted in the destruction of a Tu-22M strategic bomber at Russia’s Soltsy-2 airbase. Subsequent drone attacks in December 2022 and January 2024 also targeted Engels, with the January attack setting fire to an ammunition depot. The most recent attack, on 20 March destroyed 96 air-launched cruise missiles
These airfield attacks not only destroy Russian aerial strike capability, but also force a Russian reassessment of their air defence resources and often have them redeploy these assets further from where they had been most needed.
Sunrise over Engels. Source: Kyiv Independent
Perhaps one of the most important targets for the Ukrainians recently has been munitions depots. Significant quantities of battlefield munitions, as well as strike missiles and drones used against Ukrainian energy and civilian targets, have been destroyed in Ukrainian long-range strikes in 2024-2025. These include:
June 2024: Field munitions depot in Russia's Voronezh region.
September 2024: Munitions depot near the Voronezh village of Soldatskoye, including munitions supplied by North Korea.
September 2024: Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) 107th arsenal ammunition depot in Toropets.
September 2024: Ukrainian Navy hits munitions depot in the southern port city of Mariupol, followed by several other reported attacks on munitions storage facilities.
September 2024: Munitions depot near Tikhoretsk, in Russia's southwestern Krasnodar region.
September 2024: Russian munitions depots in the Tver region.
The availability of munitions always plays an important role in military operational tempo, and therefore Ukrainian strikes against munitions depots will have assisted Ukrainian frontline defensive operations since 2024.
As the Ukrainian commander-in-chief, General Syrskyi noted in January this year, “over the past few months, the Russian army’s daily artillery shell usage has been reduced by half. Previously, it reached up to 40,000 rounds per day, but it is now significantly lower.” An assessment by Estonian intelligence of the Ukrainian strike on the Toropets munitions depot in September 2024 described how it had destroyed 30,000 tons of munitions, and that it would have a had a significant impact on the tempo of Russian battlefield fire support activities.
The destruction of Russian munition depots will also have reduced the number of drone and missile attacks against Ukraine. This helps Ukraine to preserve its stocks of air defence missiles - and has given it time to develop improved defences against Shahed drones over the past year.
The Ukrainians have also targeted munitions production facilities. There have been two recorded strikes on the Mashinostroeniya Design Bureau in Kolomna, which develops missiles and anti-tank guided missiles. Ukraine is also reported to have attacked gun powder factories in Bryansk and Tambov and other locations. However, it will be difficult for Ukraine to significantly degrade Russia’s mobilized defence industrial capacity. Probably because of this, it appears that these industrial targets have taken a back seat to the destruction of munitions depots.
A second function of the Ukrainian strike system is to enhance Ukraine’s strategic freedom of maneuver. This freedom of maneuver is not exclusively military. A good example of this are the attacks on the Black Sea Fleet. This has led to the Russian fleet being less effective in the western reaches of the Black Sea. Consequently, it has permitted the Ukrainians to reopen a maritime trade corridor which is essential to their grain export operations – and earning foreign currency. However, the current negotiations around a potential cessation of attacks in the Black Sea will overwhelmingly disadvantage Ukraine given how well it has denied its western parts to Russia.
A third function is to engage in economic warfare and to degrade Russian industrial capacity. As the allies found during the Second World War, destroying an enemy industrial system using strike operations is very difficult. But strikes against Russian oil storage and export facilities in recent years indicates that Ukraine is implementing an economic warfare strategy. Russian oil exports declined in 2024. Ukraine will seek to further decrease this source of revenue in 2025 because of how important it is to the Russian federal budget.
As a Partner and Co-Founder of Predictiv and PredictivAsia, Jon specializes in management performance and organizational effectiveness for both domestic and international clients. He is an editor and author whose works include Invisible Advantage: How Intangilbles are Driving Business Performance. Learn more...
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