Putin's Rising Losses, Declining "Return on Investment" In Ukraine Signals Failure

"I lost a million troops and ten years worth of weapons in Ukraine and all I got was this lousy wasteland..." 

After profligate expenditures of men, armor and artillery, all Putin has to show for his effort is the 19% of Ukraine he was able to grab at the beginning three years ago. And that is largely a smoldering heap of rubble that will take years - and billions of rubles - to restore so that it can generate any sort of economic return. If that werent bad enough, his country's ferocious military reputation is shattered by repeated offensive failures, incompetence and corruption. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to out-fight, out-innovate and out-last his declining military, suggesting that Putin's belief that he can outlast his smaller rival is no longer accurate. If it ever was. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

While Russia may have cleared Ukrainian forces from much of Kursk, the opportunity cost is advances foregone by Russian forces in eastern and southern Ukraine. If all they get is the territory they have been battering for the last three years then the ‘special military operation’ will have failed. This conflict always had a territorial aspect but the core objective was to deny Ukraine its independence. Putin might bluff his way through another summer campaign season, after that, Russian forces are facing increasing shortages. Putin might still believe he can defeat Ukraine, but his theory of victory is that his forces can last just a little bit longer than Ukraine’s. But if Ukraine continues to increase its kill rate of Russians with more drone strikes, adaptive tactics and western assistance, this Russian theory of victory is far from assured

Russia’s Increasing Casualties and Declining ‘Return on Investment’. This week, British intelligence published their latest assessment of Russia’s casualties suffered since the beginning of their full-scale invasion in February 2022. So far this year, In Russia is likely to have sustained around 160,000 casualties. At a rate of 40K per month, this is a very significant number of casualties, and as the British report notes, “should these casualty rates persist for the rest of 2025, this would be the costliest year of the war in terms of Russian personnel, continuing the year-on-year trend of casualty increases.”

The graph below from the British report shows the trend in Russian casualties, which is all in the wrong direction from a Russian perspective, and heading in a positive direction for the Ukrainians (although we don’t know their casualties to make a comparison).

Source: British military intelligence

The maps below provide a comparison between the last day of 2024 and 1 May 2025 to show what the Russians have gained for 160,000 casualties.

Kursk: 31 Dec 24 to 1 May 25. Source: ISW

Chasiv Yar axis of advance: 31 Dec 24-1 May 25. Source: ISW

Pokrovsk axis of advance: 31 Dec 24-1 May 25. Source: ISW

Assessment. The above maps provide an indication of just how expensive each kilometre of Ukrainian territory has become for Russian forces, and what a poor return on their investment this has been for the Russian military. 

While they may have successfully cleared Ukrainian forces from large parts of Kursk, the opportunity cost of this is probably additional advances fo

regone by Russian forces in eastern and southern Ukraine.

The principal gain the Russians have made is not in territory but in the minds of decision-makers in the Trump administration. The Russians have sought to project the high costs of the war on Trump, Vance and others and that Russia’s momentum in Ukraine is irreversible. The Russians have had some success with this narrative, particularly with messaging from the U.S. administration about the human costs of the war and their unwillingness to acknowledge that Ukraine may get back its territories illegally seized by Russia.

But as Lawrence Freedman notes in his excellent recent article on peace negotiations, this focus on territorial gain has also come at a cost to Russia (besides the human cost, that is). As he notes in a 30 April 2025 article:

I wonder if Putin told his stories too well, so that Witkoff concluded that the big issue for Putin really was holding onto these territories and that so long as this was granted the other demands did not really matter…Of course the Russians are happy for the Ukrainians to be told that they can’t have their territory back. But they want much more. And if all they get is the territory they have been systematically battering for the last three years then the ‘special military operation’ will have failed. This conflict always had a territorial aspect but the core objective was to deny Ukraine its sovereignty and independence.

Thus, while Putin might be seeking to project success through small gains in territory (and they are small, particularly given how much they have cost him), this strategy might actually compromise his capacity to achieve his real war aim - to destroy a sovereign Ukraine and its culture.

One thing that isn’t included in the British report is equipment losses. This is an important complementary metric because while Russia might be able to reconstitute its losses in people (it has a population of 140 million afterall), its equipment losses compound its losses in personnel and are much harder to replace. According to recent reports by RAND and Carnegie Endowment, Russia’s equipment losses have equated to significant percentages of its pre-war regular stocks and it has had to draw deeply on its irreplaceable strategic stocks.

The long and the short of it is that while Putin might bluff his way through another summer campaign season, after that, Russian forces are facing increasing shortages in equipment. Additionally, while Russia might have a large population, he may also have to resort to another mobilisation campaign. As a January 2025 RAND report on Russian reconstitution notes:

Given the social tumult caused by the first mobilization and the worsening economic pains caused by transitioning to a wartime economy, a second mobilization could prove to be decisive in finally destabilizing the tightly controlled political climate in Russia.

Putin might still believe he can defeat Ukraine (at least publicly), but his theory of victory is that his forces can last just a little bit longer than Ukraine’s can. But if Ukraine continues to increase its kill rate of Russians with a combination of more drone strikes, adaptive tactics and western assistance, this Russian theory of victory is far from assured of success.