Russia Increasingly Places Blame For War Failures On Corrupt Lower Officials

The Kremlin does not want to admit that its plans and leadership may be the reason why its military has performed so poorly in Ukraine, even allowing Ukrainian drones to attack targets in Moscow and Ukrainian troops occupy parts of Russia's border regions. 

So increasingly, Russian generals and civilian leaders are finding themselves accused of corruption - a central fact of Russian life - but which has become the convenient excuse through which lower level leaders can be blamed for failures. JL

Paul Sonne and Milana Mazaeva report in the New York Times:

Government officials in three of the five Russian regions bordering Ukraine have been arrested and accused in recent months of embezzling funds Moscow had earmarked for border fortifications, cases brought after Ukrainian cross-border attacks. Russian authorities are increasingly pursuing corruption cases against regional and military officials to put the elite on guard and quell public anger about battlefield failures. Moscow cannot accuse officials of wartime failures, because that would force leaders “to acknowledge the campaign has not gone according to plan. Anti-corruption cases allow Moscow to appease the public without admitting a failure. “The government has declined to charge treason or betrayal, but corruption is routine so this allows the public to draw that conclusion."

Russian authorities are increasingly pursuing corruption cases against regional and military officials, legal maneuverings that are putting the elite on guard and in some cases may be aimed at quelling public anger about battlefield failures.

Government officials in three of the five Russian regions bordering Ukraine have been arrested and accused by prosecutors in recent months of embezzling funds that Moscow had earmarked for border fortifications, cases brought after successful Ukrainian cross-border attacks.

Last year, Russia also began a rare, high-level purge of top military generals and defense ministry leaders through corruption cases. Around the same time, President Vladimir V. Putin transferred his longtime defense chief, Sergei K. Shoigu, to a more nebulous job running the Russian national security council.

As a rule, Mr. Putin does not admit battlefield errors or publicly blame loyal aides for lapses. Criticism of the military in Russia is outlawed. So the anti-corruption cases have become a convenient option, allowing Moscow to appease the public without admitting a failure by the central apparatus. “The government has declined to connect these investigations with something you might call treason or betrayal,” said David Szakonyi, a political scientist at George Washington University, who studies corruption in Russia. “It has allowed the public to connect it in their own minds.”

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Russia? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Moscow cannot accuse the officials of wartime failures, because that would force leaders “to acknowledge that the campaign has not gone according to plan, which they are very unwilling to do, because that affects morale and recruitment,” Mr. Szakonyi said.

Corruption is a routine facet of life in Russia. But corruption cases have also long been a method for Russian elites to settle scores, assert influence and send messages to specific sectors of society. Even as certain officials face corruption charges, those close to Mr. Putin or with better connections generally remain unscathed.

As the war transforms Russian society, such cases are increasing. In the first quarter of this year, the number of corruption-related crimes identified by the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office rose by 24 percent compared with the prior year, the office told the Russian newspaper RBK. Corruption cases generally involve public officials.

Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said the wave of cases showed how the F.S.B., Russia’s domestic security service, and prosecutors are expanding their influence amid increased wartime repression. “The repression that started with normal people and opposition activists has spread to the ruling class, and purges are starting there,” Ms. Prokopenko said.

The border fortification embezzlement cases seem in part to be aimed at quelling anger among Russians in the border regions over Moscow’s failure to protect them from Ukrainian attacks, especially after Ukrainian forces occupied part of the Kursk region. The charges imply that the border with Ukraine would have been better protected had local officials not stolen the money for the defenses, claims that also deflect blame from the Kremlin.

The legal actions attracted attention this month when Russia’s transportation minister, Roman V. Starovoyt, was found dead, in what authorities called a suspected suicide, hours after the Kremlin announced he had been relieved of his duties. Russian media reported that Mr. Starovoyt, who served as governor of the Kursk region when the border fortifications were ordered, had been implicated in the case.

Whether the cases are targeting those responsible for battlefield failures is unclear. In one case, Russian authorities jailed a top general who had accused his superiors of battlefield incompetence in a widely circulated recording, in what seemed to be revenge for the public criticism. Prosecutors accused him of misappropriating some $1.6 million of metal products intended for defenses in occupied Ukraine, where he was leading troops. He denied the charges.

Other cases have appeared more clear-cut.

Timur Ivanov, the deputy defense minister sentenced this month to 13 years in prison for embezzlement, had been the target of an exposé by the late opposition campaigner Aleksei A. Navalny’s anti-corruption group. The group documented Mr. Ivanov’s family’s lavish lifestyle, with villa and yacht rentals on the Côte d’Azur and a Rolls-Royce, despite his government salary.

Mr. Ivanov, who oversaw construction for the military, denied the accusations.

Mr. Shoigu’s removal and corruption cases against his longtime underlings, including Mr. Ivanov, have been interpreted by some Russian military bloggers as belated accountability for the military’s failures at the outset of the war.

At times, Moscow also has removed officials from their posts to signal accountability during the war. After Ukraine’s occupation of part of the Kursk region, the head of the region’s border service was assigned to Siberia to oversee a handful of rural municipal districts. The head of the Russian Navy was removed in a quiet dismissal after Ukraine hobbled much of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

Now the specter of corruption cases is adding to the pressure, particularly after Mr. Starovoyt’s death.

“It’s a very effective category that provides a legal veneer,” Mr. Szakonyi said. “It doesn’t force you touch upon the other underlying issues of how these people got their positions, how the state is structured or how these decisions got made.”