Russia's "Anemic" Summer "Big Push" Will Not Result In Breakthrough

With August - and the beginning of the end of summer - two weeks away, Russia's big summer push appears anemic so far, with insignificant gains despite its huge advantages in men and materiel. 

The primary reasons for this are Russia's ongoing inability to translate its resource superiority into consistent force projection, largely due to leadership failures, Kremlin interference and declining troop quality. Ukraine, by contrast, has strengthened its defensive lines, enhanced the lethality of its dominant drone forces and continues to outthink the Russians. Most knowledgeable observers now expect Russia to be unable to continue fighting sometime in 2026, eg in five to twelve months, even with China and North Korea determined not to let Russia fail - which is very different from helping it win...JL  

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

It is unlikely that Russia's "Big Push" will result in a major shift, or provide any significant new leverage points for negotiations. Ukraine is imposing significant costs on the Russians and denying them breakthroughs. Ukraine's multiple new defensive lines in eastern Ukraine are bearing fruit, and the Russian offensive in the Sumy region has been halted by Ukraine. Any ‘acceleration’ of captured Ukrainian territory is measured against the anemic progress Russia made in the past 18 months. The Kremlin has decided 2025 is the year of decision for the war due to a straining national budget, declining quality of their forces, increasing reliance on North Korea & China, and pressure from President Trump. Putin stepped up operations, (but) Russia still struggles to translate its vast resource advantage into force.

It is apparent that the Russians have decided that 2025 is to be the year of decision for their war against Ukraine. It is likely that the challenges of a straining national budget, declining quality of their ground forces, increasing reliance on North Korea & China to support their war and pressure from President Trump to end the war, are forcing the Russian president to step up operations on the ground and in the air against Ukraine. While he might publicly discuss being able to fight this war into the far future, the reality is far from the case.

Just one indication of this was Putin’s announcement at the end of June that military spending by Russia would be cut from 2026. Putin hopes that a major effort this year will put him in an advantageous position for negotiations. It is not working out this way for him.

On the ground, Russia has increased the overall seizure of territory in the past couple of months. It should be noted however that the ‘acceleration’ of capturing Ukrainian territory is measured against the largely anemic progress that Russia has made in the past 18 months or so. That said, the Ukrainian eastern front line is under considerable pressure from the Russians at present.

In June, Russia gained 550-600 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory, which was an increase compared to previous months. But, as can be seen from the graph below, these gains are not decisive in the overall scheme of the war. The Russian’s are not gaining enough territory to project any real sense of overall success.

Image: Russia Matters, 9 July 2025.

Too much analysis is focussed on the few kilometres Russia is gaining in the east, and not enough on why Putin might be going all out to make these gains now. He needs something to negotiate with when peace negotiations do begin, he needs to eventually reduce spending on the war, and he probably wants to reduce his overall reliance on North Korea and China. He is probably under far more pressure than we realise.

But it is also clear that Putin still believes he can will this war. Until he can be disabused on this notion, the Russians will continue with their current ‘big push’.

In the air, Russia continues to pummel Ukraine with large-scale drone and missile raids. The latest series of raids occurred 16-19 July. Beginning with a 401 drone and missile raid on the 16th, Russian then conducted two nights of smaller raids on the 17th (64 drones) and 18th (35 drones) before returning to another large raid of 379 drones and missiles on the night of the 19th of July. While a large proportion of these were shot down, enough are still getting through Ukraine’s air defence network to cause damage, and increase the suffering and misery of Ukrainian people in many cities.

Image: Institute for the Study of War

While Russia is able to generate large aerial attacks against Ukraine, and is increasing the production of Shahed/Geran-2 drones, this expanded aerial onslaught may prove strategically counterproductive for Russia and drive up the level of foreign military aid for Ukraine. Russia’s enlarged air campaign against Ukrainian civilians (see graph above) was clearly a driver in Trump’s recent decision to step up provision of air defence systems and issue his 50-day ultimatum to Putin.

Despite this step up in their air-land assault, it is unlikely that this Russian air-land push will result in a major shift in the correlation of forces, or provide either side with any significant new leverage points for eventual peace negotiations. While Ukraine is suffering from a manpower shortage, it appears still able to impose significant personnel costs on the Russians and deny them the capacity for large-scale breakthroughs. Ukrainian efforts to construct multiple defensive lines in eastern Ukraine are bearing fruit, and the Russian offensive in the Sumy region appears to have be largely halted by the Ukrainians.

Russia’s main effort remains the region around Pokrovsk. Here the Russians are making gains, but these gains are taking time to achieve and are still resulting in major casualties.

This overall situation with the air and ground campaigns in Ukraine is neatly summarised by @Tatarigami in a recent assessment:

Fundamentally, both Russia and Ukraine face organizational challenges, though of different kinds. Ukraine suffers from delayed mobilization and delayed structural adaptations, while Russia struggles to translate its vast resource advantage into a combined and coordinated force