The war in Ukraine is absorbing much of the attention of strategic decision-makers in the US. Beijing cannot afford a Russian loss in Ukraine because it fears the US would then shift its whole focus to Beijing. Every dollar spent on Ukraine for military and economic aid is a dollar that can’t be invested against Chinese aggression. Plus, the war in Ukraine as an excellent way to nurture the inherent distrust that Trump administration officials feel towards Europe - and keeps the Europeans in Europe. The personnel, economic and reputational costs of the war will have a generational impact on Russia. The longer the war continues, the longer it will take Russia to recover, regardless of the outcome. This decrease in Russian power and influence will benefit to China.It takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze three feet deep. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly pointed out that there is no simple solution to complex issues. Although there are still major differences in the positions of the parties involved, it is better to talk than to fight.
The statement above, taken from a release promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs this week, is full of Chinese bureaucratic doublespeak. The quirky metaphor up front, and Xi’s support for Putin by playing for time that is inherent in this statement, are indicative of China’s clear preference for a long war in Ukraine.
Back in July last year, I published an article that I called “How China Benefits from a Russian Long War in Ukraine.” It proposed that China’s strategic interests were best served by a long war in Ukraine. This article provides a significantly updated version of that analysis, acknowledging key political and military events of the past year as well as the confirmation of China’s stance on the war during the week by a senior Chinese official.
This week, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, confirmed this hypothesis during a meeting with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. As reported in the South China Morning Post, the exchange was described as follows:
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the European Union’s top diplomat on Wednesday that Beijing cannot afford a Russian loss in Ukraine because it fears the United States would then shift its whole focus to Beijing, according to several people familiar with the exchange.
The Chinese Foreign Minister has essentially said the quiet thing out loud.
Despite Chinese protestations that they are not a party to the war (they are actually Russia’s most important war enabler) and that it seeks peace talks, Wang Yi has confirmed the strategic lens through which China actually views the war. Their calculus is this: China benefits from prolonging the war in Ukraine.
China’s Big Benefits from a Long War in Ukraine
Given Wang Yi’s statement this week, Chinese strategists and political leaders clearly view the war in Ukraine as a net positive for the achievement of Chinese national security objectives. It is unlikely that Chinese President Xi or his strategists have any sense of the moral tragedy of the war. Xi has shown zero empathy for the Ukrainian people since Russia’s brutal full-scale attempt to subjugate the country commenced in February 2022.
There are three main reasons why Xi and his advisors view a continuation of the war in Ukraine as an advantage for China in the medium and long term. These elements of advantage rest in the strategic, economic, and ideological domains.
Strategic Benefits. The first strategic benefit to China is that the war in Ukraine is absorbing much of the attention of key strategic decision-makers in the United States. While there have been calls from some commentators for the U.S. to focus solely on the challenge posed by China, wiser strategic thinking has prevailed because security in Europe is in the direct national interests of the United States. But because a secure, unified and prosperous Europe has been a key American strategic objective since the end of the Second World War, evidenced by the Marshall Planand formation of NATO among many other U.S. initiatives, it means that the U.S. must continue to invest in the defence of Ukraine.
Every minute that American political and strategic leaders invest in thinking about Ukraine is a minute they cannot focus on the China threat. Every dollar spent on Ukraine for military and economic aid is a dollar that can’t be invested in securing the western Pacific against Chinese aggression or funding the pivot to the Indo-Pacific. While it is appropriate that American make these (and potential increased) investments in Ukraine, China will see benefit in these continuing for as long as possible.
At the same time, with the Trump administration implementing a very different foreign policy from the Biden administration, Chinese strategists now probably view the war in Ukraine as an excellent way to nurture the inherent distrust that key Trump administration officials feel towards their European allies. The U.S. Vice President was clear about his feelings on this topic earlier in 2025 when he labelled the Europeans as “pathetic”. And in nurturing distrust towards the Americans from Europe, the Chinese will hope that America’s Asian allies and partners also begin to reassess their relationships with America and the Trump administration.
The unilateral decision this week by Defense Secretary Hegseth to freeze the shipment of U.S. munitions to Ukraine, under the ludicrous justification that a few thousand artillery shells and missiles will impact on U.S. military readiness, only helps China and Russia. This is only good strategic decision-making if the strategy is to help Russia and China.
Chinese strategists will also see dragging out of the war in Ukraine as a way to keep the Europeans in Europe. China will have been discomforted by increased deployments of European navy and air force assets into the Pacific region over the last few years. Most recently, the Royal Navy has deployed an aircraft carrier battlegroup to Asia.
The Chinese hates sights such as the HMS Prince of Wales arriving in Singapore on 29 June 2025. Source: @RoyalNavy While the war in Ukraine may not halt such deployments, it may reduce their tempo and the possibility of large increases in such European deployments to the western and southwest Pacific regions. While China is happy to trade with European nations, it does not want to see European military forces in what it considers to be its region, especially in areas such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Prolonging the war in Ukraine contributes to China at least partially achieving this objective.
Another strategic benefit for China of a prolonged war in Ukraine is that it provides a gigantic testbed for Chinese ideas about future war in the Pacific. While we may not see Chinese weapons being employed directly by Russia (although they provide a range of dual use technologies (see below), and supply most of the motorcycles now used in Russian motorcycle assault operations) the war in Ukraine is offering many different insights into the application of new technologies in the air, ground, space, maritime, cyber and information domains.
Chinese dual use exports to Russia. Source: Mercator Institute. Ukrainian drone operations, and more recent concepts such as the Drone Wall, have clearly informed the U.S. Hellscape concept for the defence of Taiwan. It is almost certain that the Chinese have assessed whether a similar concept, a “hellscape with Chinese characteristics” might be an operationally useful approach to the north, east or south of Taiwan, or in parts of the South China Sea.
Russian massed aerial attacks on Ukraine will also have informed Chinese concepts for fire strikes against Taiwan (and anyone helping Taiwan) in a future contingency. The kinds of insights the PLA will be seeking from these Russian aerial assaults against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure include the planning for penetrating defending airspace, electronic warfare and cyber support, getting the mix of drones, ballistic and cruise missiles right, industrial production requirements as well as the misinformation activities that accompany the conduct of such massed aerial attacks.
China will be learning about the planning and conduct of massed drone and missile attacks against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Images: Ukrainian Air Force, Kyiv Insider, t.me/monitoringwarThe longer the war in Ukraine continues, the more the Chinese also learn about the benefits and methods of contemporary integrated, joint operations and joint targeting processes. Additionally, as the war prolongs the Chinese are learning more about the need to review the quality of their military leadership, training and education. The PLA has demonstrated competence in learning from other people’s wars, and will be appreciating the opportunity to hone many of their technologies, ideas and organisations for any future confrontation with America and its allies in the Pacific.
China and Russia have stepped up their military exercises significantly since 2022, which is likely to have provided many learning opportunities for the Chinese. Russia and China now execute joint bomber patrols in the Pacific, joint maritime exercises and an array of other military exchanges. As a recent Mercator Institute for China Studies report notes:
Since 2003, Russia and China have conducted over 90 joint military exercises across various domains and formats…The number of exercises per year has increased in recent years, reaching an all-time high of 11 in 2024. However, since 2022, the vast majority of joint exercises – 22 of 27 – have consisted of naval and aerial drills and patrols, accounting for all the recent growth in joint exercise activity.
Source: Mercator Institute Beyond insights from the war in Ukraine, China is also learning about how western politicians and alliances make strategic decisions about war and about the defence industries that support them. For example, Xi and his advisors will have watched western decision-making about nuclear deterrence and the contribution of conventional weapons to Ukraine. The war is allowing Chinese decision-makers and strategists to observe how Russian statements on nuclear weapons and escalation condition western politicians to be very cautious, slow and risk adverse in their strategic decision-making. The more that Chinese decision-makers can study modern Western leadership methods in Europe, the more benefit they will gain in their aggression against nations in the Pacific.
Ultimately, the most likely outcome of the war is a weakened Russia. It may still be a nuclear power and possess a large military force that straddles the European and Asian landmass. However, the personnel, economic and reputational costs of the war will have a generational impact on Russia. The longer the war continues, the longer it will take Russia to recover, regardless of the outcome. This decrease in Russian power and influence will be of enormous benefit to China in Europe and Asia.
As Andrew Michta has identified, China might benefit in two other ways. First, Russia might be more willing to share sensitive military technologies with China. As a recent Atlantic Council report notes:
In exchange for vital military industrial assistance, China is reportedly receiving some of Russia’s most sensitive military technologies, including those involving submarine operations, aviation stealth technologies, and more.
And second, if a defeated Russia fractures politically, China might be well positioned to exploit Russia’s eastern territories for its own purposes.
But it isn’t just in the strategic realm that China benefits from a continuation of the war in Ukraine. Economics is another interesting area where China is doing very well indeed from the war.
Economic Benefits. Over the past 3 and half years since the beginning of the Russian large-scale invasion of Ukraine, China’s trade with Russia has increased markedly. In 2023, China-Russia trade grew by 26% compared to the previous year. In that time, Chinese shipments to Russia soared by 46% and Russian shipments to China increased by 13%. Despite western sanctions, China has now stepped up to become the largest importer of Russian energy.
Over the period January to September 2023, Chinese imports to Russia largely replaced EU imports to Russia. Chinese monthly exports have grown from US$3.9 billion to around US$9 billion. The kinds of exports from China to Russia range from machine tools to raw materials, transportation to communications equipment. And to give an indication just how profound this shift has been the diagram below shows Chinese exports to different countries, including Russia, over the period January 2022 through to January 2024. Chinese companies are literally making out like bandits as a result of the war in Ukraine.
Growth in China’s Trade with China since 2022. Source: Atlantic Council A more recent report from the Atlantic Council notes how China-Russia trade is on the rise. It notes that:
Year-to-date direct bilateral trade rests at just under $202 billion, up about 2.5 percent from prior-year levels. Additionally, substantial China-to-Russia trade occurs indirectly, including via third-parties in Belarus and Central Asian countries.
In 2025, Russian exports of base metals to China have also surged. As this report notes, the surge in Russian exports is “not just a temporary adjustment but a fundamental restructuring of global supply chains that appears increasingly permanent as Western restrictions solidify.” Key elements of this ‘surge’ are:
Aluminum exports: Up 56% year-on-year to nearly 1 million tons (Jan-May 2025)
Copper sales: Increased 66% compared to same period in 2024
Nickel imports: More than doubled from previous year's levels
Trading discount: Russian aluminum trading at approximately 22% below spot prices (May 2025)
Total bilateral trade: Exceeded $240 billion in 2024, cementing China's position as Russia's most crucial trading partner
Besides China, many other nations have also exploited the war to gain more favourable terms of trade with Russia and exploit western sanctions regimes. India, which refuses to condemn Moscow over its February 2022 large-scale invasion of Ukraine, has since become as one of the largest buyers of Russian oil since sanctions were imposed. While the two way trade between India and Russia is much smaller than that of China (about US$67 billion in the year to March 2024), India’s foreign minister has recently stated that this is “not a temporary phenomenon.”
But China’s massive growth in exports to Russia, and purchase of Russian energy and base metals, gives it more leverage over Russia that India’s growing trade does. As such, this has significantly changed the dynamic in the Russia-China relationship in China’s favour.
I don’t believe this makes Russia a Chinese supplicant as some have proposed. At least not yet. Russia still has agency in the relationship, just not as much as it did before the invasion.
Ideological Benefits. At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping described how China remains at threat from external actors, and indeed he considers the external environment to be getting worse:
Confronted with drastic changes in the international landscape, especially external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China, we have put our national interests first, focused on internal political concerns, and maintained firm strategic resolve.
A defining feature of Xi’s three terms as President has been his escalation of the ideological struggle against the West. Xi noted in his report to the 20th Party Congress that “we have stayed committed to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development, and we have fully implemented the Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as well as the Party’s basic line and basic policy.”
From Xi’s perspective, Russia’s war in Ukraine is part of the larger confrontation that countries like China, Russia, and Iran are waging against western dominance. A 2023 report from the European Council on Foreign Relations found:
Many scholars argue that China is right not to emulate Washington’s activism – for example, mobilising around the idea of defence of democracy – by trying to build a counter-alliance. They support Beijing’s positioning of remaining neutral as a way to further build support in the global south that does not want to be drawn into the war.
China clearly sees the opportunity to ideologically cleave more nations – especially those in the so-called Global South – away from American influence. The war in Ukraine also allows Xi to portray the conflict as a fight forced upon Russia by NATO and America. Further, from Xi’s perspective, it justifies the increased focus on national security, increasing the political purity of senior civilian and military leaders, and PLA military modernisation that were focal points of the 20th Party Congress.
With Russia ‘confronting NATO and the west’ in Ukraine, China does not have to do all the heavy lifting in that broader ideological confrontation. If China is going to convince other nations that it can provide a better design for global prosperity and security than the one provided by America since 1945, it helps to have another major nation on board. Russia, and its war against Ukraine, assists China in this regard.
As I have written elsewhere, China and Russia are the core members of a new ‘authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc’, which also includes Iran and North Korea. Each nation is learning about combat, strategy and confrontation with the West - in Europe and Asia - and sharing these ideas in what is now a global adaptation war.
This is also a theme that has been taken up by U.S. intelligence agencies in 2025. This international manifestation of learning and adaptation was covered in the March 2025 U.S. Intelligence Community Threat Assessment, which noted that
Cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea has been growing more rapidly in recent years, reinforcing threats from each of them individually while also posing new challenges to U.S. strength and power globally.
Assessment
Image: Chinese government In a 12 June 2024 briefing, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Ambassador Julianne Smith described how “China has taken a side; China has opted to support Russia through the provision of these dual-use components; and that if it opted to stop doing that, we believe it would have a major impact on Russia’s ability to conduct the war on the ground inside Ukraine.”
While China has put forward a twelve-point peace plan for ending the conflict in Ukraine, this was not a genuine initiative to stop the war. Rather, the vague assertions and desired outcomes of the Chinese ‘peace plan’ masks several deeper aspirations of the Chinese Communist Party. These include ensuring that Russia does not lose in Ukraine (which would weaken Chinese narrative of the west in decline), that China plays a central role in brokering any peace agreement instead of America, and that China does not suffer a drastic impact with its economic relations with the west.
China’s refusal to attend the June 2024 Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland is further proof that the Chinese Communist Party is not an honest or unbiased broker with regards to the war in Ukraine. It refuses to abandon its Russian partner, and is likely to work behind the scenes to sabotage any peace proposals that are not proffered by the Chinese foreign ministry.
The moral imperatives of shortening the war and reducing human suffering also plays no role in Chinese thinking about the war in Ukraine.
In the early 2000s, China benefitted from the United States focus on counter terrorism operations inside the U.S., as well as the American expeditionary operations into Iraq, Afghanistan and at a smaller scale, Africa. With the U.S. distracted by its Middle East operations, China was able to rapidly modernise its military and expand its network of South China Sea outposts with minimal interference from the U.S. administration.
The Chinese Communist Party may see a prolonged war in Ukraine as a similar opportunity. While Russia and China may have signed a ‘no limits’ friendship pact in 2022, and reinforced these ties with Xi’s 2025 visit to Moscow, there should be no doubt that China is exploiting Russia, as well as Ukrainian suffering, to achieve its own national goals.
The European Council on Foreign Relations report mentioned earlier in this article describes how many intellectuals in China believe that America is using the war in Ukraine as part of its strategy to encircle China. The report notes that “they describe American foreign policy as conducive to generating chaos around the world…Many think that America is instrumentalising the war in Ukraine and NATO’s involvement in the conflict as part of its efforts to contain not only Russia, but also China.”
As such, the Chinese Communist Party and President Xi are probably comfortable with the war continuing for some time to come. They have more to gain from its continuance than its ending. As one Russia analyst recently explained, "the war in Ukraine may be a drain on the West’s resources and on the economies of developing countries, but it suits Beijing’s interests just fine. China has gained power over Russia, all while paying minimal economic and diplomatic penalties. China, then, may stay the course."
The 2023 NATO Vilnius Summit communique noted that “the deepening strategic partnership between the PRC and Russia and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests. We call on the PRC to…condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to abstain from supporting Russia’s war effort in any way, to cease amplifying Russia’s false narrative blaming Ukraine and NATO for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.”
The 2024 NATO Summit held in Washington DC reinforced this message. The summit declaration described how:
The PRC has become a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine through its so-called “no limits” partnership and its large-scale support for Russia’s defence industrial base…This includes the transfer of dual-use materials, such as weapons components, equipment, and raw materials that serve as inputs for Russia’s defence sector. The PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation.
The 2025 NATO summit declaration, which largely focused on NATO member spending levels, did not mention China.
China’s support for Russia’s war effort has only increased since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. With China deriving substantial strategic, economic and ideological benefits from the war, a variety of robust diplomatic and economic measures will be needed from Western nations to convince Xi to step back from his support for Russia.
Unfortunately, such action does not appear to be likely anytime soon. And even if such action did occur, it is not clear that Xi could be deterred from his current strategy. China gains too much from a continued war in Ukraine to change course now.
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