Why Russia's Decreasing 'Advances' Are Getting Even Smaller

Analysis of mapped changes in control reveal that Russia's already 'painfully small' advances are getting even smaller. The reasons are that Russia's lack of armor or other military vehicles, its still extraordinary casualty levels relative to Ukraine's, and its ongoing logistics travails - exacerbated by the need to move supply centers ever further away from the front - have combined to reduce the already weakened military capabilities even further. 

The expectation is that Russia is not able to fix these operational problems, which have plagued it throughout its invasion and war, which means that any advances remain tactical at best and are likely to decrease even further. JL 

Phillip O'Brien reports in his substack:

The ground advances of Russian forces continue to be painfully small and decreasing. The great Russian Sumy offensive has not moved forward in more than 3 weeks, the only change being a small Ukrainian advance. The battle line is not changing in a material way. The Ukrainians still control Pokrovsk (pronounced doomed last August) as well as parts of Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and other towns said to be strategic targets.  Bakhmut (from which the Ukrainians withdrew in March 2023), is 11.8 kilometres /7.3 miles from Chasiv Yar despite being a major Russian area of operations for more than two years. Logistics are getting pushed further back from the front line so that attacking forces are going to have to struggle even to reach the line of contact.

The ground advances of Russian forces continue to be painfully small and even seem to be decreasing. A few weeks ago we heard about the great Russian Sumy offensive—well that has not moved forward in more than 3 weeks, the only change being a small Ukrainian advance.

In the larger perspective, the battle line is really not changing in a material way. The Ukrainians still control Pokrovsk (which was pronounced doomed last August) as well as parts of Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and other towns which were said to be strategic targets of the Russians (though really are not strategic).

To put the Russian advances in context, here is the present map around Chasiv Yar (which was supposed to fall to the Russians in May 2024)

You can see how close to Bakhmut (from which the Ukrainians withdrew in March 2023), Chasiv Yar happens to be (11.8 kilometres is 7.3 miles). This has been a major Russian area of operations for more than two years—and this is where we are.

The thing to note is that advances might get even more difficult (I will write a piece on that soon) in the coming months. Logistics are getting pushed further and further back from the front line—so that attacking forces are going to have to struggle even to reach the line of contact.

It points to why the strategic air war is in many ways the dynamic area of the war (and could be decisive). The land war is what it is—and neither side has the ability to drastically change it. If this war is to be won or lost, it will probably be because one side asserts itself in the ranged war. Europe will have to make up for the fact that the US is now serving Russian interests in this area.