A Blog by Jonathan Low

 

Aug 15, 2025

Why Putin Can't Quit Now - Even If He Wanted To, Which Is Doubtful

Putin and Zelensky are both fighting a war of survival: Zelensky to keep his country and culture and his people alive; Putin to keep the most extreme elements of the society he has created from turning on him because they want their rewards. 

In some respects, Putin's situation is the more dire. His army has failed to accomplish even its most limited objectives. Repeatedly. The Russian economy is being kept afloat by financial tricks and by the Chinese and North Koreans who are licking their chops at the riches to be gained from Putin's desperation. If he is forced to agree to a peace that is perceived to be less than his maximalist goals, he will be considered a failure. Even though he is bringing his billionaires to Alaska to appeal to Trump's greed - never a losing proposition - it may not be enough as Trump understands Russia's weakness and wants to be seen as the dominant world leader who brought his mentor to heel. Putin may yet wriggle out of this, but his army is not getting any better and the clock is ticking. JL

Harley Balzer reports in the Kyiv Post:

Putin has staked so much on the war that exiting without something he can call victory is unthinkable. Russia has suffered more than one million casualties, including 200,000 dead or missing. Telling the Russian people that this was for naught (is) impossible. Entire sectors of the Soviet economy have been undermined by Putin’s regime opting to invest in hydrocarbon production and shifting to a military economy. For Ukraine and Europe, deterring Russian aggression is existential. Putin is counting on the American president being consistently transactional (- but Trump phoned Norway's Prime Minister to ask for the Nobel Peace Prize - so Putin may be disappointed.) 

Today’s meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump will illustrate the differences in how all parties involved view Ukraine. Putin has staked so much on the war that exiting without something he can call victory is unthinkable. For Ukraine and Europe, deterring Russian aggression is existential. Putin is counting on the American president being consistently transactional.

Putin remains obsessed with restoring Russia’s empire. Analysts who blame NATO enlargement for Putin’s hostility ignore his repeated statements. While deputy mayor in St. Petersburg, Putin told the Economics Counselor in the US Consulate that his mission was to restore the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. He said the same to a German Consular officer. At the time, only a few Baltic leaders dreamed of expanding NATO.

 

Putin repeated similar statements to CIA Director William Burns on several occasions, and issued threats at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.

 

In Putin’s version of history, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Central Asian nations were never “real” countries prior to their incorporation into the Russian Empire and USSR. They still belong to Russia.

Beyond Putin’s mythology, multiple practical conditions make ending the war in Ukraine challenging.

Russia has suffered more than one million casualties, including perhaps 200,000 dead or missing. Telling the Russian people that this was for naught may be impossible. The impact on the country’s dire demographics increases the likelihood that Russia’s population will be half the current number by 2100.

 

A second obstacle is that shifting from an overwhelmingly military economy to one based on civilian industry will be far more challenging than in the 1990s. Foreign investment and technology assistance will be limited. Entire sectors of the Soviet economy have been undermined by Putin’s regime opting to invest in hydrocarbon production while importing technology. Spending three to five trillion rubles on “import substitution” that mostly involved evading sanctions has done little to increase domestic capacity in high technology.

 

A third constraint echoes what undermined Gorbachev’s perestroika and Gaidar’s economic program. Gorbachev came to power as global oil prices fell to their lowest levels in decades. The Brezhnev model of investing in hydrocarbons while buying technology failed. As Trump promotes “drill baby drill,” new production comes on line, and OPEC+ producers increase output to earn what they can. Meanwhile Chinese EVs and renewables shrink demand for oil and gas, so prices will remain low.

The most neglected and dangerous result of Putin’s war for Russians is the impact on Russian society and the problems the country will face when the war finally ends.

After quashing the Prague Spring in 1968, Soviet rulers were concerned enough about the impact participation in the operation would have on the troops involved that a significant number were not permitted to return home, in some cases for years. The occupation continued into 1991.

A researcher at a regional branch of Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs recently published an article raising concerns about the consequences Russia is experiencing and the greater dangers that are inevitable whenever the war ends.

 

The most intractable issue is the tension between external and domestic security priorities:

“It is possible to state with certainty that the Special Military Operation to some degree has already touched the life of every Russian. Its conduct is having an impact on the criminal situation in the country and will inescapably have an impact on criminality in the future, making it imperative to study questions about the influence of military activity on crime in Russia.”

The author notes that releasing prisoners to fight is not new, comparing the Ukraine war with June 1941. A Soviet Supreme Court decree issued two weeks before Hitler’s invasion permitted releasing criminals convicted of non-violent crimes in return for enlisting. This contrasts with Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin offering pardons to individuals convicted of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, sexual violations and murder. He adds: “The logical consequence of this non-selective approach is a multitude of crimes committed by such individuals upon their return from special military operations.”

 

The data are a state secret, so no one knows how many criminals have been recruited to fight in Ukraine, or how many have been allowed to return home. On Jan. 1, 2022 468,000 Russians were incarcerated. One year later the number was 433,000. The decline is one measure of military recruitment. No data were provided for 2024, but the implication is that the number increased substantially.

The released criminals were more likely to commit war crimes, yet initially they were obligated to serve six months in Ukraine. Regular Russian soldiers served two years or more. Since there were few ways to earn the high salaries paid to soldiers in Russia’s domestic labor market, the number of returnees who resume criminal activities remains high.

Beyond criminal recidivism the list of problems stemming from mobilization includes:

  • A high incidence of war crimes by mobilized convicts and regular troops
  • Manifestations of extremism by returning veterans
  • Increasing levels of Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome
  • High incomes for soldiers, plus familiarity with firearms and explosives, have induced many returning troops to resort to criminal activity.
  • Fraud perpetrated on relatives of those serving who received bonus payments or death benefits
  • Juvenile delinquency, a particular problem in single parent families, which are increasing in number

The article does not mention some pathologies reported elsewhere. Migrant workers from Central Asia have been rounded up and forcibly sent to the front. Citizens of India, Nepal, Bangladesh and other countries have been recruited to work in Russia. Upon arrival their passports are confiscated and they are sent to fight in Ukraine. Russia’s relations with most of these countries are now more difficult.

The list of challenges to Russia’s future continues to grow. Yet America may be throwing Putin a life preserver.

In preparation for Friday’s meeting in Alaska, Russian news sites report that Kirill Dmitriev, who heads the Russian Direct Investment Fund, is organizing a delegation of sanctioned Russian company heads and businessmen to join Putin.

 

The list includes Rostec head Sergey Chemezov, Igor Sechin, head of the Rosneft Oil company, Roman Abramovich, Oleg Deripaska and Leonid Mikhelson. As with Dmitriev’s previous visit, sanctions enforcement will be waived. The clear intention is to offer significant investments in the US in return for a favorable result.

The precise arrangements for the Alaska meeting remain in flux, and much could change. In the Soviet era, Americans never knew who would be in a delegation until they got off the plane.

Moscow rumors suggest that Russia’s billionaires will offer massive investment in Alaska and the Arctic in return for what Putin wants. The danger of transactions trumping security remains high.

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