Why Russia Is Not Winning And Cannot Win In Ukraine On Its Current Trajectory

Pokrovsk was the latest in battlefields where Russia managed to assemble overwhelming force - 150,000 troops, according to reports - and then failed to deliver the expected decisive victory. 

This is most interesting as an emblematic example of the repeated Kremlin attempts to impose a result by force, highly anticipated by many western media, but which ended up thwarted by superior Ukrainian tactical and strategic performance. The consensus reflected in this analysis is that Russia not 'winning' and is not expected to win its war on Ukraine. It will continue to attempt to achieve through machinations with the current US administration that which it has failed to gain in battle, but even that seems far from assured. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

On its current trajectory in November 2025, it is unlikely Russia can achieve a decisive "win" against Ukraine, though it is making tactical gains. Russia is advancing slowly on the ground, prioritizing objectives like Pokrovsk, while Ukraine has improved its defensive capabilities and continues to strike deep into Russian territory, particularly energy infrastructure. Russia's limited territorial gains—averaging about 

$0.7\%$

 of Ukraine in 2025—and Ukraine's ability to inflict damage on Russian infrastructure suggest a war of attrition that Russia is not currently winning.

On its current trajectory in November 2025, it is unlikely Russia can achieve a decisive "win" against Ukraine, though it is making tactical gains

. Russia is advancing slowly on the ground, prioritizing objectives like Pokrovsk, while Ukraine has improved its defensive capabilities and continues to strike deep into Russian territory, particularly energy infrastructure. Russia's limited territorial gains—averaging about

$0.7\%$

of Ukraine in 2025—and Ukraine's ability to inflict damage on Russian infrastructure suggest a war of attrition that Russia is not currently winning, according to a Futura Doctrina analysis. 

Russian progress and challenges 

• Tactical gains: Russia is making incremental advances, such as its recent push towards Pokrovsk, which are costly in terms of time and manpower.
• Manpower and equipment: Russia is attempting to offset personnel shortages with new manpower, but faces significant labor and military personnel shortages.
• Adapting tactics: Russia has improved its tactical and strategic adaptation, learning to better integrate its forces and leverage new tactics, such as deep penetrations.
• Limited gains: Despite its efforts, Russia's territorial gains in 2025 have been minimal, amounting to about
  

  $0.7\%$
  of Ukraine's total area. 

Ukrainian progress and challenges 

• Defensive improvements: Ukraine has enhanced its air defense system to counter Russian strikes, offering lessons for other nations.
Strikes on Russian infrastructure: Ukraine has successfully launched drone and missile attacks against Russian energy and military infrastructure.Longer-range weapons: Ukraine has deployed new, longer-range weapons and has better integrated its strike planning across its military organizations.Overstretched defenses: Russia's ongoing offensive operations are stretching Ukraine's defensive lines, a potential vulnerability.

 War of attrition: The conflict remains a war of attrition, which Russia is not currently winning. Russian advances on the ground in Ukraine this year, while limited compared to the resources expended to secure them, provide an insight into the mindset of the Russian military leadership and importantly, President Putin. This war is much less about territorial gain than it is about political gain. That should not be a surprise. But too much of the reporting on the war is reduced to square kilometres gained or lost, and numbers of drones used in Russia’s nightly, continuous aerial assaults against Ukrainian infrastructure, defence industry and civilian targets.

Throughout the course of this war, I have proposed measures of success and failure to provide more illumination about how Russia, and Ukraine, are going in this war, and to inform debate on its trajectory. These measures are also important because, if used consistently, they can also yield political and military lessons about Russia and Ukraine for western military and civilian analysts of the war.

Over the past year, Russia has built strategic momentum with its ground and aerial assaults on Ukraine. While this has been insufficient to deliver a decisive military victory for Russia, it has underpinned its diplomacy to gain limited support from the Trump administration for forcing a ceasefire on Ukraine that is advantageous to Russia. While Putin’s efforts in this regard have stalled of late, they have not been entirely wasted.

Russia retains has the strategic initiative in this war. And, over the past three years, it has learned to learn better, to adapt systemically and harness its relationships with Iran, China and North Korea to support its war effort. And, as I wrote in a just-published white paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “It is very likely that Russian efforts to “learn how to learn better” in the past three years have achieved critical mass and are now paying dividends at the tactical and strategic levels.”

But what does that really mean for Russia’s prospects in the war? And what is the possibility of President Putin achieving his political and strategic objectives of subjugating Ukraine, keeping Ukraine militarily neutral and ensuring Ukraine is not able to provide a democratic model of governance visible to the repressed Russian people? 

Russia’s Strategic Objectives: No Change

To assess Russia’s 2025 campaigns in Ukraine, it is necessary to explore what Russia set out to achieve.

Putin’s 2025 objectives for his war against Ukraine are hardly a mystery. And they have not changed since February 2025. He aims to do everything possible to ensure that the world understands that Ukraine is not a sovereign nation. Additionally, Putin, wants to reassert what he describes as Russian civilisation in his part of the world. He has also has consistently portrayed Russia as the victim of a NATO plot and Ukrainian “Nazis”. This is a narrative that he continues to employ.

As a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes:

While the war has strayed from the Kremlin’s initial plan, Putin’s core objectives appear unchanged. There is little to no evidence to suggest that the Russian president is prepared to accept the loss of Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence…Strategically, the Kremlin remains determined to subjugate Ukraine, and prevent it from aligning with the West, until it can be reincorporated into Russia’s sphere of influence… Moscow continues to seek “regime change” in Ukraine.

Assessing Progress Towards its Strategic Objectives: Measuring Russia’s 2025 Success

Russia in 2025 sustained its ground campaign along multiple axes of advance. The Main Effort on the ground for Russian forces in Ukraine was their operation to secure the city of Pokrovsk through the execution of a double envelopment. This has been slow going for the Russians, and while they are close to achieving a marry-up of the two wings of this double envelopment, this axis of advance – and other ground operations - has come at the cost of around 350,000 casualties in 2025 (casualty figure from British Intelligence at @DefenceHQ).

Russian average monthly casualties through to end of October 2025. Source: @DefenceHQ

Russia has also prioritised its Lyman Axis of Advance as a supporting effort (SE1), and with its Pokrovsk operation, this is part of a larger Russian campaign to envelop the Donetsk fortress cities. In doing so, Russia aims to make all of the Donbas region untenable for Ukrainian ground forces.

Three other secondary axes of advance have come into play throughout 2025. The first is the Sumy Front (SE2), with Russia seeking to establish a buffer zone along its border and remove Sumy as a foundation for any further Ukrainian operations into Russia.

The next secondary effort (SE3) for Russian ground forces has been their advance into Kharkiv. For some time, the Russians made progress in advancing to the Oskil River. And while they have made some additional territorial gains, this front has slowed over the past month or so.

The other secondary effort (SE4) is in southern Ukraine. While this front has not been as active as the other Russian axes of advance, it has hardly been static. There have been minor gains of territory by both sides, which the maps below show.

Russia is also undertaking a large and expanding aerial assault on Ukraine. The magnitude of strikes has increased since the start of 2025. While most strikes still feature a mix of drones, ballistic and cruise missiles, Shahed drone variants are now the overwhelming majority of weapons used in these strikes. To give a sense of the change, in January 2025, the Russians deployed an average of 83 Shahed drones per day for targets in Ukraine. By the start of November 2025, this had more than doubled to 170 per day. At the same time, Ukraine is shooting down a lower proportion of Shaheds.

Shaheds fired at Ukraine since October 2024. Source: @ShahedTracker

Russia also significantly increased its use of glide bombs, which by September 2025, had reached an average of 175 per day according to Ukrainian intelligence.

Russia therefore is undertaking many military operations against Ukraine and is continuing to expend enormous resources on the war. What is it getting in return for its investments in people, treasure, information and time?