The Ukrainians have stripped the front line of soldiers in many places, and rely on the unmanned forces and very small units to undertake the fighting. In conceptual terms they are trying to limit the number of soldiers they expose to danger while exacting the highest possible toll from the Russians. There are lots of Russian attacks up and down the line all the time, most failing, a few finding cover which leads to the Russians taking a field or a house. There can be no breakthrough in the classic sense because even if the Russians have a success, there is no supplied concentration of forces behind to follow it up. The Grey Zone is 10-15 kilometres wide but soon it will grow to 25 or 50 kilometres wide. Plans have developed to use 10% of the Ukrainian army to create 50% of the casualties for the Russians. They believe they are almost there.
I thought I would follow up the interview that was held with General Havrylov yesterday with a short commentary piece focusing on the issue of Ukraine’s supposed manpower crisis. This idea has been a key part of the analysis for more than two years now, analysis saying Ukraine was on the verge of military failure. I will also include a special section for paying subscribers explaining, as best as I can, how Ukraine was able to successfully counterattack in the last few months north of Pokrovsk and around Kupyansk. Its a fascinating story and I have been publishing overwhelmingly free material, so thought I would provide you something special; a little Christmas present as it were.
By the way, if you have not watched the interview, here it is. I would strongly urge you to do so, as General Havrylov explains clearly and effectively how the fighting has evolved over the last few years and why the battlefield looks as it does now.
How Did We Get Here?
Right off the bat what was interesting was the realization process that the Ukrainian military has had to undergo. As General Havrylov outlines at the start, the Ukrainians began the war with mostly Soviet-designed equipment and expecting to fight a combined arms war. What happened, however, was that technology, particularly the growth of UAVs (drones), started making such a plan impossible.
And it took a while for the Ukrainians to get here. He states that it was really not until 2025 that the Ukrainian military understood many aspects of the new, UAV-defined battlefield. A key moment in this process was the creation of a distinct Ukrainian UAV focussed military command, the Unmanned Systems Force, in 2024. This process was crucial, because until the realization of exactly how the battlefield had changed, Ukrainian casualties remained high. General Havrylov did not say this last statement exactly, but it was implied.
How Have UAVs Changed the Battlefield?
The first change started by the constant surveillance that UAVs could provide. As long as you had enough of them, and cheap First Person View (FPV) UAVs were fine, you could have a very good idea of what was happening on the battlefield. When UAVs were then also built to be offensive weapons (called Kamikaze drones at times) that was extremely important. It meant that not only vehicles, but also individual soldiers were in great peril almost as soon as they were identified.
This compounded so many things. Large logistic dumps had already been pushed back a great deal because of HIMARS, but now even small dumps were incredibly hard to protect, meaning that more and more supplies had to struggle even to reach the area of engagement.
This was when the creation of what Havrylov called the “Grey” Zone (its also been called the Kill Zone) really took off. It was the area between the two armies that was so regularly patrolled by UAVs that staying alive was almost impossible unless you had really good cover. Havrylov discusses the Grey Zone a great deal, saying now it is 10-15 kilometres wide but that the expectation soon is that it will grow to 25 or even 50 kilometres wide.
How Have the Russians Coped With This?
I do not know if you noticed, but the awesomely adaptive Russian military we have been hearing about for the last two years, sent some soldiers into the grey zone on horses the other day (where they were promptly killed).
This is just one example of what the Russians are doing—which is sacrificing their soldiers in many different ways to basically cross the Grey Zone and try to reach cover a little further forward. It can be horses, crawling, motorcycles, taking advantage of bad weather, etc, but the process is the same. Find some way to get some soldiers across the grey zone, even if you lose many more in the process.
Is it adaptation? I suppose of the most brutal and wasteful type. However it explains what we are seeing. Lots of Russian attacks up and down the line all the time, most failing, a few finding cover which leads to the Russians taking a field here or a house there. It also explains why there can be no breakthrough/exploitation in the classic sense (and why the analytical community always screws this up). Even if the Russians have a success and take a field, there is no supplied concentration of forces behind it waiting to follow it up.
How Have the Ukrainians Coped With This?
This was some of the most interesting things in the discussion. The Ukrainians have basically stripped the front line of soldiers in many places, and relied on the unmanned forces and very small units (a soldier or just a handful of soldiers) to try and undertake the fighting. In conceptual terms what they are trying to do is limit the number of soldiers that they expose to danger while exacting the highest possible toll from the Russians. Havrylov said plans have developed to use 10% of the Ukrainian army to create 50% of the casualties for the Russians. He added that they believe that they are almost there.
This means that in 2025 Ukrainian casualties vis a vis the Russians have dropped, which has helped the manpower situation for Ukraine. It jhas obviously taken a while and been a difficult learning curve, but now at least they seem to be able to inflict heavy casualties on the Russians while reducing their own.
What Does Ukraine Need Going Forward
Here Gen Harvrylov was explicit. Ukraine needs highly motivated and trained soldiers, not a mass army of unwilling conscripts. Indeed, identifying and training new UAV pilots is one of the greatest needs. He was clear that in Ukraine, a democratic system which has a vibrant civil society, there was not a desire for a mass conscript force at the front. The Russians can do that and basically take prisoners, etc, as they do not care about their people. However, it would be catastrophic for Ukraine to copy the Russians in this regard.
Indeed, relying on a smaller number of more motivated soldiers is a key part of the Ukrainian victory strategy. Havrylov was clear that he views the Russians as on a losing trajectory if they keep on taking such high casualties while Ukraine can reduce theirs. Ukraine needs to deny Russia the prospect of victory.
And that is a key to the kind of support that Ukraine needs from its partners. Its to fight the war that they find themselves in. The need air defense for protection against Russian ranged attacks, then as much assistance in UAV production and the like, as possible.



















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