Putin Will Never Achieve His Maximalist Ukraine Goals Because Russia Is Too Weak

It is increasingly obvious that Putin will never agree to anything other than his maximalist goals - subjugating Ukraine - because anything less will be regarded as a failure in Russia, probably resulting in his downfall. 

But it is equally obvious that he will never achieve those goals because Russia is too weak. Despite massive, unremitting effort, the Russian military has failed to beat the smaller Ukrainian military on the battlefield, in the skies or on the seas. And despite covert aid from China and North Korea, Russia's economy is deteriorating and its economy's manpower needs are being held back by the demand for evermore cannon fodder being frittered away in eastern and southern Ukraine. All of these constraints combine to limit what Russia can achieve - and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. JL

Espreso Global reports:

The fundamentals are that Putin wants to take over all of Ukraine. He wants to eliminate the military and subjugate Ukraine to Russian rule. He will never succeed in doing this because Russia's economy is deteriorating, it does not have unlimited manpower, financial resources or access to parts and technology. Most of the countries in Europe see the clear connection between their own security and Putin's aggression against Ukraine. Subjugating Ukraine is completely unacceptable to Ukrainians - and to most Europeans and Americans as well. There is a great deal of steadiness and consistency in support for Ukraine. 

American diplomat Kurt Volker, who served as U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO and Special Representative for Ukraine in 2017-2019, shared his views on how Putin is sabotaging peace negotiations, what the best security guarantees are, and elections in Ukraine in an interview with Espreso

A highly significant meeting has taken place: President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with President Donald Trump. Almost immediately, the Russians rolled out their own narrative and began accusing Ukraine of attacking Putin’s residence. Lavrov even claimed that 91 drones were involved. We understand that this is Russian propaganda and an attempt to undermine the negotiation process. Given your extensive experience, I would like to ask — what do you think motivated Russia to do this?

It is entirely predictable. Every time the United States and Ukraine make progress in aligning our positions and presenting Russia with something reasonable as a way to end the war, Putin does something to try to disrupt it. You may remember that before President Trump met with President Zelenskyy in the White House, I believe it was in September or October, Putin called just before the meeting and made a vague promise.

This time they had the meeting in Mar a Lago. Now Putin puts forward this idea of Ukraine attacking one of his houses. It is clear that the whole purpose is to influence President Trump’s reaction and to make him upset with Ukraine. That is the purpose of this narrative. Whether it is true or not is irrelevant. President Zelenskyy has said it is not true.

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Even if it were true, in my view, so what. There have been many attempts on President Zelenskyy’s life. There have been many civilian deaths in Ukraine, many attacks on cities, and absolute destruction across the country. So what if there was an attack on one of Putin’s houses. But this is not the main point.

The main point is that Putin is using a narrative like this to try to influence President Trump and to drive a wedge between the United States and Ukraine as they make progress in negotiations.

Speaking more broadly about the prospects for implementing this so-called peace plan — do you see any realistic chance that something meaningful could happen within the next month or two, or even within three or six months? Putin’s 28 points have effectively evolved into 20 points now being discussed by Donald Trump, President Zelenskyy, and European partners. We still do not fully understand whether any of this is actually feasible in practice, but there is a strong sense that, at this stage, Putin has no interest in any meaningful or results-driven peace negotiations. Do you believe that this negotiation process has any real chance of moving forward in the foreseeable future?

This is a very good question because I think it is important to take a step back and look at the fundamentals. 

"The fundamentals are that Putin wants to take over all of Ukraine. He wants to change the government, eliminate the military, and subjugate Ukraine to Russian rule. That is absolutely clear. He will never succeed in doing this, but these are his goals."

He is never going to renounce those goals, and he is never going to accept a peace agreement that does not enshrine their achievement. I do not believe Putin will ever agree to a genuine peace agreement. The purpose, therefore, is to get the United States, Ukraine, and Europe aligned around what a reasonable peace would look like.

This makes it clear that Putin is the one who is rejecting peace, which you and I already understand, but it is important to demonstrate this in diplomatic terms. In my view, that is the purpose of this 20-point plan: to keep the West united with Ukraine and to highlight Putin’s intransigence.

Then, in terms of what happens next, we have to increase the pressure on Russia so that it wants a ceasefire. It has to want to end the war. Right now, it does not. This means applying pressure on its finances, not only through the oil and gas sanctions already in place, but also through secondary sanctions on those who fail to comply with Western measures, targeting the shadow fleet, pursuing the financial institutions that facilitate payments to Russia, and ensuring a steady and predictable supply of financial and military support to Ukraine for as long as necessary.

Putin must understand that we will remain committed, including by lifting restrictions on the use of weapons supplied to Ukraine. The limitations on long-range use should end. All of these measures are needed to increase pressure on Putin so that he will seek a ceasefire. If we do this, I believe we can reach the point of a ceasefire within a few months. If we do not, it will take longer.

I still believe we will get there, because the fundamentals of Russia’s economy are deteriorating. Russia does not have unlimited financial resources, manpower, or access to parts and technology, and it is facing growing economic difficulties at home.

We can either accelerate this outcome or delay it, but I believe we will eventually reach a point where Russia finally agrees to a ceasefire.

There are two scenarios. The first is the large, global one — the reshaping of spheres of influence in the world. The second may seem more narrow in scale, but it is no less dramatic and no less bloody — Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In Ukraine, we are to a great extent dependent on the goodwill of the United States and European countries. And this applies both to financial support and to military assistance. We are extremely concerned that a decision could be made that would restrict the supply of heavy U.S. weapons to Ukraine. Whether that happens because of U.S. funding or European funding, the reality is that war is not only about heroism and bravery — war is also about resources.

So how do these two scenarios intersect? The global scenario is about Russian–U.S. arrangements — Anchorage is one example, though not the only one. At the same time, the U.S. position is underpinned by American legislation on Ukraine, including sustained support for Ukraine and the continued refusal to recognize Russian-occupied territories as legally occupied.

First of all, I agree. I think there is a surprising acceptance, or at least a surprising tolerance, of this idea of spheres of influence. It is something I thought we had moved beyond after World War II, when we recognized that the fundamental struggle between people seeking freedom and democracy and those living under dictatorship is a global struggle in which all free nations have a stake, and that we should be part of that struggle.

"Returning to the idea of geographic spheres of influence is troubling. It is not only harmful for Ukraine, but for all of Europe."

However, it is not the only framework at play. Most of our European allies, and the countries in Europe that support Ukraine, do see the clear connection between their own security and Putin’s aggression against Ukraine. Because of this, there is a great deal of steadiness and consistency in European support for Ukraine. So the situation is not entirely black and white.

Second, I completely agree that Ukraine depends on a reliable and sustained supply of financial and military support for as long as the war continues. This support is also important as a way to bring the war to an end, because it demonstrates to Putin that Ukraine will continue to receive assistance and that he will never achieve victory. For that reason, it is critical that this support be maintained.

I do not see any real prospect that this support will be cut off. The European member states of the EU and NATO have worked very hard to provide financial assistance to Ukraine, including a new loan that is roughly tied to the value of Russia’s frozen assets in the European Union. The United States has also made it clear that it is prepared to sell weapons and ammunition for Ukraine’s use, with very few restrictions. It is no longer structured as taxpayer-funded assistance from the United States, but it is still being provided and paid for.

There is no indication that President Trump intends to end this support. For these reasons, I believe there is still grounds for a degree of optimism.

Overall, in the current situation Russia reminds me of a wounded bear — still extremely dangerous, despite all the sanctions packages that have been imposed. In my conversation with General Ben Hodges, he gave a very tough assessment of the current negotiating posture of the people authorized by President Trump — in particular Witkoff and Kushner. He said that for people who come from the real-estate business, the main objective is simply to close the deal. And once the deal is done, they can quite easily walk away from the market and from certain commitments — because the deal has already been signed.

At the same time, General Hodges said that in the updated U.S. National Security Strategy, the administration has “shown the Europeans a big middle finger” — and I am quoting him verbatim here. Against that backdrop, the Russians are clearly trying to take advantage of the current situation. In your view, what would Russia realistically be seeking to achieve — beyond continuing the war and maintaining the occupation?

Ben is always very colorful in his language. I think that if there were to be a peace agreement between Russia and the United States imposed on Ukraine in some way, which I do not even believe is possible, then perhaps he would be right about this. But in reality, that is never going to happen. There are several factors that, in my view, point to a far more realistic direction for how this is likely to develop. The first is Russia’s position.

Russia has an absolutist position centered on subjugating Ukraine to Russia as part of a greater Russian empire — with “Tsar Vladimir” at its head, so to speak. This is where Russia wants to go, and it is completely unacceptable to Ukrainians.

It is also completely unacceptable to Europeans and, in fact, to most Americans as well — beyond President Trump and figures such as Witkoff and Kushner, who may simply be interested in achieving any deal at all. In the Senate, in Congress, and among the broader public, such an outcome would be viewed as profoundly unfair and unjust, and it would not be supported. So that kind of result is not going to happen.

"Instead, there are discussions and negotiations around various partial arrangements — security guarantees, for example, but the questions remain: what exactly would they be, and for how long? Would Russia withdraw from any Ukrainian territory? Would Ukraine withdraw from some territory, with some kind of new international protection force established there?"

All of these ideas are elements and concepts within ongoing negotiations that aim to bring the United States, Europe, and Ukraine into alignment around a common position. But there is no real prospect that Russia will agree to any of this. That is why it is important for Ukraine to engage constructively in these discussions about what a reasonable settlement would look like, with a high degree of confidence that Putin will ultimately reject them.

The real issue is what happens on the ground. The real question is whether Ukraine becomes stronger and whether Russia becomes weaker. Can Ukraine’s economic growth, political resilience, and military capability be sustained into the future in a way that deters Russia from attacking again? We need to reach a point where Putin feels that his forces — and his finances — need a break, and that a ceasefire is in his interest.

From there, the task is to continue strengthening Ukraine and building deterrence. That is where the real challenge lies, even as these various negotiations continue in parallel.

Putin is seeking to strike a grand deal with Donald Trump and, in particular, to preserve — or even extend — Russia’s influence over the countries of Central Europe. This brings us back to Putin’s earlier ultimatum that NATO should “pack up and return to the 1997 borders.” These are Putin’s ambitions — essentially, his wishful thinking. But at the same time, in Ukraine we need real, tangible security guarantees. If we look at the practical side of the negotiations, what could those guarantees actually be? The “coalition of the brave” is supporting us, but they still hesitate to send their own troops to Ukraine, even though such a move could significantly strengthen our defense.

The second issue concerns the so-called demilitarized zone. A demilitarized zone would also have to be guaranteed — and very likely guaranteed through some form of military presence. And that brings us back to where our conversation started: to the moment when Putin invented the story about an attack on his residence and began trying to persuade Donald Trump of it, hoping that this narrative would trigger consequences for Ukraine.

The best security guarantee in the world is NATO membership. Putin has never attacked a NATO country, and he clearly believes in the deterrent effect of the Alliance. At the same time, NATO membership is not currently on the table for Ukraine, and it is very important that nothing be done to remove that possibility permanently. The best approach is simply not to discuss it for now and to acknowledge that it is not presently under consideration. Instead, an equivalent form of security guarantee is being discussed.

These would be Article 5–like guarantees, meaning that any renewed attack on Ukraine would be met with a military response from all of the countries participating in that security arrangement, including the United States. That is the framework currently under consideration.

At the meeting in Mar-a-Lago with President Zelenskyy and his delegation, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, the White House Chief of Staff, as well as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were all present. This demonstrates that the key figures in the United States who would be involved in making such a security commitment were fully engaged in the discussion. 

And the discussion, as reported in the press, is that President Trump has proposed a security guarantee lasting 15 years, while President Zelenskyy insists that it should be longer and has suggested 50 years. The final outcome may fall somewhere in between, but this would still represent a serious security guarantee ratified by the U.S. Senate. I believe this would be a positive development and an effective deterrent against future Russian attacks.

If the United States adopts such a guarantee, I think other European allies will follow and commit to joining it. That, in turn, would create space for European NATO allies to eventually deploy forces in Ukraine. They will not do so before a ceasefire, but once a ceasefire is reached, I think such a deterrent presence would become a realistic element of the broader security framework.

As for the idea of a demilitarized zone, I recall that when I served as special representative, our proposal at the time was that Russia withdraw from the Ukrainian territory it occupies, an international force be deployed to provide peace and stability for several months, elections be held, and Ukraine’s international borders be restored.

The current proposal is the opposite: that Ukraine withdraw from its own territory while an international force moves in, creating a demilitarized zone. This is not a good proposal, but it remains a negotiating concept. In any case, Putin will never agree to it. He will never accept the deployment of an international force there, and he will never agree to withdraw any of his troops from anywhere.

For that reason, it works only as a negotiating device, but it is never going to be implemented. If such a zone were ever created, it would likely be policed by an international peacekeeping force. However, I strongly doubt that this will ever happen, because Putin will reject it.

​​On the one hand, Putin would like to use these so-called elections as a tool to weaken and dismantle Ukraine’s legitimate government. On the other hand, he clearly harbors a deep personal animosity toward President Zelenskyy. In your view, is it in any way realistic that elections could be held in open defiance of Ukraine’s current legal framework?

Different countries have taken different approaches to elections during wartime. The United States held elections during World War II, and Britain did as well, and Winston Churchill lost his re-election bid at that time. Germany, however, has a constitutional prohibition on holding elections during a time of war, so different countries handle this issue in different ways.

It is extraordinarily complex to hold a free and fair election under wartime conditions. You need reliable voter rolls. You need access to voting equipment. You need the ability for candidates to campaign freely and fairly. People must be able to move around, soldiers must be able to vote, and displaced persons must be able to vote. All of this makes the process extremely difficult.

"That is why, I believe, the Ukrainian Constitution states that elections cannot be held under conditions of martial law, and any attempt to do so would require constitutional changes."

That being said, I think - A - Ukrainians are deeply committed to democracy, and it is important to demonstrate that commitment. B - There is no doubt that a free election would result in a strongly pro-Ukrainian leadership in Ukraine. And C, it would be another demonstration to the rest of the world that Ukraine is part of the family of democratic nations and is deserving of continued financial and military support against Russian aggression.

So if events develop as some people are proposing, and there is some form of election during martial law, it would be extraordinarily complex — though there are certain benefits to doing so.

As President Zelenskyy has said, one essential condition would be a ceasefire, and he has proposed a minimum 60-day ceasefire in order to create the conditions for people to have access to voting, freedom of movement, opportunities for campaigning, and so on. This would be a very complex process.

I also think that, at this moment, it is somewhat of a distraction to focus on elections rather than on achieving a ceasefire and ending the war. But because Ukraine is a democracy, it remains a legitimate topic of discussion.