Russia's 2025 In Ukraine: A Dismal .08 of 1% Gain While Suffering Massive Losses

In a few weeks, the war will reach its fourth anniversary. By that time in 1945, the Soviet Union had defeated Nazi Germany, a far larger and more dangerous enemy than Ukraine. But in the here and now, Russia - with the maximum effort of a war economy supported by China and North Korea - managed, again, to take less than 1% of Ukrainian land, meaning that Russia's 'gains' remain less than 20% of Ukrainian territory. No major cities or defense lines, including Pokrovsk, changed hands. 

And in the process, Russia lost another 400,000 or 500,000 men - even the Russians probably aren't sure - while Ukraine cleverly employed technology to reduce the risk to its forces, stymied the Russian advance and inflicted more pain on a Kremlin military struggling to keep its numbers up. Putin refuses to negotiate because he knows this record reflects weakness and poor leadership. So expect more of the same this year since he clearly has no other answer. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

2025 was a year that saw the same changes in Ukraine as 2024. Russian territorial gains remained at less than 1 percent for the year - .8 of 1% to be precise - yet their casualties were enormous, so that maintaining present strength seems to be the best the Russians can do. Russian recruitment going forward looks at best to stay flat. And that territory was of no strategic value. Most of it empty fields the Russians seized using troops running forward, or on motorcycles or horses, just to the next tree line and hoping to reach it before being killed. (And) there can be no breakthroughs from these small advances because there are no build-ups behind them: no depots, troop concentrations or, massed vehicles waiting to move forward. Nor will there be any in the foreseeable future.

Welcome to the first weekend update on 2026. It was a year that in terms of the front line saw approximately the same changes as in 2024—and that means minimal. Russian territorial gains in Ukraine remained at less than 1 percent for the year, yet their casualties were enormous, so much so that maintaining present strength seems to be the best the Russians can do. This kind of strategy would, historically, be seen as a strategy of failure. It is doing little in the way of strategic damage to Ukraine, costing a great deal and gaining little territory. Yet the narrative, too much controlled by Washington, is that the Russian strategy is inexorably rolling to victory. That needs a reset.

 

Finally, Trump operated entirely under Russian reflexive control, got embarrassed when it was shown just how devoted he was to Putin, and tried to distract people by throwing a little shade. The key thing was the first story not the second—but people do not always get that. It was a case study of just how many people fail to see what matters.

Now for the update.

The Russian Strategy Would Normally Be Seen As A Failure

At the end of 2025 many different groups, analysts did a calculation of all the territory that Russia had seized during the year. The best, by the way, was from the Institute for the Study of War, which is linked to here. In these different reports there were charts, discussions of trends, etc. However the key one was sometimes overlooked. During all of 2025, and at vast cost, the Russians seized less than 1 percent of Ukrainian territory. The ISW’s calculation was that they took .8 of 1 percent.

And that territory was of no strategic value. Most of it was empty fields that the Russians seized using their infiltration tactics—often troops running forward, or on motorcycles or horses, just to the next tree line or structure and hoping to reach it before being killed. Most of the time they are killed or wounded, but sometimes they reach cover—and huzzah the map line shifts incrementally. No wonder that sensible analysts, such as in this CSIS report, understand that Russian battlefield performance has major weaknesses.

To see just how little of Ukraine was seized in 2025, Here is the ISW map on the Russian gains for the year—the darker pink is what the Russians captured.

It is also worth noting that even after 18 months of great effort, the Russians have still not taken all of Pokrovsk.

Moreover, there can be no breakthroughs or exploitations from these small advances because there can be no build-ups directly behind them. There are no large depots, troop concentrations and, of course, massed groups of vehicles waiting to move forward rapidly into the openings made by the attacking Russian soldiers. And there will not be any in the foreseeable future. More than likely things will get worse as the much discussed “kill zone” widens which means that troops will need to struggle for longer and longer just to reach the front line.

So this less than 1 percent of Ukrainian territory seized represents what the Russians could achieve with maximum effort during 2025. Russian losses seem to be rising faster than ever according to the BBC, and the total for 2025 was probably around 400,000. Earlier leaks from Russian sources showed that between January and August 2025, the Russians lost more than 281,000 soldiers (that is total casualties—not battle deaths). You do the math.

And Russian recruitment going forward looks at best to stay flat. They generated just over 400,000 troops in 2025 and that looks like the maximum they can have in 2026. In other words, this is the best that they can manage—and actually things could easily get worse as the quality of the troops engaged declines (Ukrainians have told me anecdotally that this is the case), training continues to be slipshod, etc.

So Russia takes less than 1 percent of Ukraine at maximum effort and at best that effort will plateau. At the same time, the Ukrainians seem to be reducing their casualties and replacing manpower in the front line with machine (I refer you to my discussion with General Havrylov).

 

This in almost all historical cases would be considered a Russian strategy of failure. They are wasting their military resources for tiny gains, not taking any territory that effects Ukrainian force generation, and will, eventually see a declining military efficiency. As long as Ukraine can keep casualties down, the Russians will find themselves in the mother of all quagmires.

And yet that is not the portrayal. Mostly because of the narrative in Washington, but as much because Europeans are afraid to act on their own, the general portrayal of the war is that Ukraine is the one withering (we have had more than 2 years of manpower crisis stories which hint darkly that Ukraine is about to collapse—and yet amazingly Russian advances have flatlined). Naturally Donald Trump has been key in spreading this idea. He even reinforced it in front of President Zelensky just the other day. Trump claimed that Ukraine needs to take the bad deal he wants to force on them, because Russia is going to seize Ukrainian territory anyway. Here was the exact quote.

“well I think uh the land you're talking about some of that land has been taken some of that land is maybe up for grabs, but it may be taken over the next period of a number of months and you're better off making a deal.”

What Trump will never say is that had the USA not switched sides in 2025, which it did and we need to face facts on that, the Russians would be in truly terrible shape. If the USA and Europe together had jumped in to help Ukraine last year, the trajectories would have gotten worse for Russia—casualties would be higher, territory gained smaller, and almost certainly Ukrainian casualties would be lower. And Russia would not have the friendship and support of the US president protecting it and giving it time to decide how it wants to prosecute the war.

That would have been the best way to end the war.

As it is, Russia’s strategy of failure has been handed a lifeline by Washington (and Beijing), but it could still result in overall failure if Ukraine’s friends step up. Gaining .8 of 1 percent of Ukraine for 400,000 casualties could turn into gaining .5 of 1 percent of Ukraine for 500,000 casualties—and that would represent a death spiral of the Russian army. Russia’s economy is weak, its army would be shrinking, etc.

In the past that is what we would almost expect to see. As Russian vulnerabilities are out in the open, Ukraine’s friends should be helping Ukraine do that. However we are not seeing this. It just proves that states do not always (or even often) do what is in their interest. The Russian strategy for failure is there to be taken advantage of, but too many people seem afraid to do so.