Pace, Effectiveness of Russian Assaults In January Was Half of December's

Analysis of Russian offensive operations in the first month of 2026 reveals that even though the number of assaults did not decrease, their pace and effectiveness in achieving goals was half that of December 2025.

What this suggests is that Russian frontline units are exhausted materially and psychologically, lacking equipment, food, warm clothing and reinforcements, all essential to successful war fighting but evidently beyond the capability of the Kremlin to provide. JL

Denys Popovych reports in New Voice of Ukraine:

The pace of Russian offensive operations in January is actually half of December’s level, even though the number of assaults carried out by the Russian army in January did not decrease. Their activity has not declined, but their offensive capabilities have weakened; they have become twice as ineffective. This indicates that the Russian army is currently exhausted and needs regrouping and reinforcements. 

If their overall rate of advance in January is taken into account, their push toward the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration was more significant than in other directions. However, if the pace of their offensive operations in January is compared with what it was, for example, in December, the tempo is actually half of December’s level

 

In other words, the enemy’s offensive pace has slowed, even though the number of assaults carried out by the Russian army in January did not decrease.

Their activity has not declined, but their offensive capabilities have weakened; they have become twice as ineffective. This indicates that the Russian army is currently exhausted and needs regrouping and reinforcements. If it wants to continue advancing, it will have to consider which resources it would rely on.

That is why, in my view, there is no sense in forecasting when a direct battle for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk might begin — whether in a few months, five months, six months or by the end of the year. To launch offensive operations directly against Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, they would first need to capture Lyman — that is the first hurdle. At this point, they have not even come close to assault operations around Lyman.

Second, they would need to conclude the fighting for the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration. Third, they would need to move toward Kostiantynivka and then take Kostiantynivka, and so on.

They would have to meet a large number of conditions before moving directly to fighting for the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. While this is a theoretical assessment, in practice, anything is possible.