'Horrific' Losses, Ukraine Advances Force Kremlin From Offense To Defense

Ukraine's counteroffensive may have altered the strategic balance for the fighting this year, if not for the entire war. 

Russia has suffered such 'horrific' casualties in attempting to fend off Ukrainian advances, that it has been forced to redeploy its units preparing for a spring offensive and has also been compelled to commit reserves intended for assaults to defensive duties. This has had a destabilizing effect on the Russian military posture in the war this year and has sapped the Kremlin's plan of much of its intended punch before it even began JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

The Russian military now faces competing dilemmas. Ukraine has inflicted 4,840 casualties on the Russians over a three-day period, one of the highest daily casualty rates for the Russians since the start of the invasion in 2022. Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction threaten the rear of Russian 5th Combined Arms Army pushing west from Hulyaipole, compelling them to shift from offensive to defensive posture. Elements of Russia’s operational reserve have been committed to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks. This is a good indicator that Russian forces are burning through reserves earmarked for the spring offensive.

Ukraine’s Southern Operations: Disrupting the Russian Spring Timetable. The most consequential military development of the past few weeks is not what Russia has done. It is what Ukraine has prevented Russia from doing. The Ukrainian counter attacks in the south, initiated in late January, has now liberated more than 400 square kilometres of previously occupied territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, according to General Staff operations chief Major General Oleksandr Komarenko.

Also this week, the Ukrainian commander-in-chief, General Syrsky, described how the tempo of attacks had increased in recent weeks. At the same time, Ukraine has claimed that Russia suffered 4840 casualties over a three-day period. If accurate, this would be one of the highest daily casualty rates for the Russians since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Ukraine’s counterattacks on the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole axes of advance are having cascading effects across the frontline, disrupting Russian preparations for what was intended to be (again) a decisive spring-summer campaign. Russia had hoped that advances toward Hulyaipole would allow it to approach Orikhiv from both east and west simultaneously and therefore bypassing Ukraine’s east-west defensive lines in Zaporizhzhia Oblast without frontal assault. Ukrainian air assault and assault regiment formations have comprehensively disrupted that plan.

The Russian military in Ukraine now faces competing dilemmas. Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction threaten the rear of Russian 5th Combined Arms Army elements pushing west from Hulyaipole, potentially compelling them to shift from offensive to defensive posture. Elements of Russia’s operational reserve have been committed to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks. This is a good indicator that Russian forces are burning through reserves earmarked for spring offensive operations.

The price of this Ukrainian operational success, however, is being paid elsewhere. Ukraine’s ground force resources are not infinite. Meduza’s analysis published on March 19 notes bluntly that the redeployment of Ukrainian units to the south has weakened the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk, allowing Russian forces to launch a new offensive push toward Dobropillia. This is the inherent tension of counteroffensive operations in a resource-constrained environment: you cannot be strong everywhere.

Russian Shaping for its Spring Offensive Operations. On the night of 17 March, Russia appears to have launched the opening salvos of its long-anticipated spring-summer offensive. Euromaidan Press reported that a sudden weather change, which included fog and drizzle across the Dobropillia, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole regions, triggered pre-infiltrated Russian assault groups that had been deployed in forward positions throughout early March. The assumption of the Russian forces was that fog would suppress Ukrainian drones. It did not.

By the end of 17 March, Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces drone units had reportedly killed 292 Russian soldiers and wounded 221 others. Over the following 36 hours, Russian forces suffered an estimated 900 casualties across a 100-kilometre stretch of front without breaking through at any point. The drone operators used ground-based systems that proved capable even in low-visibility conditions. This capability apparently caught Russian planners off guard.

The broader picture of Russian mechanised activity is interesting. An assessment on 20 March by ISW notes that Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanised assaults in multiple sectors such as the Lyman, Kostiantynivka, and Pokrovsk axes of advance. These are probably reconnaissance-in-force missions ahead of larger Russian spring assaults in the area of its main effort.

Source: ISW

The situation around Kostiantynivka is worthy of close attention. Meduza’s analysis describes how Russian forces destroyed a dam near Osykovo on 25 February with a three-tonne guided aerial bomb, flooding a key Ukrainian supply road into the city and forcing Ukrainian units into permanent buildings where they become easier targets. Despite Russian General Staff claims of holding 60 percent of the city, Russian troops remain engaged in urban fighting on its outskirts. Meanwhile, along the Kazennyi Torets valley, a separate Russian grouping has reached the village of Novopavlivka, about 12 kilometres from Druzhkivka, in a push designed to cut off Kostiantynivka from the broader Kramatorsk urban complex.