It's 2 Weeks Into Russia's Spring Offensive - But It's Ukraine Gaining Ground

It is, admittedly, confusing. Theoretically, when you launch an offensive, your troops are the ones who are supposed to gain ground, not your opponents.' But that is not what has happened this year in Ukraine. 

It is the Ukrainians who are gaining territory, not the supposedly attacking Russians. The reasons for this scenario are reported to be significantly strengthened Ukrainian defenses - including an effectively functioning 'drone wall,' decreasingly trained and motivated Russian troops who have now had four years to hear the rumors about what happens to soldiers in the Russian army forced to serve in Ukraine (none of it inspiring) and, that the Ukrainians anticipated where and when the Russian offensive would take place, so acted first and cut it off. As the article below suggests, Ukraine may now actually have the opportunity to start an irreversible decline of the Russian military. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

Starting March 17, in a four day period, the Russians launched more than 600 assaults across the front. (But) Russian gains have been non existent, both during the last two weeks when they have been attacking, and before. Leading into March, the Ukrainians actually recaptured over 100 square miles of land. Many factors seem to be stopping the Russian offensive. The Russians have run into very well prepared Ukrainian defenses: minefields, fortifications, and, an increasingly effective drone wall. Soldiers (even more poorly trained and motivated than in the recent past) make bloody assaults for little/no gain. The tactics are resulting in such high losses and low morale that the casualties the Russians are suffering averaged over 1000 per day. Ukraine has a chance to put the Russian army into a spiral of decline out of which it will be hard to pull out.

Starting around March 17, there was a massive spike in Russian ground attacks in Ukraine. According to General Syrskyi, in a four day period near the start of the offensive, the Russians launched more than 600 different assaults across the front.

And we saw a range of Russian efforts, including in some instances attempts to send groups of armored vehicles into the attack. One Ukrainian corps reported that one series of Russian attacks included as many as 500 vehicles. These kinds of attacks even as late as last year, might have resulted in small but perceptible (if strategically irrelevant) gains for Russian forces.

This year, however, something rather different seems to have happened, at least to begin with. Russian gains have been in practical terms non existent, both during the last two weeks when they have been attacking, and before. Leading into March, as I am sure many of you have heard, the Ukrainians actually recaptured about 100 square miles of land.

When the Russians attacked this year, they have run into very well prepared Ukrainian defenses. There were minefields, fortifications, and, a growing and increasingly effective Ukrainian defensive drone wall.

Off to work at the wall

Most interestingly, is how little land the Russians seem to be able to capture. During the first week of the Russian Spring Offensive (March 17-24) the Ukrainians reportedly regained even more land than the Russians seized. Now it was a tiny amount, about four square miles, but it is notable that it happened with the Russians trying to seize the initiative.

Btw, General Syrksyi claimed that so far, since the Ukrainians started their attacks a few months ago, that they have regained overall 470 square kilometres/181 sqare miles from the Russians. This might be somewhat overstating what has happened, but it is notable that the Ukrainians are claiming it.

Many factors seem to be interacting in the stopping of the Russian offensive. One thing that is getting more and more mention is the decreasing quality of the Russian soldier. This should not be surprising (in some ways I would have expected it to have happened sooner) but the enormous losses that the Russians have suffered, and their insatiable need to send more and more forces into the attack, seems to be reaching a point of diminishing returns.

Vladyslav Urubkov, head of the military ‌department at our good friend Come Back ‌Alive, gave an interview in which he discussed how the “low morale and poor training” of Russian troops was proving to be a major problem with the Russian attacks.

And this makes sense. Even in a closely guarded society such as Russia, news of the massive casualties, miserable conditions in the army, and poor training has been circulating. To actually raise soldiers, the Russians have to rely increasingly on those who have no other option and probably understand that they are signing up for close to certain death or serious disability. And those soldiers the Russians do raise seem barely trained. There were reports in the last week that the amount of training that Russian soldiers are getting before being sent to the front is down to one week.

And after their extremely quick training, these soldiers are sent forward quickly to make bloody assaults for little/no gain. The tactics are resulting in such high losses and low morale that the extremely nationalistic Russian milblogger community is now regularly bemoaning the present state of the Russian army. Btw, the casualty rates the Russians are suffering make this all plausible. While the week before saw two higher days, Russian casualties over the past week averaged comfortably over 1000 per day.

Here is the daily reported breakdown of Russian personnel losses as judged by the Ukrainians:

• March 28: 1,300 casualties

• March 27: 1,000 casualties

• March 26: 1,210 casualties

• March 25: 1,220 casualties

• March 24: 890 casualties

• March 23: 970 casualties

• March 22: 940 casualties

The issue with poorer quality soldiers getting less good training, is that once a ship heads in that direction it is very hard to turn it around. The losses and frustrations on the battlefield will continue to be a disincentive (to put it mildly) dissuading those from serving, and that means those men that somehow end up in the Russian army will be needed at the front sooner and sooner—which means they will get even more degraded training. You can see the vicious cycle developing.

Btw, this was one of the reasons those who for two years were clamoring for Ukraine to draft more unwilling people for the army and send them to the front were being so dangerous. Compelling unmotivated soldiers to serve in such a horrible battle area could make things worse. It is far better to reform the military you have (the Ukrainian military was/is in need of reform) and adjust to the technological realities of the battlefield than generate soldiers through force and send them to the front. Here is a piece from late 2025 which tried to walk readers through just this dilemma. The Russians decided to throw troops at the question, the Ukrainians have tried to adapt.

The Fewer Soldiers On The Front Line The Better Phillips P. OBrien · December 23, 2025 Read full story

So, two weeks or so after the start of the new Russian Spring Offensive, Russian advances are declining compared to 2025 and Russian losses are so high that training and morale are suffering. Ukraine has a chance to put the Russian army into a spiral of decline out of which it will be hard to pull out.