Ukrainian Counterattack Advances Force Russians To Redeploy On Defensive
Ukraine's counterattacks continue with multiple new advances observed just in the past seven days. This has forced the Kremlin to redeploy at least four elite naval infantry (Marine) brigades, as well as other units, from Donetsk to the south in order to try to prevent further Ukrainian incursions. But even these forces new to the embattled southern sector are on the defensive and not able to go on the offensive because of the Ukrainian's success in penetrating Russian positions.
The Russian redeployment provides Ukraine with two benefits: it relieves pressure on its troops in the Pokrovsk sector where they have been holding off the Russians for over a year and it exposes these relatively healthy Kremlin reserves to greater casualties and equipment losses which will render them less able to attack in the future. The Ukrainian strategy at this point in the war reveals an intelligent, adaptive capability to seize opportunities and exploit them, a capacity the Russians have never seemed to grasp in their pursuit of this war. JL
The Institute for the Study of War reports:
Ukraine's counterattacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are forcing Russia to redeploy forces from other fronts and from operational reserves, while Russian forces in the Oleksandrivka direction have switched from offense to active defense. Ukraine's two-drive advance in the south has already forced Russia into a reactive posture on a sector it expected to use as a launchpad for its spring campaign. Each Russian reserve unit pulled south to plug holes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is unavailable for the offensives Russia planned elsewhere. Continued Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction compel Russia to redirect the 5th Combined Arms Army from its push toward Orikhiv to defending against Ukrainian advances.
Ukraine's counterattacks in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are forcing Russia to redeploy forces from other frontline areas and likely from operational reserves, while Russian forces in the Oleksandrivka direction have switched from offense to active defense, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed on 16 March. ISW noted that the continued Ukrainian advances may spoil Russia's planned Spring-Summer 2026 offensive campaign.
Ukraine's two-drive advance in the south — launched on 29 January and building on flank conditions set in late 2025 — has already forced Russia into a reactive posture on a sector it expected to use as a launchpad for its spring campaign. Each Russian reserve unit pulled south to plug holes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a unit unavailable for the offensives Russia planned to open elsewhere once spring ground conditions improve.
New advances since 9 March
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on 16 March that Ukrainian forces made additional tactical penetrations in the past week, including entering Sichneve east of Oleksandrivka, reaching the eastern outskirts of Voskresenska, advancing toward Novoivanivka, entering and advancing into southeastern Novomykolaivka, and seizing Rybne southwest of Novomykolaivka. Mashovets' statements indicate Ukrainian forces likely also liberated Sichneve and Vorone.
Since late January 2026, Ukrainian forces have liberated over 400 km² in the Oleksandrivka and Huliaipole directions in two separate drives, ISW noted.
ISW-assessed control of terrain in eastern Zaporizhzhia Oblast as of 16 March 2026, showing Ukrainian positions northwest of Huliaipole. Map: ISW
Road cut, Russian defense slows
Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces advanced to within two kilometers of the Huliaipole-Velyka Novosilka road from the north, preventing Russian forces from using it for logistics or equipment transport even without crossing it. Russian forces in the Oleksandrivka direction have switched from active offensive operations to active defense to constrain Ukrainian advances — a shift consistent with the reduced tempo of Russian ground operations in the area in recent weeks.
Northwest of Huliaipole, Mashovets reportedUkrainian forces reached the eastern outskirts of Hirke, the western outskirts of Staroukrainka, and that several assault groups entered Sviatopetrivka. Elements of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army fighting northwest and west of Huliaipole have not been able to restore the battlefield situation prior to these counterattacks, Mashovets noted, with Russian advances slowing to less than 1.2-1.5 km per week.
Russia's burning reserves
ISW previously observed indications that Russia redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and 55th Naval Infantry Division from the Dobropillia tactical area to the Huliaipole direction as of late February. Mashovets reported that Russia also redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and 120th Naval Infantry Division to the Oleksandrivka direction — ISW had observed the 120th Division operating near Dobropillia as recently as 11 March.
More significantly, a Russian milblogger claimed on 16 March that drone operators of the 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment are striking Ukrainian forces near Hai southeast of Oleksandrivka. ISW has not observed the 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment operating on the battlefield since August 2025 — suggesting the Russian military command had withdrawn the unit and was holding it in reserve for future offensive operations. Its reappearance indicates Russia may already be pulling operational reserves to defend against Ukraine's advances.
Mashovets also reported that Russia may pull elements of the 69th Separate Cover Brigade and 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade from the operational reserve to defend in the Oleksandrivka direction.
Implications for Russia's spring offensive
ISW said that continued Ukrainian counterattacks will likely force Russia to choose between defending against them and allocating manpower and materiel for offensive operations elsewhere — and may spoil the anticipated Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Continued advances in the Oleksandrivka direction will likely compel Russia's Eastern Grouping of Forces to redirect the 5th Combined Arms Army from its push toward Orikhiv to defending against Ukrainian counterattacks
As a Partner and Co-Founder of Predictiv and PredictivAsia, Jon specializes in management performance and organizational effectiveness for both domestic and international clients. He is an editor and author whose works include Invisible Advantage: How Intangilbles are Driving Business Performance. Learn more...
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