Why the Iran War Is Constraining Russia In Ukraine and Europe

Early analyses of the US and Israeli attacks on Iran purported to show that the primary beneficiary was Russia due increased oil prices and attention deflected from its faltering invasion of Ukraine. 

But that appears to have been short-term thinking. In a geostrategic sense, Russia - already found wanting by its inability to win in Ukraine - has now lost two of its key global allies, Syria and Venezuela. With Iran now under attack and military capabilities degraded, Russia's incapacity to do more than provide intelligence has undermined its standing as a serious alternative to western power. It also weakens the potential threat the Kremlin has attempted to create to Europe because with US aggression and European steadfast, defiant support for Ukraine, Putin's bluff has been called. JL 

Suzanne Loftus reports in The National Interest:

Analysts argue that rising oil prices and US attention to the Middle East gives Russia an advantage against Ukraine. While it may prove true in the short term, this overlooks a strategic consequence of the US’ employing coercive diplomacy and military force to reshape power balances. Degrading Iran’s military capabilities and weakening the regime, contributes to a weakening of the geostrategic ecosystem that helped Russia withstand Western pressure since its invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin frames its war in Ukraine as part of a struggle against Western domination in which Russia has positioned itself as an alternative to Western powers. (But) Russia's limited support for Iran is overshadowed by Ukraine’s military and technical aid. Moscow's inability to do more for Iran demonstrates its limits. Moscow may be operating in an environment of increased constraints on its behavior, discouraged from attempting to test NATO

On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale bombing campaign against Iran, killing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and dozens of the country’s senior leaders within the first day. According to the Trump administration, the objective of this campaign is to degrade Iran’s ability to wage war. This includes degrading its nuclear enrichment program, its missile development systems and capabilities, and its ability to arm proxy forces throughout the Middle East. Iran responded by attacking US bases across the region as well as neighboring countries.

Many commentators and analysts argue that rising oil prices and renewed American attention to the Middle East could give Russia an advantage in its war against Ukraine. While this may prove true in the short term, this view overlooks a potential strategic consequence of the United States’ renewed willingness to employ coercive diplomacy and targeted military force to reshape regional power balances. If the United States succeeds in significantly degrading Iran’s military capabilities and weakening the regime, it could contribute to a gradual weakening of the geostrategic ecosystem that has helped Russia withstand Western pressure since its invasion of Ukraine. 

Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort depends not only on battlefield dynamics but also on a network of political partnerships, economic ties, and military cooperation. This helps Moscow evade Western sanctions, mitigate diplomatic pressure, and reinforce the narrative of an emerging multipolar world order.

The strikes against Iran did not occur in isolation. As recently demonstrated in Venezuela with the toppling of President Nicolas Maduro and the re-establishment of diplomatic ties with the United States, members of this broader geostrategic ecosystem may be weakening or reorienting themselves. Assuming the West continues to support Ukraine and maintain pressure on Moscow, the gradual erosion of Russia’s coalition partners could reshape the strategic environment surrounding the war and influence its long-term trajectory. 

Russia’s International Support Network

The Kremlin frames its war in Ukraine as part of a larger struggle against Western domination. This narrative has gained traction in the “Global South,” particularly among victims of Western colonialism or interventions. Russia’s continued ability to withstand Western pressure lends credence to the idea of an emerging multipolar world order where the West no longer holds as much leverage to shape global affairs. 

This idea is celebrated by much of the non-Western world and actively supported by a coalition of anti-Western states that some have categorized as the “CRINK” grouping of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Together, the “CRINK” provides an axis upon which to balance Western power, helping one another evade Western sanctions and resist Western military and normative domination. 

In Russia’s war against Ukraine, North Korea has supplied Moscow with ammunition and troops, and Iran has supplied it with Shahed drones and military technology. China has bought vast amounts of Russian oil and provided the Kremlin with dual-use technology. These countries, along with many others in the Global South, have served as alternative trading partners for Russia, helping the Kremlin evade sanctions. 

While it may not be their explicit goal to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, the “CRINK” grouping is interested in helping Russia sustain itself against Western pressure to weaken the West’s relative power. Consequently, Russia has been able to avoid complete diplomatic and economic isolation, leaving the Kremlin better equipped to sustain its war in Ukraine.  

With respect to the Middle East, Russia has positioned itself as an alternative interlocutor to Western powers. It has maintained a careful balancing act in its relationships with Iran and the Gulf monarchies. This approach has enabled Russia to expand its influence in the region, leading to greater trade and cooperation while reinforcing the narrative of an emerging multipolar order in which Western primacy is gradually fading. 

The Ukraine War Comes to the Persian Gulf 

Potential consequences of the war in Iran include the weakening of Russia’s diplomatic balance in the Middle East and its influence over a key partner. Russia’s reported intelligence support for Tehran, while Iranian strikes directly impact Gulf states, risks undermining the perception of Russia’s neutrality in the region. At the same time, Moscow’s inability to provide more direct support to Iran demonstrates the limits of its regional leverage.

Meanwhile, a diplomatic opportunity for Ukraine has presented itself. Kyiv is now a leading expert at countering Iranian-designed Shahed drones due to Russia’s extensive use of them on the battlefield. Ukraine is now lending support to the United States and Gulf countries facing similar threats, which may strengthen its diplomatic position in the region and possibly secure additional military support. 

The overt security threat facing Gulf countries is likely to push them closer to the United States and Israel. In this context, Russia’s recent diplomatic overtures to mediate regional tensions while simultaneously supporting Iran with intelligence are overshadowed by Ukraine’s provision of military and technical support.  

The Iran War and US Grand Strategy

The war in Iran appears to be part of a broader foreign policy shift in the United States centered around coercive diplomacy, economic pressure, and targeted military operations to shape the international environment in a traditional great power competition. Rather than focusing on democracy promotion or nation-building initiatives that characterized much of the post-Cold War era, this administration appears to be applying sustained pressure on adversarial regimes to coerce them into cooperating with Washington.

The larger goal is to reshape the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and the Middle East in favor of the United States and its allies, enabling Washington to focus more resources on the Indo-Pacific, where the United States faces its most significant long-term challenger.

With respect to the war in Iran, successful regime change would be a very complex and uncertain undertaking. Nevertheless, the United States and Israel may succeed in weakening Iran’s ability to wage war and weaken the regime’s overall military reach, at least for the foreseeable future. Elsewhere, renewed American diplomatic engagement with Venezuela after the removal of Nicolas Maduro from power affects the orientation of that country, a formerly important partner for Russia in the western hemisphere.

The Trump administration claims it has its eyes on Cuba next, which has been facing near economic collapse as its main source of economic support in Venezuela has been cut off. Taken together, the weakening or re-orientation of these nation-states could represent a gradual fragmentation of the loose coalition of countries that support Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. 

This policy isn’t new. Throughout the Cold War, the United States also sought to shape the global balance of power through influencing the alignment of other states, at times using explicitly coercive measures. Even if the main aim of current US interventions is not explicitly stated in this way, such actions can produce broader strategic consequences much like they did in the past.

How US Resolve in Iran Changes Russia’s Ukraine Calculus

The war in Iran and the removal of Nicolas Maduro from power in Venezuela are moves that may change the Kremlin’s perception of American resolve. Demonstrations of US willingness to employ decisive political and military measures against regimes aligned with Russia could alter the Kremlin’s risk calculus, potentially reducing its willingness to escalate in Ukraine or beyond. 

At the same time, these developments may confirm Moscow’s long-standing fear that the United States ultimately seeks regime change in states that challenge its interests and may therefore become increasingly skeptical of current diplomatic efforts to end the Ukraine War. 

While the Kremlin may conclude that its best path forward is to persist with its military campaign, current dynamics suggest Moscow may be operating in an environment of increased constraints on its behavior. With a heightened perception of US resolve, Russia may be discouraged from attempting to test NATO’s limits or from intensifying its nuclear signaling. If the United States and its Western partners sustain current levels of support for Ukraine, these shifts could gradually shape the long-term trajectory of the war. 

Russia’s ability to sustain its war in Ukraine depends not only on battlefield dynamics but also on the strategic ecosystem that helps it circumvent Western sanctions and evade diplomatic isolation. This coalition helps shape the narrative that the West is no longer dominant in an emerging multipolar world order. If this coalition weakens or realigns because of the use of American hard power, Russia’s strategic environment shifts to its disadvantage.  

With a renewed willingness to use coercive tactics in today’s great-power competition, the United States can begin to reshape the broader geopolitical landscape by weakening adversarial coalitions. Assuming the West sustains current levels of support for Ukraine and pressure on Russia, these geostrategic shifts could impact Russia’s prospects in the war.